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	 1. Developing	science-based	food	safety	regulations	is	challenging	when	the	concept	of	‘science’	is	disputed.		(this	thesis)		2. Domestic	regulatory	standards	are	more	barriers	than	catalysts.		(this	thesis)		3. Mandatory	labelling	of	GM	foods	increases	the	stigma	that	they	are	unsafe.		4. The	fact	that	everyone	thinks	they	are	a	food	safety	expert	leads	to	more	food	poisoning	and	unjustified	shaming.			5. The	United	States	is	a	failed	democracy.		6. If	Wageningen	University	prides	itself	on	being	sustainable	it	should	not	dispense	disposable	plastic	cups	at	coffee	machines.											Propositions	belonging	to	the	thesis,	entitled	Sword	or	shield?	The	impact	of	WTO	law	on	the	extraterritorial	effect	of	sanitary	and	phytosanitary	measures	Dominique	Sinopoli	Wageningen,	19	June	2018	
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 Introduction  Domestic regulatory standards may unfold effects beyond a given country’s jurisdiction. Legal scholars increasingly study this mechanism as the extraterritorial effect of domestic regulatory standards on trading partners. It has most frequently been observed with the exportation of European Union (EU) rules to other countries, in particular across the Atlantic to the United States (US). Most of this scholarship has focused on the adoption of the typically more stringent EU laws as an inevitable consequence of accessing the EU market, resulting in a ‘trading up’ of regulatory standards.1 More recently scholars have also examined this phenomenon from the US perspective, looking into the routes EU law uses to travel into the US2; and studied methodologically exactly what, how and why is being transferred.3  This ‘extraterritorial effect’ does not happen in a void of law, but is subject to the rules of international trade. The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the most important body governing international trade and hence has great potential to affect the extraterritorial effect phenomenon. The WTO dispute settlement system serves as a venue for 
challenging other countries’ trade rules. If the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) declares a measure as incompliant with WTO law, the country imposing it is expected to comply with the ruling.4 However, scholars have argued that, more often than not, WTO rules 
‘provide little protection’5 against the extraterritorial effect of measures. One of the main reasons it has arguably failed to constrain extraterritoriality is through the non-discrimination principle.6 In situations in which foreign companies are subject to the same rules as EU companies, it has been argued that ‘(i)f the EU regulations have no disparate impact on foreign producers, allegations of protectionism are difficult to                                                         1 See for example Gregory Shaffer (1999), The Power of EU Collective Action: The Impact of EU Data Privacy Regulation on US Business Practice. European Law Journal 5(4): 419-437; Gregory Shaffer (2000), Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and International Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards. 
Yale Journal of International Law 25(1): 1-88; David A. Wirth (2007), The EU’s New Impact on U.S. Environmental Regulation. Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 31(2): 91-109; Anu Bradford (2012), The Brussels Effect. Northwestern University Law Review 107(1): 1-68. 2 Joanne Scott (2009), From Brussels with Love: The Transatlantic Travels of European Law and the Chemistry of Regulatory Attraction. American Journal of Comparative Law 57(4): 897-942. 3 Elaine Fahey (2017), The Global Reach of EU Law. Routledge. 4 Bradford, above n. 1. 5 Gregory Shaffer (2000), Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and International Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards. Yale Journal of International Law 25(1): 1-88, p. 46. 6 Bradford, above n. 1, p. 56; Gregory Shaffer (1999), The Power of EU Collective Action: The Impact of EU Data Privacy Regulation on US Business Practice. European Law Journal 5(4): 419-437, p. 426.  
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maintain. The WTO can do little to restrain such regulations that are costly yet not 
protectionist in their object or effect.’7 Similarly, since the EU has a ‘legitimate public 
policy objective’8 as a basis for its measures, the WTO can only provide a ‘limited check’9 on the extraterritorial reach of the EU’s measures’. Additionally, scholars have observed that WTO rules may even serve as a ‘shield’ against retaliation.10  If a responding country does not comply with the dispute settlement ruling, retaliation is often not an effective solution (particularly for smaller trading partners) and responding to extraterritorial measures with unilateral trade sanctions may be in violation of WTO law. The WTO does not only not limit the extraterritorial effect of measures, but it ‘may even help to 
facilitate it’11 and ‘contribute to a trading up’12 of laws.   This dissertation argues that existing scholarship offers a limited perspective on the use 
of WTO rules as a ‘sword’ or shield’ to constrain or facilitate the extraterritorial effect of measures. The conceptualizations described above are often based on simplified notions of WTO rules without addressing their complexities. This is perhaps due to the fact that the previous research has been mostly conducted from the perspective of the EU13, with WTO law approached in a more abstract way. For example, the claims regarding non-discrimination look only at the surface of the issue and do not consider that measures may violate WTO rules for reasons other than discrimination. This limited approach to WTO law may result in a misrepresentation of how domestic measures may be regulated.   This dissertation looks into the extraterritorial effect of domestic regulatory measures from a WTO law perspective and pays particular attention to the technicalities of WTO rules. Such a detailed approach allows for an extensive examination of the application of 
WTO rules as a ‘sword’ or ‘shield’, looking beyond dispute settlement, retaliation and non-discrimination in general, and focusing on specific provisions and applications of 
                                                        7 Bradford, above n. 1, p. 55-56.  8 Shaffer, above n. 5, p. 54. 9 Ibid., p. 54.  10 Shaffer, above n. 6, p. 419; Gregory Shaffer (2010), Risk Science, and Law in the WTO: The Centrality of Institutional Choice. Proceedings of the 104th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law. 11 Bradford, above n. 1. 12 Shaffer, above n. 5, p. 55.  13 Dominique Sinopoli & Kai Purnhagen (2016), Reversed Harmonization or Horizontalization of EU Standards?: Does WTO Law Facilitate or Constrain the Brussels Effect? Wisconsin Journal of International Law 34(1): 92-119, p. 95. 
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WTO law. The focus is not only on the technicalities, but also specifically on the understudied area of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures.   
An elaboration of the ‘extraterritorial effect’ phenomenon is presented in Section 1.2, including an overview of the various terms used and a discussion of why such measures may be enacted. This is followed by background information on the SPS Agreement in Section 1.3.  Sections 1.4-1.6 cover the research questions, methodology and an overview of the entire dissertation.   
 Extraterritorial effect of measures  The extraterritorial effect of measures is not a new concept; it has been discussed in the literature for decades. Paradoxically, trade liberalization has been argued both to trigger 
a ‘race to the bottom’14 or a ‘race to the top’ 15 of standards.  Whether it is one or the other depends largely on the specific case study and often simply the opinion of the scholar. While the downward or upward effect of trade liberalization may be open for discussion, both sides agree that there is a flow of standards across borders. As 
observed by Vogel (1995): ‘Trade and agreements […]affect not only the flow of goods among nations, but also the movement of regulations across national boundaries. 
Nations are thus increasingly importing and exporting standards as well as goods.’16 He found that in the case of environmental product standards there was a ratcheting upward of regulations.17 He termed this phenomenon the ‘California Effect’, and linked it 
to a ‘trading up’ effect, specifically in the case of stricter standards providing a competitive advantage.18  
Since Vogel introduced the notions of ‘trading up’ and the ‘California Effect’, the power to regulate global markets has been referred to by various terms, such as ‘extra-                                                        14 William L. Cary (1974), Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware. Yale Law Journal 83(4): 663-705; Alan Tonelson (2002), The Race to the Bottom: Why a Worldwide Worker Surplus and Uncontrolled 
Free Trade are Sinking American Living Standards. Basic Books; Bruce Silverglade (2000), The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: Weakening Food Safety Regulations to Facilitate Trade? Food and 
Drug Law Journal 55: 517-524. 15 David Vogel (1995), Trading Up: Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a Global Economy. Harvard University Press; David Vogel & Robert A. Kagan (2004), Dynamics of Regulatory Change: How Globalization 
Affects National Regulatory Policies. University of California Press, p. 3; Bradford, above n. 4. 16 Vogel, above n. 15, p. 2. 17 Ibid., p. 259-269. 18 Ibid., p. 6.  
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jurisdictional impact’19, ‘back impact’20, ‘upward harmonization’21, ‘law’s migration’22, 
‘regulatory turbulence’23, ‘unilateral regulatory globalization’24, the ‘Brussels Effect’25, 
‘territorial extension’26 and ‘rule-transfer’27. Many of these terms are related, and in 
some cases build upon each other. Shaffer (1999) and Wirth (2007) described ‘extra-
jurisdictional impact’ and ‘back impact’, respectively, more generally as the impact of EU regulatory policy on other countries, demonstrated with the example of the US. Wirth 
also described what he referred to as ‘upward harmonization’, which is when ‘higher 
standards buoy up those of others, creating…momentum in the direction of greater 
rigor’ (essentially Vogel’s concept of ‘trading up’). He added ‘This kind of upward harmonization can occur when a jurisdiction with high standards and that commands a very large market makes a unilateral regulatory decision, even one that ostensibly 
applies only internally. If that jurisdiction’s market share is sufficiently large, regulatory requirements can affect an even larger area, including those under the control of other 
sovereign authorities.’28 Scott (2009) described ‘law’s migration’ as the impact that 
foreign law can have in other countries, by ‘serving as both a catalyst and a resource for 
regulatory reform’. Scott found that the flow of laws was not entirely one way, however, and that reciprocal learning could occur.29 Sachs (2009) described ‘regulatory 
turbulence’ as ‘an unintended byproduct of one jurisdiction’s regulatory decisions’, 
which ‘can trigger unexpected economic, political, and cultural ripple effects in numerous jurisdictions—effects that may or may not be reflected, ultimately, in national 
legislation.’30  
Bradford’s (2012) description of ‘unilateral regulatory globalization’ builds upon these 
concepts, which she defined as when ‘a single state is able to externalize its laws and regulations outside its borders through market mechanisms, resulting in the                                                         19 Shaffer, above n. 6. 20 Wirth, above n. 1. 21 Ibid. 22 Scott, above n. 2.  23 Sachs, above n. 30. 24 Bradford, above n. 1. 25 Ibid. 26 Joanne Scott (2014), Extraterritoriality and Territorial Extension in EU Law. American Journal of Comparative 
Law 62(1): 87–126. 27 Fahey, above n. 3. 28 Wirth, above n. 1, p. 96. 29 Scott, above n. 2. 30 Noah M. Sachs (2009). Jumping the Pond: Transnational Law and the Future of Chemical Regulation. 
Vanderbilt Law Review 62: 1817-1869, p. 1844-1845. 
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globalization of standards…Unilateral regulatory globalization is a development where a law of one jurisdiction migrates into another in the absence of the former actively 
imposing it or the latter willingly adopting it.’31 A specific application of unilateral 
regulatory globalization is described colloquially as the ‘Brussels Effect’: ‘Europe’s 
unilateral power to regulate global markets’.32 Bradford described how EU regulations impact standards around the world through the process of unilateral regulatory globalization.33 Market forces are strong enough to create involuntary incentives for businesses to adjust to stricter standards. Even though exporting businesses would prefer other standards, they reluctantly adopt the strict standards of importing countries due to the opportunity costs of not doing so.34 Foreign companies must typically meet importing country requirements in order to gain market access. It is often more cost effective for them to adopt one standard instead of frequently adjusting production to meet various standards, and they therefore apply the importing country standard to all its products, whether they are exported to this one country or elsewhere in the world.35 Similarly to the Brussels Effect, ‘territorial extension’ is described by 
Scott (2004) as the practice of enabling the EU ‘to govern activities that are not centered upon the territory of the EU and to shape the focus and content of third country and 
international law.’36 It is used ‘to shape the organization, operation and governance of 
firms, including foreign firms wishing to provide services within the EU’.37 Fahey (2017) 
described ‘rule-transfer’ as ‘a means or process by which EU legal rules are adopted in 
third country legal orders’38 and showed how EU rules move and are adopted abroad.39                                                          31 Bradford, above n. 1, p. 4. 32 Ibid., p. 3. 33 Ibid., p. 3. 34 Ibid., p. 9. 35 Ibid., p. 6. 36 Scott, above n. 26, p. 89. 37 Ibid., p. 107. 38 Fahey, above n. 3. 39 The term ‘extraterritorial effect’ was selected in this dissertation as an umbrella term to capture the terms described above, i.e. generally when a stringent measure of an economically strong country migrates to another country on the back of traded goods. In Chapter 3, the term ‘unilateral regulatory globalization’ was used, but 
the meaning is the same and it is interchangeable with ‘extraterritorial effect’.  In Chapter 4, the term ‘Brussels 
Effect’ was used because the criteria applied were directly from Anu Bradford’s piece titled ‘The Brussels Effect’ (2012).  It is worth noting that Joanne Scott makes a distinction between territorial extension and enacting 
extraterritorial legislation. She wrote: ‘a measure will be regarded as extraterritorial when it imposes obligations on persons who do not enjoy a relevant territorial connection with the regulating state. By contrast, a measure will be regarded as giving rise to territorial extension when its application depends upon the existence of a relevant territorial connection, but where the relevant regulatory determination will be shaped as 
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Bradford and Scott observed that the exportation of EU standards was mainly 
unintentional. Bradford found that ‘The EU’s external regulatory agenda has thus emerged largely as an inadvertent by-product of that internal goal [of creating an 
internal market] rather than as a result of some conscious effort to engage in “regulatory 
imperialism.”’40 Scott also wrote that ‘it is inaccurate to say that the EU thereby seeks to export its own norms. EU legislation which engages in territorial extension is generally characterized by an international orientation revealing the EU to be engaged in action-forcing contingent unilateralism rather than the exportation of norms.’41 Countries enact stringent measures to protect their own consumers—and perhaps even their own producers and economics through protectionist measures—but the migration of these regulations to other countries is regarded as essentially a side effect of the stringent standards. It is questionable, however, whether intent matters. Even if the EU and other dominant countries do not intend to export their rules, they may in fact have exactly this effect.42    
 Food and agriculture sectors under WTO law: The SPS 
Agreement   The extraterritorial effect of measures has been demonstrated in the context of a variety of areas: laws of climate change43; data privacy44; chemicals, specifically on Registration, Evaluation, and Authorization of Chemicals (REACH)45; GMOs46; antitrust47; 
                                                                                                                                                                             
a matter of law, by conduct or circumstances abroad.’ Her use of the term ‘territorial extension’ is more 
consistent with ‘extraterritorial effect’ used in this dissertation, even though what she considers to be 
‘extraterritorial legislation’ is something different. Scott argues that the EU rarely enacts extraterritorial 
legislation but frequently employs territorial extension ‘to influence conduct that takes place outside the EU.’ Joanne Scott (2014), The New EU ‘Extraterritoriality’. Common Market Law Review 51(5): 1343-1380, p. 1343-1344. 40 Bradford, above n. 1. 41 Scott, above n. 26, p. 87. 42 Ibid., p. 107-108. 43 Joanne Scott & Lavanya Rajamani (2012), EU Climate Change Unilateralism. European Journal of International 
Law 23(2): 469-494, p. 470; Scott, above n. 26. 44 Shaffer, above n. 5, p. 46; Shaffer, above n. 6, p. 419; Bradford, above n. 1.  45 Diana Bowman & Geert van Calster (2007), Reflecting on REACH: Global Implications of the European Union’s Chemicals Regulation. Nanotechnology Law & Business 4(3): 375-384; Scott, above n. 2.; Wirth, above n. 1; Sachs, above n. 30; Bradford, above n. 1. 46 Alasdair R. Young (2003), Political Transfer and ‘Trading Up’? Transatlantic Trade in Genetically Modified Food and U.S. Politics. World Politics 55(4): 457-484; Bradford, above n. 4; Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer 
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environment48; maritime transport49; air transport50 and financial services51. Besides the research in the area of GMO regulation, however, there has been no other work done on the extraterritorial effect in the food and agricultural sectors.   With the emergence of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the resulting reduction in tariffs, non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade have become even more prevalent. SPS standards in particular are presently considered to be the biggest impediment to trade.52 Since the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO), over 50053 disputes have been formally raised, of which 47 have cited the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) in their request for consultations. 54   The SPS Agreement55 entered into force on 1 January 1995, the same date that the WTO 
was established. It ‘applies to all sanitary and phytosanitary measures which may, 
directly or indirectly, affect international trade’ (Article 1.1). Sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS measures) are defined as those that intend to protect human, animal or plant life or health (Annex A). SPS measures can take the form of e.g. maximum allowable levels of pesticide residues, product inspections, requirement to use only certain additives in food, requirement for products to come from disease-free areas, import bans, quarantine requirements and labeling requirements.   The SPS Agreement states that Members have the right to take SPS measures (Article 2.1), but only under certain conditions: they must be ‘applied only to the extent 
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health…based on scientific                                                                                                                                                                              (2009), When Cooperation Fails – The International Law and Politics of Genetically Modified Foods. Oxford University Press.  47 Florian Wagner-von Papp (2012), Competition Law, Extraterritoriality and Bilateral Agreements. In Ariel Ezrachi (Ed.), Research Handbook on International Competition Law. Edward Elgar Publishing; Bradford, above n. 1. 48 Ibid.; Scott, above n. 26. 49 Scott, above n. 26. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid. 52 European Commission (2013), European Union and United States to Launch Negotiations for a Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=869. 53 WTO, Chronological List of Disputes. Accessed 21 February 2018, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm 54 Ibid.  55 WTO, Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement).   
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principles…and not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence’ (Article 2.2). Countries are encouraged to base their measures on international standards, guidelines and recommendations, where they exist, in order to achieve harmonization (Article 3.1). The SPS Agreement specifically endorses the standards of the Codex Alimentarius Commission for food safety, of the International Office of Epizootics (OIE) for animal health and zoonoses, and of the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) for plant health (Annex A(3)). Members are permitted to deviate from international standards and introduce SPS measures that are stricter than those of the international organization if they can provide scientific evidence demonstrating that they are necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health (Article 3.3). If SPS measures are based on the standards, guidelines or recommendations established by one of the three endorsed organizations, then they are presumed to be consistent with WTO law56 and have ‘greater immunity.’57 Other key provisions include that SPS measures must be based on a risk assessment (Article 5.1) and must not be more trade-restrictive than required to achieve the appropriate level of protection (ALOP) (Article 5.6).   Governments enact SPS measures to ensure both domestically produced and imported food products are of a sufficiently high standard – not only for the protection of human life and health, but also for that of animals and plants. They primarily aim to minimize the chance that humans consume foods containing harmful pathogens, contaminants or ingredients that can cause illness or death; and that pathogens in food products transfer to and subsequently infect other animals or plants. Such public regulatory standards address important health and safety concerns. From a free trade perspective, however, they also constitute trade barriers.58 This is largely due to the fact that what different 
countries consider to be of a ‘sufficiently high standard’ varies around the world due to differences in dietary preferences, perceptions of risk, climate, technology, infrastructure and incidence of pests and diseases.59                                                          56 SPS Agreement, Annex A 3(a). 57 Jeffery Atik (1997), Science and International Regulatory Convergence. Northwestern Journal of International 
Law and Business 17(1): 736-758; p. 744. 58 Spencer Henson & Rupert Loader (2001), Barriers to Agricultural Exports from Developing Countries: The Role of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Requirements. World Development 29(1): 85-102, p 85; Steven Jaffee & Spencer Henson (2004), Standards and Agro-Food Exports from Developing Countries: Rebalancing the Debate. 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3348, p. 1. 59 Jaffee & Henson, above 58, p. 1-2.; Emily Reid (2012), Risk Assessment, Science and Deliberation: Managing Regulatory Diversity Under the SPS Agreement? European Journal of Risk Regulation 3(4): 535-544; Michael Ming Du (2010), Autonomy in Setting Appropriate Level of Protection Under the WTO Law: Rhetoric or Reality? 
Journal of International Economic Law 13(4): 1077–1102; Dasep Wahidin & Kai P. Purnhagen (2017), 
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Although often times SPS measures are necessary for legitimate health concerns, they may be hidden protectionist measures. Protectionist measures are those that protect domestic industries from foreign competition; types of protectionist measures may include tariffs, import quotas and NTBs. This research looks beyond the traditional 
definition of protectionist measures to include also those domestic standards that 
dominate other markets through an extraterritorial effect. SPS measures are sometimes used in a protectionist way with regards to their domestic standards, which may then influence standard-setting in less strong countries.   
Ultimately, the SPS Agreement searches for ‘the right balance’60 between Members’ rights to take domestic measures for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health and the free trade paradigm that characterizes the WTO. It aims to allow governments to provide the level of protection they deem appropriate, while at the same time ensure that SPS measures are based on science and are not misused for 
protectionist purposes, by providing ‘scientific’ justifications for import bans or unnecessarily strict measures.61 It can be particularly challenging, however, to distinguish between measures that have a legitimate justification and those that do not.62 This is largely due to the fact that ‘in most circumstances where protectionism is alleged, there are at least partially legitimate food safety or agricultural health issues involved. In other cases, trading partners have differing perspectives on the current 
state of scientific knowledge and/or the need to make allowance for uncertainty.’63 It is for this reason that the SPS Agreement promotes the use of science and risk assessment,64 since they can provide impartial standards by which to evaluate the 
                                                                                                                                                                             Determining a Science-Based Food Safety Objective/Appropriate Level of Protection for Application in Developing Countries. European Journal of Risk Regulation 8(2): 403-413. 60 Gabrielle Marceau & Joel P. Trachtman (2014), A Map of the World Trade Organization Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods: The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Journal of World Trade 48(2): 351-432. 61 Jaffee & Henson, above n. 58, p. 2-3; Ming Du, above n. 59; Wahidin & Purnhagen, above n. 59. 62 Simonetta Zarrilli (2000), WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: Issues for Developing 
Countries. In UNCTAD, A Positive Agenda for Developing Countries: Issues for Future Trade Negotiations.  63 Jaffee & Henson, above n. 58, p. 5; Vogel, above n. 15, p. 3.  64 John C. Beghin, Miet Maertens & Johan Swinnen (2015), Non-Tariff Measures and Standards in Trade and Global Value Chains. Annual Review of Resource Economics 7: 425-440, p. 7-8; Gregory Shaffer (2010), Risk Science, and Law in the WTO: The Centrality of Institutional Choice. Proceedings of the 104th Annual Meeting of 
the American Society of International Law, p. 19. 
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legitimacy of an SPS measure.65 Nevertheless, even if SPS measures are not intentionally used to protect the domestic market, they do often restrict trade.66    
 Research questions  The aim of this dissertation is to advance the so far mostly simple accounts of WTO functions in relationship to the extraterritorial effect of domestic regulatory measures. WTO rules have been labelled as both a ‘sword’ and a ‘shield’ but the conceptualizations on which they are based miss a nuanced analysis taking into account the technicalities of WTO law. Existing scholarship in this field has covered various sectors, but SPS measures have remained understudied. This dissertation hence consists of a comprehensive analysis of the extraterritorial effect of domestic SPS measures from a WTO law perspective. The central research question this dissertation answers is: In 
what ways does WTO law constrain or enable the extraterritorial effect of 
domestic sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures?    To address this question, the following three sub-questions were formulated.   
1. How does the extraterritorial effect of SPS measures impact trading partners in 
practice?  The extraterritorial effect has been studied in various areas, but limited research has been done in the SPS sector. In order to study the influence of WTO law on the extraterritorial effect of SPS measures, it is necessary to understand how the extraterritorial effect impacts trading partners in practice. This research question first addresses whether an extraterritorial effect in the SPS sector can be observed, and then looks into the legal impacts of the extraterritorial effect of SPS measures.   
2. How is SPS law applied and interpreted as a ‘sword’ or ‘shield’ by the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body?   In order to study how SPS law may be used to prevent or enable the extraterritorial effect of measures, it is important to know how the law is applied. This research                                                         65 Sun Young Oh (2010), Incorporating Public Sentiment into a Science-Based Risk Analysis in WTO Laws. 
Yonsei Law Journal 1(2): 363-378, p. 364. 66 Jaffee & Henson, above n. 58, p. 2-3. 
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question looks into two aspects of WTO law in action. First of all, it addresses how the WTO Dispute Settlement Body applies and interprets SPS law in trade disputes. Second of all, it studies the extent with which the rulings are complied.  
3. How do international regulatory standards influence the extraterritorial effect of 
SPS measures?   The SPS Agreement encourages countries to adopt standards of international organizations in order to achieve harmonization. This research question addresses how international standards, both those endorsed by the SPS Agreement and those not, may be used to challenge measures with an extraterritorial effect.   
 Methodology  As argued above, there is a knowledge gap due to the abstract way in which the impact of WTO rules on the extraterritorial effect has previously been described. In order to conduct a technical analysis of WTO law, this research has been primarily undertaken through legal doctrinal analysis.   
Legal doctrinal analysis is a ‘critical conceptual analysis of all relevant legislation and 
case law to reveal a statement of the law relevant to the matter under investigation.’67 For the doctrinal analysis first the relevant legislation and jurisprudence, both at WTO and national levels, were identified. Since the focus of the dissertation is on the extraterritorial effect of SPS measures, the sources at WTO level were primarily the SPS Agreement and the Panel and Appellate Body reports of trade disputes that invoked the SPS Agreement. The extensive use of trade dispute rulings allowed for a more systematic and technical analysis of the influence of WTO law on the extraterritorial effect of measures. At national level, domestic regulatory measures in the relevant fields, e.g. food safety and phytosanitary regulations, of the EU, US and South Africa were examined. Secondary sources used included government policy statements and scholarly writings.    To analyze these sources both textual and contextual interpretation were employed. 
Textual interpretation is defined as ‘the action of explaining what a normative text                                                         67 Terry C. Hutchinson (2014), Valé Bunny Watson? Law Librarians, Law Libraries and Legal Research in the Post-Internet Era. Law Library Journal 106(4): 579-592, p. 584. 
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conveys by looking at the usual meaning of the words contained therein’68. In other words, it involves looking into the ‘plain meaning’ of the text and is used to understand 
the ‘ordinary meaning to be attributed to the terms.’69 This technique was used primarily to understand how WTO law is applied and interpreted in the jurisprudence. The WTO DSB is unique in that it not only clarifies and interprets WTO rules, but its rulings are binding on the parties in the dispute. Members are required to bring inconsistent measures into compliance with WTO law, and may face consequences if they do not. Although the WTO agreement interpretations by Panels and the Appellate 
Body are ‘formally authoritative for the dispute being decided, not for others’70 they are 
‘likely to have a kind of de facto71 finality as interpretations of law, even if they lack de 
jure72 finality’.73  In order to bring ‘more interpretive depth’74 to the legal doctrinal analysis75, the analysis was expanded to the different contexts76 in which they are embedded. This was done by engaging with research of other disciplines and using insights from political (economic) analysis, business analysis and comparative institutional analysis. These contextual analyses are further elaborated in the chapters. Secondary sources such as scientific experiments, technical government working party documents, trade statistics, news articles, scholarly writings and informal interviews were used. Insights from these sources were then extrapolated to the legal doctrinal analysis in order to place the law into a broader context. The specific contexts applied and data sources used are discussed further in section 1.6.   
                                                        68 Koen Lenaerts & Jose A. Gutierrez-Fons (2013), To Say What the Law of the EU is: Methods of Interpretation and the European Court of Justice. EUI Working Papers, AEL 2013/9, p. 6. 69 Andrea Bianchi (2010), Textual Interpretation and (International) Law Reading: The Myth of (In)determinacy 
and the Genealogy of Meaning. Cambridge University Press, p. 34-55.  70 Isabella van Damme (2010), Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body. European Journal of 
International Law 21(3): 605-648, p. 610. 71 Meaning what happens in practice even though not formally recognized by law 72 Meaning what happens in law 73 Robert Howse (2003), The Most Dangerous Branch? WTO Appellate Body Jurisprudence on the Nature and 
Limits of the Judicial Power. In Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis (Eds), The Role of the Judge in 
International Trade Regulation. University of Michigan Press, p. 11, 15. 74 Matyas Bodig (2015), Legal Doctrinal Scholarship and Interdisciplinary Engagement. Erasmus Law Review 8(2): 43-54, p. 43. 75 Ibid., p. 50. 76 Lenaerts & Gutierrez-Fons, above n. 76, p. 13.  
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The specific methodology applied in this dissertation allowed for a more nuanced examination of the technicalities of WTO law. Through the legal doctrinal analysis embedded in contexts of other disciplines it was possible to better conceptualize the role of WTO law in relationship to the extraterritorial effect.   
 Structure of the dissertation   
Chapter 2 investigates the impact of the WTO Dispute Settlement system on challenging the extraterritorial effect. Three WTO disputes are examined to determine whether the 
WTO constrains or facilitates the ‘Brussels Effect’. This chapter looks at not only the results of the official dispute settlement documents, but also beyond them in order to study the impact of the dispute settlement system in action. These disputes were therefore selected specifically because enough time had lapsed after the dispute settlement rulings in order to study the compliance with the rulings and if any extraterritorial effect were still present. This chapter required a political analysis to study the impact of WTO rules on the countries on both sides of the Brussels Effect. In addition to the corresponding Panel and Appellate Body reports, various national regulations, policy statements, trade statistics and scholarly writings are examined to conduct the analysis.   
Chapter 3 presents a practical example of the extraterritorial effect and shows how it may lead to upward harmonization. The phytosanitary trade dispute on citrus black spot disease between the EU and South Africa is used to illustrate this effect. This chapter included insights from political economy and business analysis to interpret the effects of the law in practice. An extensive literature review of information on the trade dispute and its effects on South Africa was conducted. A variety of sources was used, including official statements from governments, working party documents, scholarly writings, scientific experiments, news articles and informal interviews. The issue of the open interpretations of science and risk in the SPS Agreement and how they may provide a leeway for countries to extraterritorialize their standards is also addressed. Previous similar WTO disputes were selected to estimate a benchmark that could be used in this dispute.   
Chapter 4 presents a detailed analysis of a provision that may be used to challenge measures with an extraterritorial effect. Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement states that measures should not be more trade-restrictive than required to achieve a country’s 
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appropriate level of protection (ALOP). This chapter consists of an empirical, systematic analysis of all 20 disputes77 that invoked the provision, using qualitative content analysis software (Atlas.ti7). The aim is to generate insights into the current and future 
use of Article 5.6 SPS in WTO litigation and the implications for WTO Members’ regulatory powers to take SPS measures. It focuses on which aspects of the cases were most likely to lead to a ruling of an Article 5.6 violation and how these may be used to strike down measures not in compliance with SPS law.  
Chapter 5 serves as a control in assessing the role of international organizations in the vacuum of WTO law. In the vegetable seed industry, countries have widely diverging phytosanitary standards, many of which are not based on science. Through an institutional analysis the role of relevant international organizations in setting standards and achieving harmonization are examined, and the question of harmonization as a goal is addressed.   The concluding chapter answers the research questions and engages in a discussion of the role of science and international standards. It also provides an overview of the main contributions of this dissertation to the academic literature, as well as the policy implications and recommendations.    
                                                        77 WTO, Dispute Settlement: Disputes by Agreement. Accessed 12 July 2017, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm?id=A19. 
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Table 1.1. Structure of the dissertation 
Chapter Title Answer to 
research question 
1 General introduction General introduction  2 Reversed harmonization or horizontalization of EU standards? Does WTO law facilitate or constrain the Brussels Effect? 
1, 2 
3 When life gives you lemons: The ‘battle of science’ on the correct interpretation of data on citrus black spot disease between the European Union and South Africa according to the SPS Agreement 
1, 2 
4 The potency of the SPS Agreement’s ‘excessivity test’: The impact of Article 5.6 on trade liberalization and the regulatory power of WTO members to take sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
2, 3 
5 The role of international organizations in the harmonization of phytosanitary standards for vegetable seeds 
3 
6 Conclusions and general discussion    Chapters 2-4 have been published in international peer-reviewed scientific journals. 
Chapter 2 was published as ‘Reversed harmonization or horizontalization of EU 
standards? Does WTO law facilitate or constrain the Brussels Effect?’ in the Wisconsin Journal of International Law. Chapter 3 was published as ‘When life gives you lemons: The 
“Battle of Science” on the correct interpretation of data on citrus black spot disease 
between the European Union and South Africa according to the SPS Agreement’ in Trade, Law and Development. Chapter 4 was published in the Journal of International Economic Law, titled ‘The potency of the SPS Agreement’s Excessivity Test: The impact of 
Article 5.6 on trade liberalization and the regulatory power of WTO members to take 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures’. 
 CHAPTER 2 
Reversed harmonization or horizontalization 
of EU standards? Does WTO law facilitate or 
constrain the Brussels Effect?      
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Abstract78  European Union (EU) law establishes an internal market. To achieve that goal, it acts to a large extent as a regulator, setting standards. These standards are often legally binding inside of the jurisdiction of the EU, but increasingly travel beyond the borders of the EU 
on the back of traded goods. In some areas, this leads to a “Brussels Effect,” where EU 
standards factually harmonize legislation at transnational level, creating a “race to the 
top” in international standards. This generates a level playing field for transnational trade, directed by the EU as a de facto transnational regulator. Professor Anu Bradford brought forward the argument that a de facto or de jure transnational harmonization by EU standards might be facilitated or constrained by the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO could strike down such regulations as purely domestic ones without taking into account that these EU-standards have factually already achieved what the WTO aspires: removing barriers to trade between its member countries by establishing equal treatment of all trading partners as the norm. We will call this phenomenon of the Brussels Effect the Reversed Harmonization Effect. The WTO could also facilitate the Brussels Effect by providing a specific forum for negotiations, which favors the EU as a dominant regulator, leading to a horizontalization of standards across the WTO. One may hence claim normatively that the WTO should take into account a broader view on the economic effect of these measures beyond their formal domestic jurisdiction by differing between domestic and horizontalized standards.  This piece examines whether this normative claim is well-founded in the law of the WTO using the example of food trade. We will investigate whether current WTO law as applied “in action” has the potential to facilitate or constrain the Brussels Effect. Three famous trade disputes are analyzed to investigate this hypothesis. We conclude that, in the areas investigated, WTO law has very limited potential to jeopardize the Brussels Effect. From our study, we hence find no evidence that would support such a normative claim.   
  
                                                        78 This chapter was published as Dominique Sinopoli & Kai Purnhagen (2016), Reversed Harmonization or Horizontalization of EU Standards? Does WTO Law Facilitate or Constrain the Brussels Effect? Wisconsin Journal 
of International Law 34(1): 92-119. 
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 Introduction  
Critics of globalization argue that free trade leads to a ‘race to the bottom’, in which governments lower their regulatory standards to attract economic activity and improve their competitive position in the global market.79 They fear that this may lead to a downward harmonization of standards.80 Other scholars have challenged this claim and shown that trade liberalization instead frequently triggers a ‘race to the top’, which is the idea that regulatory standards are being driven upward and strict standards may actually form a competitive advantage.81 Vogel described this phenomenon as the California Effect: Trade and agreements to promote [regionalization and globalization] affect not only the flow of goods among nations, but also the movement of regulations across national boundaries. Nations are thus increasingly importing and exporting standards as well as goods.82   Bradford builds upon the California Effect by examining the global regulatory power of the European Union (EU).83 The Brussels Effect she describes provides an example of a dominant regulator whose power leads to the harmonization of global standards. The EU exports its standards to the rest of the world and sets the global rules in a range of areas, such as competition, privacy, environment, chemicals, and food, resulting in a 
‘Europeanization’ of global regulatory standards.84 Bradford identified various factors that may place limits on the Brussels Effect—one of which is the law of international organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO).85  This paper takes the next step and seeks to further explore the proposition that the WTO places limits on the Brussels Effect. It is expected that if the WTO indeed constrains the global regulatory power of the EU, the Brussels Effect will be greater where EU and WTO laws diverge. Previous findings on the impact of WTO laws on influencing the interplay of EU data protection laws on United States (US) data privacy standards have already illustrated that WTO rules can work as both a shield and a sword.86 In analyzing the 
influence of the EU’s data protection Directive on US standards, Shaffer illustrated that                                                         79 Cary, above n. 14; Tonelson, above n. 14, p. 14-15.  80 Silverglade, above n. 14. 81 Vogel, above n. 15; Vogel & Kagan, above n. 15, p. 3; Shaffer, above n. 5; Shaffer, above n. 6. 82 Vogel, above n. 16, p. 2. 83 Bradford, above n. 1. 84 Ibid., p. 3.  85 Ibid., p. 55-56. 86 Shaffer, above n. 5; Shaffer, above n. 6, p. 419-437.  
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international trade liberalization rules did not have a significant impact on ‘the ability of 
governments to require greater social protection’.87 Even more, international trade law often does not have any impact on the extra-jurisdictional effects of social data protection law.88 Subsequently, several scholars looked more comprehensively into the phenomenon of the extraterritoriality of specific EU regulatory regimes such as competition law89 and the law of chemicals.90 More than a decade after Gregory Shaffer’s analysis, Joanne Scott took up this ‘extraterritorial’ reach of EU law as a basis to comprehensively analyze the territorial extension of EU law in the areas of environmental law, aviation law, and the law of financial markets.91 With respect to the topic of whether WTO law might constrain such an extraterritorial Brussels Effect, she contends that WTO law may permit an extraterritorial reach of EU laws if they are 
‘sufficiently flexible’.92 These pieces have comprehensively looked at the extraterritorial application of EU law in a variety of specific fields. What unites these pieces is that they apply a specific European Union-centered analysis. A thorough analysis of the effects of WTO laws on this extraterritorial effect from the perspective of WTO law is missing, which we will provide in turn. In order to keep the level of analysis comprehensible we will focus on the area of food safety and quality regulation. This highly important and 
relevant area is becoming increasingly transnational and is one that ‘directly, personally and continually affect(s) the well-being of every citizen’.93 There are several famous international trade disputes in this area and many political and social tensions surrounding food regulation. We will use various trade issues in the area of food safety to investigate this hypothesis.   What is ironic is that, if the Brussels Effect indeed leads to harmonization of food safety standards, then it is line with the aims of the WTO: levelling trade barriers and non-discrimination.94 If the WTO constrains the Brussels Effect, however, then it may actually work against these goals as a form of reversed harmonization. It is therefore                                                         87 Shaffer, above n. 5. 88 Shaffer, above n. 6, p. 426-429.  89 Wagner-von Papp, above n. 47. 90 Scott, above n. 2. 91 Scott, above n. 26. 92 Ibid., p. 115-116.  93 Christopher Ansell & David Vogel (2006), The Contested Governance of European Food Safety. In Christopher Ansell & David Vogel (Eds.), What's the Beef: The Contested Governance of European Food Safety Regulation. MIT Press. 94 As former Director-General Pascal Lamy stated, ‘The WTO's founding and guiding principles remain the pursuit of open borders, the guarantee of most-favoured-nation principle and non-discriminatory treatment by and among members, and a commitment to transparency in the conduct of its activities’ (WTO, n.d.). 
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ironic that what may be considered a trade barrier can actually lead to harmonization. This proposition will be further explored in the analysis section.   Sections 2.2 and 2.3 provide a foundation for the article. Section 2.2 includes background information on the Brussels Effect: what it is, how unilateral regulatory globalization works, and which factors, such as the WTO, may place limits on the effect. Section 2.3 examines the harmonization approach of the WTO through the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) and the Codex Alimentarius Commission, and the relationship with the Brussels Effect. Section 2.4 identifies cases of the Brussels Effect in the food sector. Food-related trade issues raised in the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) system are selected and subsequently analyzed for incidence of the Brussels Effect. The cases are assessed to determine if WTO law constrains the Brussels Effect. Section 2.5 addresses the hypothesis that the Brussels Effect is greater where WTO law and law of the dominant regulator diverge. It is important to keep in mind that dominant regulators may push for international treaties that force their own standards on other nations.95 Therefore, the relationship between dominant regulators and the Codex Alimentarius Commission is also addressed. The possible ironic situation that the WTO constrains the Brussels Effect even though it leads to harmonization is also examined.   While it is recognized that there are likely many instances of the Brussels Effect beyond what are reported in trade disputes, the limit will be on cases in which the WTO has been involved, since the focus of this paper is on the role of the WTO. Therefore, there is a lot that lies outside the scope of this article. Three cases have been selected for this study, chosen according to what the authors believed to be ones which best illustrate the possible constraint to the Brussels Effect. The criteria we chose from were: food-related disputes, variety in measures, and involvement of the EU or the US as a dominant regulator. In order to allow for a sound analysis of the effects, we chose established settlements where a sufficient time span elapsed after they became published. For this reason, we also refrained from basing our analysis on more recent settlements.  The challenges of launching a case within the WTO Dispute Settlement system mean that countries are likely to do so only when they expect a positive outcome. Considerable efforts and resources are required to raise a WTO case, particularly for developing                                                         95 Beth Simmons (2004), The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of Capital Market Regulation. In David Vogel & Robert A. Kagan (Eds.), Dynamics of Regulatory Change: How Globalization Affects National 
Regulatory Policies. University of California Press, p. 50-51. 
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countries. Additionally, countries may have other reasons not to raise an issue within the WTO, such as to avoid media attention on a particular topic96 or to avoid further tensions. Downes has warned of the limitations of extrapolating from WTO disputes, since the cases may be too specific to apply the results elsewhere, and because it is not always clear if regulations applied are a result of the SPS Agreement or the legal strategy of a jurisdiction.97 Therefore, it is recognized that the conclusions drawn in this paper do not necessarily apply to all cases concerning the Brussels Effect and the WTO. However, unlike national law, WTO black letter law is the outcome of a political compromise between contracting parties which does not lend itself to solving detailed questions. In fleshing out the WTO legal system, the WTO dispute settlement regime hence also plays a much stronger role in law-creation than in national regimes. While the specifics of each individual case do not lend themselves to extrapolate the outcomes of the dispute to other cases, the generalized reasoning of the WTO dispute settlement institutions on the WTO legal system need to be taken into account when interpreting the WTO legal system.  
 Brussels Effect  This section will provide the basis for the analysis to come. We will first explain the Brussels Effect (section 2.2.1.), before we move on to illustrate how we will apply the phenomenon of the Brussels Effect in this paper (section 2.2.2).  
2.2.1 Background  The Brussels Effect provides an example of a dominant regulator whose power leads to the harmonization of global standards. The European Union exports its standards to the rest of the world, and sets the global rules in a range of areas, such as competition, 
privacy, environment, chemicals and food, resulting in a ‘Europeanization’ of global regulatory standards.98 Bradford identified various factors which may place limits on the Brussels Effect—one of which is international organizations such as the WTO.99   
                                                        96 Pollack & Shaffer, above n. 46, p. 179. 97 Chris Downes (2014), The Impact of WTO SPS Law on EU Food Regulations. Springer, p. 110-111. 98 Bradford, above n. 1. 99 Ibid., p. 6. 
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The EU has the world’s largest internal market, supported by strong regulatory institutions. Trading with the EU requires foreign companies to adjust their conduct or production to EU standards—which often represent the most stringent standards—or else forgo the EU market entirely. Rarely is the latter an option. While the EU regulates only its internal market, multinational corporations often have an incentive to standardize their production globally and adhere to a single rule. This converts the EU rule into a global rule—the ‘de facto Brussels Effect’. Finally, after these export-oriented firms have adjusted their business practices to meet the EU’s strict standards, they often have the incentive to lobby their domestic governments to adopt these same standards in an effort to level the playing field against their domestic, non-export-oriented competitors—the ‘de jure Brussels Effect’.100  
Market forces are strong enough to create ‘involuntary incentives’ for businesses to adjust to stricter standards. Even though exporting businesses would prefer other standards, they reluctantly adopt EU standards due to the opportunity costs of not doing so. Bradford identifies five conditions for this phenomenon, called unilateral regulatory globalization:   1) market power;101  2) regulatory capacity;102  3) preference for strict rules;103  4) predisposition to regulate inelastic targets;104 and  5) nondivisibility of standards.105   The Brussels Effect occurs only when the exporter applies the stricter EU standards to all of its products or services, whether they are exported to the EU or elsewhere in the world. An exporter has an incentive to do this when it is more cost effective to adopt a single global standard rather than adjust production to meet varying regulatory standards.106   
                                                        100 Ibid., p. 6. 101 Ibid., p. 11-12. 102 Ibid., p. 12-14. 103 Ibid., p. 14-16. 104 Ibid., p. 16-17. 105 Ibid., p. 17-19. 106 Ibid., p. 48.  
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The Brussels Effect does not occur in all instances of trade. Various external and internal factors place limits on the ‘Europeanization’ of global standards:107   1. Alternative markets: The EU has limited regulatory power in certain areas where alternative markets exist. Businesses are currently typically not willing to forgo the large EU market. However, as demand grows in emerging markets, businesses will no longer be so dependent on the EU market for their products and services;  2. Other nations: Other nations may wish to constrain the Brussels Effect: strict EU standards may be perceived negatively in other countries. Additionally, the regulatory power of the EU is limited in cases where other nations have regulatory standards higher than those of the EU;  3. International institutions: The World Trade Organization (WTO) works to lower trade barriers. Countries are not allowed to restrict imports from countries with more lenient standards unless they can prove it is necessary for the goals stipulated in the respective legal regimes (GATT, SPS Agreement);  4. Internal conflicts: Internal conflicts and growing diversity within the EU, especially as more nations are joining the Union, place constraints on the Brussels Effect. Not all consumers and businesses within the EU benefit from strict regulatory standards.108   
2.2.2 Application  In this paper, the Brussels Effect is considered to be the concept of a dominant regulator who exports its standards to the rest of the world, leading to the harmonization of global standards either by law or factual economic power. It is recognized that this concept is not only limited to the EU, but can be applied to the US or other countries that may be the dominant market in some cases. The US in particular was more powerful in the past few decades, a role that the EU is now filling; therefore the US showed instances of the Brussels Effect during that period. In this paper examples of the Brussels Effect are shown with the EU and US as dominant regulators.   
                                                        107 Ibid., p. 48-63.  108 Ibid., p. 62-63. 
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 World Trade Organization and trade in foods  Food regulations are (mostly) national or regional, yet trade is global, creating problems 
of ‘linkage’.109 International trade problems occur when countries and regions have different regulations and businesses or authorities are confronted with multiple requirements.110 Differences in technical standards such as labelling requirements and premarket approvals are examples of non-tariff barriers. At the global level, the WTO and its agreements play a major role in reducing barriers to international trade and promoting the harmonization of national regulations.111 We will look into how the relevant WTO agreements might influence the Brussels Effect in trade in foods. To this end, we will first illustrate how the WTO de facto regulates the world food market (section 2.3.1), and how this has changed the authority of the Codex Alimentarius (section 2.3.2).  
2.3.1 SPS and TBT Agreements  Although there are several international organizations that frame international trade law, the WTO is the only one that has the power to issue legally binding obligations upon its Members.112 Although a huge number of disputes on WTO law concern trade in foods, food safety has never been a prime issue for the WTO.113 This comes as no surprise, as the WTO is primarily an organization that aims to remove barriers to trade between its Member States, by establishing equal treatment of all trading partners as the norm.114 The WTO has, however, become the major international de facto regulator in global food trade.115 The regulatory gate through which food safety travels to WTO law is Art. XX(b) 
                                                        109 Dennis Patterson & Ari Afilalo (2008), The New Global Trading Order. Cambridge University Press, p. 86-93.  110 Ibid. 111 Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis (2007), The World Trade Organization: Law, Economics and 
Politics. Routledge.  112 Alberto Alemanno (2007), Trade in Food: Regulatory and Judicial Approaches in the EC and the WTO. Journal 
of International Economic Law 11(2), p. 227. 113 Huei-chih Niu (2006), A Comparative Perspective on the International Health Regulations and the World Trade Organization's Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. Asian Journal of 
WTO & International Health Law and Policy 1(2): 513-542, p. 515.  114 Kai Purnhagen & Bernd van der Meulen (2016), Consumer Protection Legislation. In Benjamin Caballero, Paul Finglas, Fidel Toldrá (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Food and Health. Elsevier, p. 296-300. 115 Alessandra Arcuri (2014), The Coproduction of the Global Regulatory Regime for Food Safety Standards and the Limits of a Technocratic Ethos. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No. RSCAS 
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GATT,116 which recognizes that certain exceptions to free trade can be necessary to protect social values such as health and (food) safety.117 The Article is further substantiated in the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement),118 which applies to all sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS measures) that may affect international trade. In addition, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement)119 aims to ensure that technical regulations and standards are non-discriminatory and do not create unnecessary obstacles to trade. In line with the trade rationale of WTO law, these agreements aim to harmonize measures around the world in order to create market access at an equal level for all Member States. The level of harmonization is determined by international standards, guidelines, or recommendations, where they exist.120 If measures of a Member State conform to these international measures, then they are presumed to be consistent with WTO law.121 WTO law does not completely turn a blind eye to food safety concerns, however: Members may apply SPS measures that result in a higher level of protection than would be achieved by measures based on international standards if there is a scientific justification to apply a stricter standard,122 and if it is not inconsistent with the other requirements of the Agreement, such as non-discrimination and not a disguised restriction on international trade.123  
2.3.2 Codex Alimentarius  The SPS Agreement states that if food safety measures are based on standards, guidelines, or recommendations established by the Codex Alimentarius Commission, then they are presumed to be consistent with WTO law (Annex A, 3(a)), thereby making the Codex Alimentarius Commission a de facto global regulator.124 The Codex Alimentarius Commission was established in 1963 with the purpose of minimizing 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2014/97; David E. Winickoff & Douglas M. Bushey (2010), Science and Power in Global Food Regulation: The Rise of the Codex Alimentarius. Science, Technology & Human Values 35(3): 356-381.  116 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. July 1986 (GATT). 117 Purnhagen & van der Meulen, above n. 114. 118 WTO, Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement).   119 WTO, Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement). 120 Article 3.1 SPS Agreement, Article 2.4 TBT Agreement. 121 Article 3.1 SPS Agreement. 122 Article 3.3 SPS Agreement. 123 Article 2 SPS Agreement. See in detail on this observation Downes, above n. 97, p. 91-126.  124 Arcuri, above n. 115; Winickoff & Bushey, above n. 115. 
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international trade barriers through the promotion of harmonized food standards.125 For decades its standards were entirely voluntary: they served (and still do) as model regulations for national legislation126 and private standard setters.127 As Codex 
standards were hence perceived of only ‘marginal importance’,128 countries were entirely free to ignore Codex standards.  When the SPS Agreement came into force in 1995, the Codex Alimentarius Commission was named as an organization that can establish international standards for food safety.129 It has since gained considerable legal authority.130 Codex standards are now used by WTO dispute panels for resolving trade issues, to help determine whether national food safety regulations are non-tariff barriers or not.131 ‘With the adoption of the SPS Agreement, states have delegated significant authority to supranational bodies to set and enforce food safety rules and standards and have agreed to be bound by the 
decisions of bodies that adjudicate disputes that arise over these rules’.132 WTO members can either base their measures on Codex Alimentarius standards or deviate from them and provide scientific evidence demonstrating that stricter standards are necessary for life or health purposes.133 In practice, conforming with Codex provisions can create a presumption of compliance with international law and therefore lower the 
                                                        125 Codex Alimentarius Commission, Codex Timeline from 1945 to the Present, Accessed 1 February 2016, http://www.codexalimentarius.org/about-codex/codex-timeline/en/. 126 See on the intertwindedness of national actors and Codex Jessica Vapnek & Melvin Spreij (2005), Perspectives and Guidelines on Food Legislation, with a New Model Food Law. FAO Legislative Study 87, p. 31-34. 127 Kai Purnhagen (2015), Mapping Private Regulation – Classification, Market Access and Market Closure Policy, and Law's Response. Journal of World Trade 49(2): 309-324. 128 Downes, above n. 97, p. 205. 129 Vapnek & Spreij, above n. 126, p. 38. 130 Michael A. Livermore (2006), Authority and Legitimacy in Global Governance: Deliberation, Institutional Differentiation, and the Codex Alimentarius. New York University Law Review 81: 766-801; Ravi Alfonso Pereira (2010), Why Would International Administrative Activity Be Any Less Legitimate? - A Study of the Codex Alimentarius Commission. German Law Journal 9(11): 1693-1718; Winickoff & Bushey, above n. 115; Grace Skogstad (2001), The WTO and Food Safety Regulatory Policy Innovation in the European Union. Journal of 
Common Market Studies 39(3): 485-505; Codex Alimentarius Commission, About Codex. Accessed 12 July 2017, http://www.codexalimentarius.org/about-codex/en/. 131 Vapnek & Spreij, above n. 126, p. 38. 132 Grace Skogstad (2001), Internationalization, Democracy, and Food Safety Measures: The (Il)Legitimacy of Consumer Preferences? Global Governance 7(3): 293-316.  133 David G. Victor (2004), WTO Efforts to Manage Differences in National Sanitary and Phytosanitary Policies. In David Vogel & Robert A. Kagan (Eds.), Dynamics of Regulatory Change: How Globalization Affects National 
Regulatory Policies. University of California Press, p. 230-231.  
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threat of potential costs of litigation before the WTO.134 The WTO legal system therefore provides a huge incentive for businesses to comply with Codex standards instead of relying on their own risk assessment.  
 Does WTO law facilitate or constrain the Brussels Effect?  This section will discuss whether the WTO trade regime in foods described in brief above relates to the Brussels Effect. We will first illustrate how this regime incentivizes dominant regulators to push for the recognition of their domestic food standards at WTO level. We will conclude, however, that this incentive does not facilitate the Brussels Effect (section 2.4.1). Subsequently we analyze Bradford’s claim that the WTO regime may limit the Brussels Effect for the area of food trade.135 We will show with the example of three cases settled at WTO level (genetically modified organisms (GMOs),136 hormones,137 and dolphin/tuna138 that the WTO food regulation regime has very limited potential to constrain the Brussels Effect (section 2.4.2). The evidence from the case studies presented here therefore do not support Bradford’s proposition.  
2.4.1 Does the WTO food law regime facilitate the Brussels Effect?  Codex standards have factually become a binding authority in the WTO. What looks like a victory for transnational standardization has a considerable impact on the balance of power between WTO Members. As Member States are more concerned about what they include as a Codex standard, national legislators now ‘have an incentive to bring Codex standards more closely in line with domestic policy goals since the negative domestic consequences of adopting an international standard are least when the divergence 
                                                        134 Downes, above n. 97, p. 205-206. 135 Bradford, above n. 1, p. 54. Bradford acknowledges later in her paper that this claim at the beginning might not be as watertight as her initial claim makes us believe and that there is a potential that the WTO might even facilitate the Brussels Effect, p. 56.  136 Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products (EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products), WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (29 September 2006).  137 Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (EC – Hormones), WT/DS26/R/USA (18 August 1997).  138 Panel Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna 
Products (US – Tuna II (Mexico)), WT/DS381/R (15 September 2011).  
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between the international standard and the optimal domestic regulation are smallest’.139 
Codex standards now ‘act to restrict and structure the policy choices of states’.140 It is likely that those trading blocs with bigger negotiation power will dominate negotiations on transnational setting of standards, conventionally investigated as a north/south conflict.141 In this sense, the new Codex role in WTO law accelerates the already existing risk that dominant regulators may push for international treaties that impose their own standards on other countries.142 ‘If national administrators are encouraged to believe that their policy options will be unduly constrained by international law, this may change the way they interact with other countries in international bodies, such as Codex 
Alimentarius, aimed at facilitating and managing the global food trade’.143 As such bigger trading blocs include the EU or the US, the impact of their regulations on the Codex Alimentarius Commission and the WTO also need to be addressed.   As the EU is largely dependent on imports from WTO member countries for a large number of foodstuffs,144 the negotiation power of the EU is likely to be limited in the area of food law in cases where alternative markets exist. In addition, the EU might be a strong trading block in the WTO but it is not the only one. To achieve voting power, the EU would at least have to have China and the US in the boat when enforcing its standards in WTO disputes. Given the fact that quarrels between the US and the EU over food standards are often subject to WTO disputes,145 it is not likely that such consensus will be easy to reach. What is however likely is that the WTO will see (or already sees) a north/south conflict, where standards set by northern countries dominate southern ones.146 It is therefore unlikely that the trading bloc’s increased interest to enforce its standards in WTO disputes will lead to an increase of EU standards, a fact that is important for making our argument in this piece. The fact that Codex provisions have become factually binding law means they are unlikely to increase the Brussels Effect.                                                           139 Livermore, above n. 130, p. 786.  140 Ibid., p. 778. 141 Karin Mickelson (2000), South, North, International Environmental Law, and International Environmental Lawyers. Yearbook of International Environmental Law 11: 52-81, p. 54 (for similar developments in international environmental law). 142 Simmons, above n. 95, p. 50-51. 143 Downes, above n. 97, p. 2-3. 144 Eurostat (2013), EU-27 – Trade Balance with EXTRA EU-27, http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/statistics/trade/2012/eur27ag/page_147.pdf. 145 See as an example the WTO trade dispute with the USA over GMO regulation, for details Pollack & Shaffer, above n. 46, 177-234. 146 Mickelson, above n. 141, p. 54 (for similar developments in international environmental law). 
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2.4.2 Does the WTO legal regime constrain the Brussels Effect?  In this section we elaborate on whether the WTO regime limits the Brussels Effect in the area of food trade, leading to what we call reversed harmonization. Bradford has brought forward the claim that the WTO regime is one of five factors that may put limits on the Brussels Effect.147 By analyzing dispute settlement reports on 1) GMOs, 2) hormones, and 3) dolphin/tuna at WTO level, we will show that, at least within the limits of the cases analyzed, the contrary is true: The WTO food regulation regime has very limited potential to hinder the Brussels Effect.  
2.4.2.1 GMOs  Bradford presented GMOs as one of five cases demonstrating the Brussels Effect.148 In 2003, the US,149 Canada,150 and Argentina151 challenged the EU’s de facto moratorium and its member state bans on GMOs.152 The moratorium and bans restricted imports of agricultural and food products from the complainant countries, among others. A panel was established later that year.   The panel ruled in favor of the US, Canada, and Argentina, but mainly for procedural reasons. The panel avoided making a decision of whether or not GMOs pose a risk to health and whether the EU had based its decision on a risk assessment.153 It instead 
targeted the EU’s moratorium which had been in place from June 1999 to August 2003 
and found that the EU’s excessive delays in the GMO approval process were in violation                                                         147 Bradford, above n. 1, p. 54.  148 Ibid., p. 32-35.  149 Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, above n. 136.  150 Ibid. 151 Ibid. 152 See for details Pollack & Shaffer, above n. 46, p. 177-234. 153 There is no Codex Alimentarius standard on GMOs. It states on the website: ‘Codex is strongly committed to promote safe foods. Amongst safe foods, Codex does not give any preference to certain kinds of foods over others. Such choice belongs to consumers.  Codex has adopted principles and guidelines to assess food safety of foods derived from recombinant-DNA plants, animals and microorganisms. If a government chooses to build a regulatory mechanism to address the food safety of so-called GM foods, then they can use Codex text as a basis for it. This being said, each government is free to adopt its own policy as to the use of GM organisms in the agriculture and other sectors.  At the moment, there are no internationally-agreed recommendations on the food labelling of GM foods. Governments are therefore applying their own regulations.’ From Codex Alimentarius Commission, FAQs – Questions about Specific Codex Work. Accessed 12 July 2017, http://www.codexalimentarius.org/faqs/specific-codex-work/en/. 
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of Article 8 (regarding approval procedures) and Annex C(1)(a) (which states that 
approval procedures should be undertaken and completed without ‘undue delay’) of the SPS Agreement. The EU announced its intention to implement the recommendations and rulings of the panel.154  The EU in the case of GMOs shows most elements of a Brussels Effect. The EU has built the regulatory capacity that allows it to influence regulation of GMOs. GMOs also work very well within the framework of the Brussels Effect: they are considered to be an inelastic product, because regulation cannot be avoided by moving the regulatory targets (i.e. consumers) to another jurisdiction. GMOs are non-divisible products in practice.155 Although it is possible to grow GM and conventional crops on different fields, it is very difficult to prevent transfer of seeds and crops by the wind or other means. Additionally, crops would have to be segregated through all processing and distribution steps, including ‘separate equipment, storage areas, and shipping containers, and establish trait identification systems that allow for the tracking of produce from the farm 
to the consumer’.156 To try to segregate GM and conventional crops is at best very expensive, and very difficult if not impossible to execute. GM crops are therefore nondivisible in practice.   
It is less clear, however, if the EU has the required market power. The EU is only the US’ fifth largest export market, making up 8 percent of US agricultural exports.157 Therefore it appears that farmers and producers should be able to forgo the EU market and sell their products elsewhere. The EU has, however, already influenced many other countries, such as Australia, Brazil, China, and Japan who are posing restrictions on GM products and are requiring labeling for GMOs and their products.158 The US is therefore more limited in diverting its agricultural and food products elsewhere.159 Nevertheless, 
the US has displayed limited evidence of ‘trading up’.160                                                          154 WTO Dispute Settlement Body meeting, 19 December 2006, cited in WTO summary of Dispute DS291, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds291_e.htm.  155 Bradford, above n. 1, p. 33-34.  156 Ibid., p. 34.  157 Ibid., p. 33.  158 Ibid., p. 33.; Vogel, above n. 16, p. 89. 159 Bradford, above n. 1, p. 33. 160 Ibid., p. 33; FDA (1992), Statement of Policy – Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInformation/Biotechnology/ucm096095.htm.  
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It can be argued that the US also displayed elements of a Brussels Effect in the case of GMOs. Both the US and the EU pushed their views on other countries and tried to convince them to support or be against GMOs. For example, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) stated one of its goals is ‘to facilitate the marketing of 
bioengineered products in both the domestic and international markets’.161 For example, in 2001, the Chinese government communicated to the US that they would accept US safety certifications for GMO crops.162 Several months later the Chinese officials 
reversed their decision, and the US stated that it was ‘unacceptable’.163 The Chinese government responded by issuing temporary safety certificates allowing GMO imports, and within two years permanent regulations were enacted. One Non-Governmental 
Organization (NGO) official complained ‘the U.S. is trying to impose its standards on the 
rest of the world’.164 Many developing countries, including India, Brazil, South Korea, Egypt, Kenya, South Africa, and Thailand have become more accepting of GMO products, by approving crops or having pilot programs.165   The EU has also shown similar examples of trying to impose its standards of anti-GMO 
regulations on other countries. Thanks to the EU’s six-year moratorium on GMO imports, many trade-dependent countries had to adapt to EU law. Not only the moratorium tied other countries to EU GMO regulation, however: The Bablok case requires all honey imported into the EU which contains GMOs to undergo an authorization procedure for GMO products. 166 As virtually any honey has the potential to contain GMOs,167 and importers may not always file for such an authorization procedure, planters of GMO crops near bee hives all around the world run into liability risks if a bee collects GM pollen which contaminates the honey.168 In this way, EU GMO regulation has the potential to regulate farming around the globe with very strict standards.169 Zambia’s                                                         161 USDA (2007), Agricultural Biotechnology—Frequently Asked Questions. Cited in Daniel W. Drezner, All Politics 
Is Global. Princeton University Press, p. 166.  162 Daniel W. Drezner (2007), All Politics Is Global. Princeton University Press, p. 166. 163 Ibid., p. 166-167. 164 Ibid., p. 167. 165 Ibid., p. 167-168.  166 Case C-442/09, Bablok and Others v. Freistaat Bayern, 2011 E.C.R. I-7419. 167 Matthias Lamping (2012), Shackles for Bees? The ECJ’s Judgment on GMO-Contaminated Honey. European 
Journal of Risk Regulation 3(1): 123-129, p. 127-128.  168 Kai Purnhagen & Justus Wesseler (2016), The 'Honey' Judgment Bablok and Others vs. Freistaat Bayern of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union: Implications for Coexistence. In Nick Kalaitzandonakes, Peter Phillips, Stuart Smyth & Justus Wesseler (Eds.), The Coexistence of Genetically Modified, Organic and Conventional Foods: 
Government Policies and Market Practices. Springer.  169 Ibid.  
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president said in 2003, for example, that the nation would ‘rather starve’ than accept GM corn (food aid from the US).170 There was concern that the corn seed could contaminate 
the entire seed supply in the country and then Zambia wouldn’t be able to export products to the EU. Similar events happened in other African nations.171   The US, Canada, and Argentina won the trade dispute against the EU.172 This positive ruling has done little to change the regulation of GMOs in the EU, however. The US had requested that the EU speed up the approval process for new and pending GMO authorizations, address the EU’s ‘zero-tolerance’ policy, and challenge EU member state bans on GMOs.173 The EU Commission approved fifteen varieties of GMOs for sale in the EU from 2004 to 2008, despite member state opposition, and some EU countries, such as Spain, began growing GM crops.174  Despite being approved for use in food and feed, they are mostly used only for feed.175 The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) also published positive assessments for other GM varieties.176   
‘Legal victories, of course, do not mean commercial ones.’177 Even though the Commission approved the production and sale of various GM crops and products, they are still not accepted by consumers and therefore only minimally present on the market.178 Additionally, EU member states are still allowed to reject the Commission’s approvals and implement national bans against GMOs.179   
Due to pressure from member states, the Commission has asked EFSA to ‘address more explicitly potential long-term effects and bio-diversity issues in their risk assessments 
                                                        170 Drezner, above n. 162, p. 169.  171 Ibid., p. 169.  172 Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, above n. 136. 173 Pollack & Shaffer, above n. 46, p. 225. 174 Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 on genetically modified food and feed. OJ L 268, 18.10.2003; Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 concerning the traceability and labelling of genetically modified organisms and the traceability of food and feed products produced from genetically modified organisms and amending Directive 2001/18/1EC. OJ L 268, 18.10.2003. 175 European Parliament, Eight Things You Should Know About GMOs. Accessed 27 October 2015, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20151013STO97392/Eight-things-you-should-know-about-GMOs. 176 EFSA, GMO. Accessed 11 February 2016, http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/panels/gmo.htm. 177 Pollack & Shaffer, above n. 46, p. 229. 178 European Parliament, above n. 175.  179 Pollack & Shaffer, above n. 46, p. 229. 
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for the placing on the market of GMOs.’180 This causes difficulties for two reasons. First, it is difficult to assess long-term effects of GMOs, and there is much uncertainty surrounding the issue. This would make EU arguments stronger and more defensible when challenged by arguments under the SPS Agreement. Second, businesses would be discouraged from seeking GM approval in the EU due to the high costs associated with additional tests for long-term and biodiversity effects.181 This only causes more extensive delays in GMO approvals or no further approvals on the market.  Transatlantic trade in GMOs thus remains very limited, and the EU is making it even 
more so. Additionally, ‘if the EU combines a zero-tolerance threshold with a refusal to assess without delay and approve varieties for consumption that EFSA has found to be safe, then the EU will not only affect international trade but also seriously constrain 
other countries’ abilities to make choices over this technology.’182 The WTO regime, it seems, had minimal impact on the Brussels Effect.  
2.4.2.2 Hormones  In 1996 the US and Canada requested a panel with the EU over its prohibition on the use of six specific hormones for growth promotion purposes in meat and meat products.183 The panel found that the ban on imports of meat and meat products from cattle treated with hormones was inconsistent with Articles 3.1 (measures must be based on international standards, where they exist), 5.1 (measures should be based on scientific risk assessment), and 5.5 (must avoid distinctions in levels of protection) of the SPS Agreement.184 The EU refused to comply with the WTO dispute panel’s ruling of beef hormones, and the US and Canada responded with retaliatory tariffs against various European products.185  
                                                        180 Commission of the European Communities (2006), Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the implementation of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council on genetically modified food and feed. 25.10.2006. COM (2006) 626 final. 181 Pollack & Shaffer, above n. 46, p. 229. 182 Ibid., p. 231. 183 Panel Report, EC – Hormones, above n. 137.  184 Panel Report, EC – Hormones, above n. 137, para. VIII, D.  185 WTO (2009), DS26: European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 
Summary Page. Accessed 11 February 2016, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds26_e.htm. 
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In 2003, the EU stated that it had carried out a risk assessment and the findings indicated that the hormones posed a risk for consumers. It therefore claimed that there was no longer a reason for the retaliatory tariffs since it was now in compliance with its WTO obligations. The US argued that the new EU Directive186 did not have any scientific basis since several studies had found no health risks from consumption of meat treated with hormones.187 In fact, the Codex Alimentarius Commission had set standards for five of the six hormones that the EU had banned.188   The EU in this case shows most elements of a Brussels Effect. The EU has built the regulatory capacity that allows it to influence regulation of hormones. By banning the use of hormones in beef, it clearly applies strict standards. Beef is considered to be an inelastic product, because regulation cannot be avoided by moving the regulatory 
targets (i.e. consumers) to another jurisdiction. The EU’s market power is not entirely clear. US exports of beef to the EU represent only a small percentage of total US beef exports.189 ‘U.S. meat exports to the EC represented less than 5 percent of total American meat exports, which were worth approximately 1.3 billion dollars in 1988, 90 percent of which went to Japan (Total annual American beef production amounts to 20 billion 
dollars).’190 However, over 90 percent of European Union beef imports were from Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay, among other nations.191  In addition to the US and Canada, hormones are approved for use in Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Japan; so it seems that there are possibilities to divert trade elsewhere. On the other hand, other major markets, such as Russia and China, have also banned hormones in beef.192 Beef is somewhat a divisible product—it is possible to treat some cattle with and others without hormones. The products then have to remain                                                         186 Directive 2003/74/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 amending Council Directive 96/22/EC concerning the prohibition on the use in stockfarming of certain substances having a hormonal or thyrostatic action and of beta-agonists. OJ L 262/17. 14.10.2003. 187 Renee Johnson (2015), The U.S.–EU Beef Hormone Dispute. Congressional Research Service.  188 According to Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement, WTO members shall base their measures on international standards unless there is a scientific justification to do otherwise. Codex did not set any limits for the three natural hormones, and set limits for residues of two of the three synthetic hormones.  189 U.S. Meat Export Federation, Total U.S. Beef Exports 2004-2013 (Including Variety Meat), https://www.usmef.org/downloads/Beef-2004-to-2013.pdf; U.S. Meat Export Federation (2013), Leading 
Markets for U.S. Beef Exports. January-December 2013, https://www.usmef.org/downloads/statistics/2013-12-beef-exports.pdf. 190 Vogel, above n. 16, p. 169. 191 Johnson, above n. 187. 192 U.S. Meat Export Federation, Australia Government Issues Advisory on China’s Hormone Ban. Accessed 14 October 2015, https://www.usmef.org/australian-government-issues-advisory-on-chinas-hormone-ban/. 
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segregated throughout processing and distribution. It is also sometimes possible to perform tests to detect the presence of added hormones.193 Slaughterhouses often found it uneconomical to process both hormone-treated and untreated beef, however, since their production runs were quite small and it was both expensive and difficult to separate the products.194   It has been argued that it was the pressure from citizens that convinced the EU to implement its ban on hormones. As a result of the EU ban, however, other countries such as Argentina and Uruguay have taken action to prevent the use of hormones in cattle.195 
‘The need to meet the demands of these markets has motivated Argentinian and Uruguayan beef producers to adopt production practices designed to allay international 
concerns about animal disease and residual growth hormones in beef.’196 Uruguay banned growth hormones in 1978 and Argentina in 2004.197   
The US has also started a program called the USDA’s Non-Hormone Treated Cattle (NHTC) program in which farms, ranches, feedlots and cattle management groups can apply to be audited and therefore approved as sources of non-hormone treated beef which can be exported to the EU.198 The program’s purpose is explicitly to allow exports of non-hormone treated beef to the EU.199   
The EU refused to comply with the WTO dispute panel’s ruling of beef hormones. The US and Canada responded with retaliatory tariffs against various European products. The EU was well within its rights as a WTO member to not comply and accept the retaliatory tariffs. This highlights a weakness of the WTO and the dispute settlement system.200 It seems that the WTO in fact had little impact on the Brussels Effect.                                                         193 Unless it is a hormone that is also produced naturally by the animal.   194 Vogel, above n. 16, p. 161. 195 Michael J. McConnell & Kenneth Matthews (2008), Global Market Opportunities Drive Beef Production 
Decisions in Argentina and Uruguay. United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).  196 Ibid. 197 Ibid.  198 W.A. Wallis & United States (1984), Foreign Policy, Its Impact on Agricultural Trade. Washington, D.C: U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication, Editorial Division, http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=umn.31951d008229029;view=1up;seq=1. 199 USDA. Non-Hormone Treated Cattle Program, https://www.ams.usda.gov/services/imports-exports/nhtc. 200 William A. Kerr & Jill E. Hobbs (2005), Consumers, Cows and Carousels: Why the Dispute over Beef Hormones is 
Far More Important than its Commercial Value. In Nicholas Perdikis & Robert Read (Eds.), The WTO and the 
Regulation of International Trade: Recent Trade Disputes Between the European Union and the United States.  Edward Elgar Publishing, p. 192.  
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2.4.2.3 Dolphin-Tuna  In the Eastern Tropical Pacific (ETP) Ocean schools of yellowfin tuna typically swim underneath schools of dolphin. When tuna is fished with purse seine nets, dolphins may be trapped in the nets as well, and they often die unless they are released. The US Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA)201 established requirements for tuna fishing. 
The MMPA prohibited the ‘taking’ (hunting, killing, capture) of marine mammals, including dolphins.202 Fisherman in many places around the world used purse seine nets as a means to catch tuna.203 The US placed restrictions on the number of dolphins that could be killed in the catching of tuna.204 Due to the high incidence of dolphin deaths, the US banned many imports of tuna from these places.205 The US also placed a ban on 
imports from ‘intermediate’ nations who processed tuna from fishing nations with a high dolphin mortality rate.206   Mexico requested a panel in 1991 against the US ban.207 The panel found that the US could only apply regulations on the quality or content of imported tuna, but not on the way it was produced (product vs. process issue).208 The focus of the panel was on whether the measure was consistent with the GATT, and not whether the policy was environmentally correct.209 The ban was considered an extra-territorial application of the MMPA.210 All GATT members, including the thirty-five member GATT Council, 
supported the panel’s decision and not the US.211   
In 2008, Mexico challenged the US’ use of a ‘dolphin-safe’ label on tuna products.212 Mexico argued that the measure was discriminatory and unnecessary under the GATT                                                         201 Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), October 21, 1972. 202 Ibid., section 103.   203 FAO, Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, Tuna Purse-Seining, http://www.fao.org/fishery/fishtech/40/en. 204 MMPA, above n. 201, section 302.  205 Ibid., section 101(a)(2).  206 Ibid., section 101(a)(2)(D).  207 WTO, Mexico etc versus US: ‘Tuna-dolphin’. Accessed 11 February 2016, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/edis04_e.htm; a case brought by Mexico and others against the US under GATT. The case was settled outside of the GATT.  208 Vogel, above n. 16, p. 118. 209 WTO, above n. 207. 210 Ibid. 211 Vogel, above n. 16, p. 113. 212 Panel Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), above n. 138. The dispute concerned the following measures: 1) the 
United States Code, Title 16, Section 1385 (‘Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act’), 2) the Code of 
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and TBT Agreement.213 The WTO ruled that the US labeling program was indeed discriminatory because tuna caught in the ETP had to meet additional criteria to qualify 
for the ‘dolphin-safe’ label.214 The Panel recommended that the US bring its measures into conformity with the TBT Agreement.215  This case meets most of the requirements for a Brussels Effect. The US has the regulatory capacity to enforce its rules in the US and abroad. The requirement to use proper nets for the safety of dolphins is a strict standard. Since this is a standard that regulates a consumer market, it is also inelastic and cannot be moved to another jurisdiction. At the time of the original dispute, the US was the biggest market for canned tuna products,216 making up over half of global tuna consumption.217 Since then, the demand in western Europe has surpassed that of the US.218 Canned tuna, however, is a divisible product. The US has established requirements for storing dolphin-safe and non-dolphin-safe tuna on board fishing vessels and in processing operations. Tracking and tracing along with auditing of fishing vessels is conducted.219                                                                                                                                                                               
Federal Regulations, Title 50, Section 216.91 (‘Dolphin-safe labeling standards’) and Section 216.92 
(‘Dolphin-safe requirements for tuna harvested in the ETP [Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean] by large purse seine 
vessels’) and 3) the ruling in Earth Island Institute v. Hogarth, 494 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2007). Vogel, above n. 15, p. 
106. (‘The law required companies selling “dolphin-safe” tuna to be able to demonstrate that their product was caught using methods that limited dolphin deaths. It also required all other tuna to be labeled “caught with 
technologies that are known to kill dolphins.”’). 213 Panel Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), above n. 138, at 4.4, 4.5.  214 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), ‘Dolphin-Safe’ Tuna, NOAA Tracking Program 
Verifies Claims. Accessed 11 February 2016, http://www.noaa.gov/features/04_resources/tuna.html. 215 Panel Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), above n. 138, at 381.  216 FAO (2004), Analysis of the Tuna Industry, http://www.fao.org/docrep/008/y5984e/y5984e0n.htm, figure 13B. See also http://aciar.gov.au/files/node/2148/MN028%20part%2021.pdf  (EU figures) and http://aciar.gov.au/files/node/2148/MN028%20part%2022.pdf (US figures). 217 Vogel, above n. 15. 218 In 2008: Western Europe (76 million cases consumed), US (48 million cases consumed). Forum Fisheries Agency (2011), Market and Industry Dynamics in the Global Tuna Supply Chain, https://www.ffa.int/node/567. 219 ‘The DPCIA itself expressly mandates the use of written statements by captains to attest that either no purse seine net was intentionally deployed on or used to encircle dolphins during the trip in which the tuna were caught, and (in some cases) to also attest that no dolphins were killed or seriously injured in the sets or other gear deployments in which the tuna were caught. The tracking and verification system does not rely solely on certifications by fishing captains. As described elsewhere in this rule, certifications by an onboard observer or by an authorized representative of the nation participating in a qualified and authorized observer program are also used to help verify the dolphin-safe status of the harvested tuna for some fishing trips. The tracking and verification system also includes recordkeeping and inspections at processing facilities and certifications by 
importers and exporters.’ 
‘Regulations at 50 CFR 216.93(c)(4) and (d)(4) already require vessels to segregate non-dolphin-tuna and dolphin-safe tuna. Additionally, 50 CFR 216.93(f)(3) gives the Administrator, Southwest Region, timely access 
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Both the de facto and the de jure Brussels Effect can be seen in different ways in this case. Due to the threat of important restrictions and US consumer preferences, several nations adjusted their fishing procedures to meet the requirements of the MMPA. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, New Zealand, Senegal, and Spain, among others, pressed their fishing boats to comply with MMPA requirements for dolphin release procedures.220 Bermuda, Canada, South Korea, and Nicaragua stopped using purse seine nets in the ETP.221  Even more importantly, Mexico changed its original stance on the issue. President Carlos 
Salinas de Gortari professed a ‘deep love of dolphins’ and announced a plan to protect them.222 Mexico also never submitted the panel report to the GATT Council for formal option, despite pressure from other nations.223 Lastly, in May 1992, the US, Mexico, and eight other nations, which together made up 99 percent of tuna fishing in the ETP, developed and signed an international accord to protect dolphins, which included phasing out the use of purse seine nets.224   It is unlikely that the Mexican President Salinas had a sudden change of heart and interest in saving dolphins. It is instead likely that that this turnaround was brought about by political and economic pressure from Mexican fishermen and/or producers as potential voters, as it became more profitable to use other, dolphin-safe fishing methods.  The EU also had a dramatic change in its views on fishing with purse seine nets. It had been an intermediate processor of tuna from countries such as Mexico, and its products were therefore banned in the US. The EU had fought this within the WTO dispute settlement system on two occasions.225 In 1992, however, the European Parliament turned around and called for a ban on imports of tuna that were caught by methods that                                                                                                                                                                              to all pertinent records and facilities to allow for audits and spot-checks on caught, landed, stored, and processed tuna. NMFS believes the current system is already working well and the increased authorities and requirements of this rule will fortify the verification program. In addition, the new observer requirements will afford NMFS an additional tool in verifying the dolphin-safe status of the harvested tuna.’ (from National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) (2013), Enhanced Document Requirements to Support Use of 
the Dolphin Safe Label on Products, https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2013/07/09/2013-16508/enhanced-document-requirements-to-support-use-of-the-dolphin-safe-label-on-tuna-products) 220 Vogel, above n. 15, p. 107. 221 Ibid., p. 107.  222 Economist (1991), Divine Porpoises, at 31.  223 Vogel, above n. 15. 224 Ibid., p. 116.  225 WTO, above n. 207. 
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resulted in dolphin mortality.226 This measure was not adopted by the European Council of Ministers, out of fear that action would be taken against the EU within the WTO.227 The EU did, however, forbid ships from its own member states from using purse seine nets.228 The EU also uses a dolphin friendly label under Council Regulation (EC) No. 882/2003.229   
 Analysis and conclusions  The hypothesis was that the Brussels Effect is greater where WTO law and law of the dominant regulator diverge. Therefore, in cases where there is no relevant WTO law, the Brussels Effect is more likely to prevail. In all the cases above, the WTO poses limits, to varying extents, on the ability of a dominant regulator to impose its standards on other countries. The hypothesis proved true when we look in the black-letter of the respective WTO rulings, but the actual effects in action were typically something different.   In the GMO case, the WTO ruled against the EU for its de facto restrictions on GMO approvals. The effect of the ruling was limited in practice, however, since GM products are currently minimally found on the EU market. Pollack and Shaffer described this as 
‘reform without change’.230 The EU did significantly modify its legislation on GMOs since the WTO ruling.231 It ended its moratorium on new GMO approvals and even approved seventeen GM crops between May 2004 and November 2008.232 Despite being approved for food and feed, however, they are mostly only used for feed. There is still largely an absence of GM products on the EU food market. The EU changed its legislation so that it is justifiable under the WTO dispute settlement system but otherwise it has not had much of an effect. In the hormones case, the WTO also ruled against the EU’s ban on hormones in meat. Instead of changing its laws and allowing the import of hormone-treated beef, the EU preferred to accept retaliatory tariffs imposed by the US and Canada.233 This case expressed a limit of WTO power. The WTO solution of retaliatory                                                         226 Vogel, above n. 15, p. 116. 227 Ibid., p. 116-117.  228 Ibid., p. 116-117. 229 Council Regulation (EC) No 882/2003 of 19 May 2003 establishing a tuna tracking and verification system. OJ L 127/1, 25.3.2003.  230 Pollack & Shaffer, above n. 46, p. 260. 231 Ibid., p. 260.  232 Ibid., p. 260. 233 Kerr & Hobbs, above n. 200, p. 192; WTO, above n. 185. 
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tariffs was an insufficient incentive for the EU to change its behavior. The WTO ruled against the US in the dolphin/tuna case for the extra-territorial application of US laws and for discriminating between WTO members. The US changed its laws so that they were no longer discriminatory, but still exerted its influence by requiring that exporting countries meet its standards.234   The WTO has settled many disputes and solved many trade issues, but nevertheless, its 
impact is limited in situations where ‘social and regulatory approaches to technology 
and its risks are deeply engrained’.235 In such situations regulatory convergence is 
‘significantly constrained’236 and ‘not even globalization’s powerful dynamics can push 
states into cooperating’.237   The Brussels Effect was identified in all cases: both a de facto and a de jure Brussels Effect occurred. When compared with the five essential factors for a Brussels Effect as discussed by Bradford,238 however, the dominant regulator often did not meet all of the criteria. Frequently the products were divisible. Even though not all the boxes were checked, the effect was still present. This study found that therefore not all five criteria are necessary to see the effect.   Additionally, Bradford stated that international institutions such as the WTO may place limits on the Brussels Effect, which may lead to what we call reversed harmonization. 
This paper found that while the WTO ‘black-letter law’ does place limits on the effect, WTO law in action does not. We hence could not find any evidence that the WTO leads to reversed harmonization or would facilitate horizontalization.  In all three cases above, it has been demonstrated that the WTO has attempted to constrain the Brussels Effect, and it ruled in such a way in the DSU system. The WTO ruling had little effect on the way the dominant regulator acted, however, and also on the end result. Essentially, the WTO tried to constrain the Brussels Effect, but had little success in doing so. It is important to keep in mind again that this effect is based only on three cases in the WTO dispute settlement system. The results cannot necessarily be extrapolated to all instances of the Brussels Effect in the SPS area, or even beyond.                                                          234 Vogel, above n. 15, p. 107. 235 Pollack & Shaffer, above n. 46, p. 23. 236 Ibid., p. 23.  237 Drezner, above n. 162, p. 5. 238 Bradford, above n. 1, p. 10-19. 
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Abstract239  According to Articles 2.2, 5.1 and 5.2 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), Members need to base sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS measures) on scientific principles and risk assessment. 
These provisions have sparked analysis on issues such as how this ‘risk’ needs to be addressed, how ‘science’ needs to be interpreted, and what the relationship is between values and science. It is commonly observed that the SPS Agreement leans toward a technical approach to the determination of risk. If socio-economic concerns would be taken into account in the SPS Agreement, a leeway for Members to introduce protectionist policies would open up. We illustrate with the example of the ongoing citrus dispute between the European Union and South Africa that the technical approach can likewise be used to shield protectionist policies with an extraterritorial effect. The reason for this is the uncertainty with regards to how science needs to be interpreted in relation to the probability that a disease will be introduced. Rather than debating the 
options of ‘socio-economic’ risk and ‘technical’ risk only, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body should use disputes such as the one on citrus to develop a more normative 
approach to ‘risk’ in the SPS Agreement, indicating the ‘probability’ that is normatively required to justify SPS measures.   
                                                        239 This chapter is based on Dominique Sinopoli & Kai Purnhagen (2016), When Life Gives you Lemons: The 
‘Battle of Science’ on the Correct Interpretation of Data on Citrus Black Spot Disease Between the European Union and South Africa According to the SPS Agreement. Trade, Law and Development 8(1): 29-62.  
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 Introduction  The requirement to base sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS measures) on science under Article 2.2 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) has sparked lively scholarly debate in recent decades240 and has been the subject of a number of WTO disputes.241 The extensive analysis in case law and scholarly work, however, has not led to certainty regarding what evidence Members have to present to uphold an SPS measure. On the contrary, these works have left a trail of uncertainty in many respects. For instance, can data from only risk assessment242 or from risk management as well243 be applied? Can values and cultures also be incorporated into SPS measures?244 What can be established as common ground, however, is that in the area of policy-making, at least in practice, a technical view of risk within the SPS context still prevails.245 The major reason for this is, from a WTO trade law perspective, summarized by Quick and Blüthner: ‘[I]t will be extremely 
difficult to replace the “scientific” route chosen by the SPS Agreement with a new approach taking socio-economic considerations into account without opening Pandora’s box and allowing WTO Members to introduce protectionist measures.’246  The uncertainty with regards to how science needs to be interpreted to establish a 
sound ‘probability’ in terms of the SPS Agreement can be used as a shield for bringing forward such policies that impose internal standards of a bigger trading bloc on a smaller partner. In this piece, we will go beyond the classical understanding that looks only at whether measures protect internal trade to classify them as protectionist. Instead, we will look at the often overlooked facet that these measures can also be protectionist with regards to domestic standards as they factually dominate other markets.                                                          240 For a summary, see Downes, above n. 97, p. 91. 241 WTO, above n. 77. 242 In this vein Atik, above n. 57; Warren H. Maruyama (1998), A New Pillar of the WTO: Sound Science. The 
International Lawyer 32(3): 651-677, p. 665.  243 Marijn P. Poortvliet, Martijn Duineveld & Kai Purnhagen (2016), Risk Communication: Performativity in Action: How Risk Communication Interacts in Risk Regulation. European Journal of Risk Regulation 7(1): 213-217. (Illustrating that in practice risk management and risk assessment cannot easily be distinguished as risk assessment is largely dependent on the discourses in risk management).   244 On this point, see n. 240, p. 102-03.  245 Jacqueline Peel (2004), Risk Regulation Under the WTO SPS Agreement: Science as an International Normative Yardstick? Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 02/04, p. 54. 246 Reinhard Quick & Andreas Blüthner (1999), Has the Appellate Body Erred? An Appraisal and Criticism of the WTO Hormones Case. Journal of International Economic Law 2(4): 603-639, p. 639. 
CHAPTER 3 
 
 
54 
Section 3.2 of the article will illustrate how interpretations of the ‘science’ paradigm in 
Art. 2.2 of the SPS Agreement and the ‘risk’ paradigm in Art. 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement, in case law and scholarly work, have translated into uncertainty for Members regarding which scientific evidence to take into account and how to interpret 
science correctly in a way to establish ‘probability’. In section 3.3, using an example from EU law, we will argue that such uncertainty invites Members to behave opportunistically by using such legal gaps for their own interest. Subsequently, in section 3.4 we will illustrate this with the example of the ongoing battle between South Africa and the EU on regulations for citrus. In section 3.5, we will also show what a sensible solution to this problem, an alternative measure in compliance with Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement, may look like. Section 3.6 of the article will conclude with a suggestion to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body to use this dispute, if it ever gets to the final stage, to provide clearer guidelines on how to interpret these provisions of the SPS Agreement.  
 ‘Science’ and ‘risk’ according to the SPS Agreement? 
Illustrating the trail of uncertainty  WTO law is designed to enable free trade among its Member States. However, according to the SPS Agreement, Members are allowed to establish SPS measures that affect trade if necessary for the protection of life or health. SPS measures have become more important stumbling blocks in international trade than tariffs and quantitative restrictions.247 As the European Commission acknowledges, ‘[i]n today’s transatlantic trade relationship, the most significant trade barrier is not the tariff paid at the customs, 
but so called “behind-the-border” obstacles to trade, such as different safety or environmental standards for cars.’248  It might be for this reason that WTO law lays down relatively strict requirements for SPS measures. In practice, the rationalization approach taken by WTO SPS law has been a major reason for disputes among the Member States. SPS law requires SPS measures to 
be ‘based on scientific principles’ and ‘not maintained without sufficient scientific 
evidence’ (Art. 2.2 of the SPS Agreement). Furthermore, they need to be ‘based on an 
assessment (…) of the risk (…)’ (Art. 5.1 of the SPS Agreement), where Members need to 
‘take into account available scientific evidence’ (Art. 5.2 of the SPS Agreement). Paragraph 4 of Annex A of the SPS Agreement defines further requirements of risk                                                         247 Henson & Loader, above n. 58, p. 85. 248 European Commission, above n. 52. 
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assessment without embarking on the method that is to be used.249 In several cases, the Appellate Body (AB) has provided a bit more flesh on the bones by providing some normative requirements for risk assessment according to WTO SPS law. Risk assessment 
needs to be ‘characterised by systematic, disciplined and objective inquiry’250, which 
must build on ‘legitimate science according to the rationale of the relevant scientific 
community’.251 With regards to whether an SPS measure can be upheld to prevent the spreading of a disease, the AB determined that risk assessment has to establish the likelihood or probability (not merely the possibility) that the pest or disease will spread without the measure252, followed by a thorough evaluation of this probability or likelihood.253 It remained silent, however, with regards to whether the probability must be a certain value to justify an SPS measure, and if so, what that may be. Beyond that WTO law has mainly told us what does not constitute a benchmark. The science on which the measure is based does not need to represent the mainstream opinion in the scientific community;254 it does not need to reflect methods of international standards,255 nor does it need to exclusively follow the list provided in Art. 5.2 of the SPS Agreement.256 Some commentators hence conclude that the WTO regime does not 
subscribe ‘to a purely technical approach to SPS risk’;257 others interpret these 
requirements as a ‘sound science’ approach258 and therefore hail the benefits of such a technocratic, science-driven approach.259 Either way, the extreme variation in the interpretation of these SPS provisions in scholarly literature illustrates the uncertainty left by SPS law with regards to its normative requirements for justifying SPS measures. From these provisions alone it is very hard, if not impossible, for Members to derive some legal certainty regarding which science is appropriate and how to interpret science to meet the exigencies of WTO law. Such leeway in the law invites Members to behave opportunistically, using the uncertainty to their advantage and designing                                                         249 The latter point was highlighted by Downes, above n. 97, p. 99. 250 Appellate Body Report, European Communities–Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (EC – Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R (16 January 1998), para. 187.  251 Appellate Body Report, United States–Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC-Hormones Dispute (US – Continued Suspension), WT/DS320/AB/R (16 October 2008), para. 591. 252 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon (Australia – Salmon), WT/DS18/AB/R (20 October 1998), para. 123.  253 Ibid., para. 124. 254 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, above n. 250, paras. 187, 194.  255 Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Suspension, above n. 251, para. 685.  256 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, above n. 250, para.187. 257 Downes, above n. 97, p. 99. 258 Gavin Goh (2006), Tipping the Apple Cart: The Limits of Science and Law in the SPS Agreement after Japan – Apples. Journal of World Trade 40(4): 655-686, p. 677. 259 Quick & Blüthner, above n. 246.   
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protectionist measures shielded as a ‘scientific necessity’. In certain situations the existence of scientific data is not questioned, but the interpretation of these data as required by the law is rather uncertain (‘battle of science’).  
The textbook example of such a ‘battle of science’ in trade law is the proceedings between France and the European Commission in the aftermath of the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) crisis.260 After risk assessment showed uncertainty about a possible link between BSE and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, which affects human beings, the Commission adopted a ban prohibiting the UK from exporting beef to other Member States and third countries.261 The ban was soon thereafter lifted due to a new interpretation of scientific evidence under the condition that the origin of the beef was traceable according to the ‘date-based export scheme’ (DBES). France, however, still refused to import British beef due to the health concerns expressed, especially by the French Food Standards Agency (AFSSA), which had interpreted the same data differently. The Commission compromised by allowing France to distinctively mark British beef. However, French authorities would still have to accept the marketing of British beef in France. France, however, continued to prohibit the marketing of British beef. The British Farmers’ Union (NFU) hence filed an action in French courts to enforce their freedom of movement rights, which was then referred to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The Court decided that as the DBES was a maximum-harmonization-
measure France could not rely on (today’s) Art. 36 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) to prevent British beef imports.262 It thereby circumvented the rather delicate question with regards to the normative requirements that EU law imposes on the interpretation of scientific evidence and simply decided who decides. In the absence of such a clear hierarchy in WTO law, this institutional solution would not work. Hence, in WTO law, a different solution should be found to prevent Members from using the uncertainty with regards to the interpretation of science as both a shield and a sword for their own interest.  
                                                        260 The following passage is a shortened and revised version of a passage in Kai Purnhagen (2015), The EU’s Precautionary Principle in Food Law is an Information Tool! European Business Law Review 26(5): 903-921, p. 917-918; For further reference, see Karolina Szawlowska (2004), Risk Assessment in the European Food Safety Regulation: Who is to Decide Whose Science is Better? Commission v. France and Beyond. German Law Journal 5(1): 1259-1274.  261 Commission Decision 96/239, Emergency Measures to Protect Against Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, 1996 O.J.(L 78)47 (EC). 262 Case C-241/01, Nat’l Farmers’ Union v. Secrétariat générale du gouvernement, 2002, E.C.R. I-9070. 
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 The citrus dispute as a case study – How uncertainty with 
regards to the interpretation of science supports the 
extraterritorial effect of SPS measures   In the absence of such a normative solution, the uncertainty with regards to the ‘science’ paradigm at WTO level can be used by economically strong Members to use SPS measures in a protectionist way with regards to their domestic standards, where these domestic standards then influence standard-setting in less strong countries (section 3.3.1). Subsequently, we will illustrate with the example of the citrus dispute between 
South Africa and the EU how the ‘science’ paradigm in the SPS Agreement can be used to this end (section 3.3.2). This case was selected specifically since it is an ongoing dispute. Since this paper claims to use a case such as the citrus dispute to introduce a more 
normative approach to ‘risk’, it is important to select a case for illustration where there is still potential for the incorporation of such an approach.  
3.3.1 Possibility of Members to use SPS measures to protect local 
markets and extraterritorialize standards and their effects  Due to varying socio-economic settings, Members aim to reach different goals with their SPS measures:  
‘First, there are significant differences in tastes, diets, income levels and 
perceptions...Differences in climate and in the available technology (from 
refrigeration through to irradiation) affect the incidence of different food 
safety and agricultural health hazards. Standards reflect the feasibility of 
implementation, which itself is influenced by legal and industry structures as 
well as available technical, scientific, administrative and financial resources. 
Some food safety risks, for example, tend to be greater in developing 
countries due to weaknesses in physical infrastructure (for example 
standards of sanitation and access to potable water) and the higher 
incidence of certain infectious diseases. Further, tropical or sub-tropical 
climatic conditions may be more conducive to the spread of certain pests and 
diseases that pose risks to human, animal and/or plant health.’263                                                          263 Jaffee & Henson, above n. 58, p. 1-2. 
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Lenient standards allow for more exports from developing countries and are usually perceived to be better for farmers and the economy as a whole. However, stricter requirements are important for, inter alia, consumer safety and plant health.264 While different SPS measures reflect different needs of the respective populations and may be implemented for legitimate reasons,265 they can also be used as tools to impede international trade and protect domestic producers and consumers, typically through unsubstantiated requirements and unnecessary and/or costly inspections and tests.266 While certainly not all SPS standards are protectionary regulations in disguise, it can be difficult to distinguish them from SPS measures that are justified by a legitimate goal.267 Nevertheless, many national regulations disadvantage imports, whether intentionally or unintentionally.  The EU is often considered to have the most stringent SPS standards.268 The proliferation of stringent SPS standards has been a major burden on many developing countries in particular since they may face constraints in implementing more stringent standards and complying with non-domestic and international requirements. Additionally, compliance with SPS measures is a prerequisite and challenge for them to access developed country markets. Products that do not comply with local regulations cannot be sold in these markets. In this way, and under certain circumstances, bigger trading blocs can use trade to impose their domestic standards on other countries, the so-called extraterritorial effect.269                                                          264 However, there will likely always be a debate over the ALOP due to different ‘conflicting interests, perceptions of risk, and estimations of what constitutes international scientific best practices regarding food 
safety (…) The criteria to determine whether standards are “too high” or “too low” are likely arguable’. John S. Wilson & Tsunehiro Otsuki (2003), Balancing Risk Reduction and Benefits from Trade in Setting Standards. 2020 Vision for Food, Agriculture and the Environment, Focus 10, Brief 6.   265 See illustratively Robert Howse (2000), Democracy, Science, and Free Trade: Risk Regulation on Trial at the World Trade Organization. Michigan Law Review 98(7): 2329-2357, p. 2329, 2342 (stipulating that the ALOP 
determines ‘citizens’ preference about risk' in opposition to the scientific determination of risk itself needed to justify SPS measures). 266 Zarrilli, above n. 62; Gerhard Erasmus (2014), This Dispute is About More Than Black Spots on Oranges. 
Tralac, https://www.tralac.org/discussions/article/6519-this-dispute-is-about-more-than-black-spots-on-oranges.html. Due to scarce resources developing countries often face difficulties in determining the ALOP in light of their socio-economic needs, see Wahidin & Purnhagen, above n. 59. 267 Zarrilli, above n. 62. 268 Henson & Loader, above n. 58; Y. Gebrehiwet, S. Ngqangweni & J.F. Kirsten (2007), Quantifying the Trade Effect of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regulations of OECD Countries on South African Food Exports. Agrekon 46(1): 23-39.  269 Bradford, above n. 1. 
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Many African countries in particular face critical challenges in exporting products to developed country markets. For several reasons, it is often difficult to comply with more stringent standards in these markets. Demand for product quality is typically lower among consumers in these countries than consumers in developed countries. This is largely due to limited awareness of food safety and quality, lack of strong consumer organizations, and due to a lack of financial capacity, being forced to tolerate lower-quality products, training and technology.270 Producers also do not view product quality as essential when producing for the domestic market.271 In addition, because domestic consumer expectations of product quality are much lower, national regulations are typically more lenient than international regulations. It can therefore be challenging and costly for producers to adopt better practices if they need to meet more stringent foreign or international standards for exportation. Challenges involved in improving production and quality standards to meet the requirements in import markets include improving quality assurance and management systems, monitoring, evaluation, product testing and packaging methods. This can be difficult particularly when there are weaknesses in surveillance and risk analysis systems, and inadequate testing facilities. It also requires large investments in human capital and infrastructure to improve facilities. Additionally, it is difficult to keep track of the ever-changing SPS standards and technical requirements of trading partners in other countries.272 While an extraterritorial effect of stricter standards from other countries might hence be beneficial for the protection of health and safety in developing countries,273 it would also have a negative impact, including a loss of export revenue, employment and income. In addition, if a 
consignment is rejected at the importing country’s border, additional costs incurred include loss of product value and transport costs.274 It remains to be seen, however, whether the benefits of stricter standards will outweigh their costs.  Quantitative studies so far point in the direction that the extraterritorial effect of higher standards does not outweigh the costs for African countries. For example, Otuski, Wilson and Sewadah compared the EU and Codex standards on aflatoxin levels in cereals, edible nuts, and dried and preserved fruits.275 They found that the EU standard, in comparison                                                         270 John S. Wilson & Victor O. Abiola (2003), Standards and Global Trade: A Voice for Africa. World Bank, p. xx.  271 Ibid. 272 Ibid. 273 Tsunehiro Otsuki, John S. Wilson & Mirvat Sewadeh (2001), Saving Two in a Billion: Quantifying the Trade Effect of European Food Safety Standards on African Exports. Food Policy 26(5): 495–514; Wilson & Otsuki, above n. 264; Wahidin & Purnhagen, above n. 59. 274 Gebrehiwet et al., above n. 268, p. 26-27; Wilson & Otsuki, above n. 264.  275 Otsuki et al., above n. 273.  
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with the Codex Alimentarius standard, would reduce the risk to public health by approximately 1.4 deaths per billion a year—and also result in a 64% decrease in African exports, amounting to a total of USD 670 million.276 These findings suggest that it is difficult to justify trade losses based on gains in public health, although these cases cannot be generalized.277  In another study by Gebrehiwet et al., the trade effect of total aflatoxin levels set by five OECD countries (Ireland, Italy, Sweden, Germany and the United States) on South African food exports was measured.278 They found that if these five countries had adopted the total aflatoxin level recommended by Codex Alimentarius, South Africa would have gained an estimated additional USD 69 million per year from food exports. These are only a couple of examples of the many studies that show the trade effect of stringent SPS standards on developing countries.279  In line with the economic trade rationale that underlies the WTO, such numbers should not go unnoticed. In fact, facilitating trade, whenever possible, is therefore a great instrument for improving the economic situation in developing countries such as South Africa.280 This is particularly truer as Art. 10 of the SPS Agreement states that Members shall take the special needs of developing countries into account.  
3.3.2 How the ‘science’ policy supports extraterritorialization of 
standards – A case study on the citrus dispute between South 
Africa and the EU  
The extraterritorial effect described is supported by the ‘science’ policy of WTO SPS law. The uncertainty concerning the interpretation of science in a WTO context, we argue, facilitates such an extraterritorial effect of measures. We will illustrate this with the example of the citrus dispute between South Africa and the EU.   
                                                        276 Otsuki et al., above n. 273.; Wilson & Otsuki, above n. 264.  277 Wilson & Otsuki, above n. 264.  278 Gebrehiwet et al., above n. 268, p. 26-27. 279 Ibid. 280 Globalization 101, Trade-Not-Aid. Accessed 14 October 2015, http://www.globalization101.org/trade-not-aid/. 
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3.3.2.1 The citrus dispute – Background  Over the past couple of decades, South Africa and the European Union have had an ongoing debate regarding the level of risk posed by the importation of citrus fruit containing the fungus Guignardia citricarpa (or Phyllosticta citricarpa), the agent responsible for citrus black spot (CBS) disease, into the EU. CBS causes spotty lesions on the rind, thus reducing the appeal of the fruit, but does not cause internal decay and is also not dangerous for human consumption. However, severe infections can cause premature fruit drop and highly blemished fruits are unmarketable. Additionally, infected orchards require additional fungicide treatments, and once the fungus is established it is very difficult to eradicate.281 Although almost all citrus species are susceptible to the disease, sour orange and Tahiti limes are not affected. Lemons are particularly susceptible; therefore, when the disease becomes established in a new area it usually appears first on lemons.282  CBS has a wide global distribution but is only known to occur in countries with a subtropical, summer rainfall climate. In addition to South Africa, it has been found in New South Wales, Australia; Argentina; Bhutan; Brazil; China; Indonesia; India; Kenya; Mozambique; Nigeria; Philippines; Swaziland; Taiwan; Uruguay; Venezuela; West Indies;283 Zimbabwe and Zambia.284  CBS has never become established in any region with a Mediterranean, i.e. winter rainfall climate, including the citrus-producing areas of the Western Cape province of South Africa, southern and western Australia, Chile, Spain, Greece, Israel, Italy, Turkey                                                         281 EFSA Panel on Plant Health (2014), Scientific Opinion on the Risk of Phyllosticta citricarpa (Guidnardia 
citricarpa) for the EU Territory with Identification and Evaluation of Risk Reduction Options. EFSA Journal 12(2): 3557.  282 Kotzé, J.M. (1981), Epidemiology and Control of Citrus Black Spot in South Africa. Plant Disease 65(12): 945-950, p. 945; V. Hattingh et al. (2000), Citrus Black Spot: Pest Risk Assessment Document for the Review of Current 
Phytosanitary Regulations Pertaining to the Export of Fresh Citrus Fruit from the Republic of South Africa to the 
EU; Department of Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries & National Agricultural Marketing Council (DAFF & NAMC) (2015), International Trade Probe. Issue No 55, p. 7; EFSA Panel on Plant Health (2008), Pest Risk Assessment 
and Additional Evidence Provided by South Africa on Guignardia citricarpa Kiely, Citrus Black Spot Fungus – 
CBS[1]-Scientific Opinion of the Panel on Plant Health. EFSA Journal 7(1); Erasmus, above n. 266; USDA APHIS Plant Protection and Quarantine (2010), Risk Assessment of Citrus spp. Fruit as a Pathway for the Introduction of 
Guignardia citricarpa Kiely, the Organism that Causes Citrus Black Spot Disease. Rev. 2. 283 E.C. Calavan (1960), Black Spot of Citrus. California Citrograph 46: 22-24. 284 Ida Paul, A.S. van Jaarsveld, L. Korsten & V. Hattingh (2005), The Potential Global Geographical Distribution of Citrus Black Spot Caused by Guignardia citricarpa (Kiely): Likelihood of Disease Establishment in the European Union. Crop Protection 24(4): 297-308, p. 297-298. 
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and California.285 Due to these climatic differences, CBS is actually not present throughout South Africa. While it is found in many provinces, particularly in the northeast region of the country, the following provinces are known to be CBS-free: Northern Cape, Free State, Western Cape (30 magisterial districts) and Northwest (2 magisterial districts).286  South Africa is a major global producer and exporter of citrus fruits, including oranges, grapefruit, lemons, limes, kumquats, pummelos, soft citrus and Seville oranges.287 These 
products are referred to collectively as ‘citrus fruit’ in this paper. In 2014, the country-wide industry exported citrus products to 119 countries. South Africa is the third largest exporter of citrus in the world, second only to Spain and China.288  Citrus fruit is produced all across South Africa; production in the cooler climates of the Western and Eastern Cape provinces is focused on navel oranges, soft citrus, lemons and limes, and the other warmer provinces grow primarily grapefruit and Valencia oranges.289 The industry produces 2 million tons and exports 1.7 million tons of citrus fruit (70% of the total volume produced) annually,290 making it a key component of 
South Africa’s agriculture sector. More than half of the country’s fresh fruit exports are citrus.291 Of all the southern hemisphere fresh citrus exports, 85% of grapefruit, 76% of oranges, 33% of soft citrus and 26% of lemons come from South Africa.292 It is one of the largest horticultural sectors in the country, second only to wine.293 The export sector is dominated by large commercial producers294 and brings in over ZAR295 5 billion (US$                                                         285 Hattingh et al., above n. 282, p. 5-6. 286 Department of Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries, Regulated Areas, Pest Free Areas with Regard to Citrus Black 
Spot in South Africa. Accessed 27 January 2017, http://www.daff.gov.za/daffweb3/Branches/Agricultural-Production-Health-Food-Safety/Plant-Health/National-Control-Measures/Regulated-areas. 287 Agricultural Product Standards Act, No. 119 of 1990; International Trade Centre (2010), South Africa: A Potential Market for Agri-Food Products from Africa. 288 ITC, Trade Map. Accessed 2 September 2015, http://www.trademap.org/Index.aspx. 289 Citrus Growers’ Association (2014), Annual Report. 290DAFF & NAMC, above n. 282, p. 7. 291 South African Citrus Black Spot Expert Working Group (2009), Position Document – Comments on the 
European Food Safety Authority’s Opinion on CBS, New Information and Implications for the Pest risk Assessment, p. 26. 292 Ibid. 293 DAFF & NAMC, above n. 282, p. 7. 294 H. Vermeulen, D. Jordaan, L. Korsten & J. Kirsten (2006), Private Standards, Handling and Hygiene in Fruit Export Supply Chains: A Preliminary Evaluation of the Economic Impact of Parallel Standards. International 
Association of Agricultural Economists Conference, Gold Coast, Australia, p. 2. 295 ZAR = South African rand. 
CHAPTER 3 
 
 
63 
370 million296) every year.297 The industry is also a major source of employment: 60,000 people are employed year round, and during the peak season from April to September,298 this figure rises to approximately 100,000.  The Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) of 2004 between the EU and South Africa introduced a free trade area (FTA). According to GATT Art. XXIV (1), this FTA is in itself subject to the rules of the SPS Agreement. The FTA has been 
successful insofar as the EU has become South Africa’s main trading partner. The TDCA has been beneficial to the South African citrus industry: exports increased from ZAR 1.1 billion (USD 82 million) in 2002 to ZAR 9.3 billion (USD 700 million299) in 2013.300 Many South African citrus producers, however, face problems with CBS. Import restrictions on citrus fruits infected with CBS have had a significant effect. Guignardia citricarpa, the agent responsible for CBS, is classified by the EU as a harmful quarantine organism in Council Directive 2000/29/EC.301 The Directive lays down the phytosanitary provisions to be met and control measures to be carried out at the place of origin and upon arrival in the EU. Decision 2014/422/E302 adds that citrus fruit from South Africa can only be introduced into the EU if consignments are shipped with a phytosanitary certificate, stating that: 1) the citrus has been subjected to treatments against CBS, 2) inspections have been conducted and no signs of CBS have been found to be present, and 3) samples have been taken and they do not show any signs of CBS (Annex point 1). Additionally, producers must have a traceability program and citrus fruits must be visually inspected upon arrival in the EU. In case of the presence of CBS, the batch from which the sample was taken is to be refused entry into the EU or destroyed (Article 1, Annex point 2). The 
Decision also states: ‘In case of recurring interceptions due to failing monitoring and certification procedures within the same year, the Commission will review this Decision before the sixth interception has been notified’.303                                                         296 As of 31 October 2016 (exchange rate: 1 USD = 13.8 ZAR). 297 South African Citrus Black Spot Expert Working Group, above n. 291, p. 26. 298 Nicolas Rubio (2013), Uncertainty of Policy Changes in the European Union Cloud Forecast for South African Citrus Exports. USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, GAIN report.  299 As of 31 October 2016 (exchange rate: 1 USD = 13.8 ZAR) 300 DAFF & NAMC, above n. 282, p. 7. 301 Council Directive 2000/29, on protective measures against the introduction into the Community of organisms harmful to plants or plant products and against their spread within the Community, Annex II pt. I § 1, 2000 O.J. (L 169) (EC). 302 Commission Implementing Decision of 2 July 2014 2014/422, setting out measures in respect of certain citrus fruits originating in South Africa to prevent the introduction into and the dpread within the Union of 
Phyllosticta citricarpa (McAlpine) Van der Aa (notified under document C(2014) 4191), 2014 O.J. (L 196). 303 Ibid., recital 4.  
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Citrus fruits infected with Guignardia citricarpa are therefore not allowed to be imported into the EU due to their quarantine regulations. South Africa is not the only country affected by this regulation; Argentina304 and Brazil305 in particular are both battling CBS and therefore face restrictions in accessing the EU market. The EU prohibits importing citrus fruit infected with CBS due to the risk it may pose to its own citrus producing countries in the Mediterranean, including Spain, Italy and Greece. This is due to its concern that a piece of infected fruit could transfer the disease to its own citrus orchards. Therefore, the EU has implemented various restrictions and bans on the importation of citrus fruit infected with CBS.   
3.3.2.2 The citrus dispute – A battle of science  Since 1992, the EU and South Africa have been engaged in a debate on CBS-related technical and political issues. Bilaterals over the past two decades have not resolved these issues.306 The debate is not on scientific facts or due to a lack of scientific information, so the precautionary principle is not relevant. It is rather on how to interpret the available scientific evidence to determine whether it is enough to justify an 
SPS measure. The subject of the issue is hence a ‘battle of science’, as described above, 
                                                        304 European Commission Health and Consumer Protection Directorate-General (2001), Final Report of a 
Mission Carried Out in Argentina from 10 to 14 September 2001 in order to Evaluate the Inspection Procedures for 
Citrus Fruit Originating in Argentina and Exported to the European Union. DG SANCO/4303/2001-MR final. 305 European Commission Health and Consumer Protection Directorate-General (2000), Final Report of a 
Mission Carried Out in Brazil from 3 to 6 July 2000 in order to Evaluate the Pre-Export Inspections on Citrus Fruit 
Originating in Brazil and Exported to the European Union. DG(SANCO)/1180/2000-MR final. 306 Hattingh et al., above n. 282; European Commission Health & Consumer Protection Directorate-General (2001), Report of the Commission Working Group on Evaluation of the Pest Risk Assessment (PRA) Prepared by 
South Africa on Citrus Black Spot (CBS); Directorate Plant Health & Quality (2002), Response from South Africa on 
the Report (dated 24/10/2001) of the EC Working Group (WG) Relating to the WG’s Evaluation of the Pest Risk 
Assessment (PRA) by South Africa on Citrus Black Spot (CBS); European Commission Health & Consumer Protection Directorate-General (2006), Report of the Commission Working Group on Evaluation of the Pest Risk 
Assessment Prepared by South Africa on Citrus Black spot (caused by Guignardia citricarpa Kiely); South African Citrus Black Spot Expert Working Group (2007), Report of the South African CBS Expert Working Group on 
Evaluation of the Pest Risk Analysis for Citrus Black Spot (Guignardia citricarpa) on Fresh Citrus Fruit from South 
Africa to the European Union; EFSA Panel on Plant Health (PLH), above n. 282; South African Citrus Black Spot Expert Working Group, above n. 291; South African Citrus Black Spot Expert Panel (2013), Comments on: EFSA 
Panel on Plant Health, 2013: Draft Scientific Opinion on the Risk of Phyllosticta citricarpa (Guignardia citricarpa) 
for the EU Territory with Identification and Evaluation of Risk Reduction Options; EFSA Panel on Plant Health (2015), Statement on the Comments by Hattingh et al. (2014) on the EFSA PLH Panel (2014) Scientific Opinion on 
Citrus Black Spot. EFSA Journal 13(1); among many others.  
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largely resulting from the fact that WTO law does not provide any guidance on how data must be interpreted.  South Africa has exported citrus to European countries since 1926,307 even though CBS has been present in some South African citrus orchards since 1929.308 Most South African citrus exported to Europe has, for a long time, been primarily for consumption in the northern European member states.309 Before the harmonization of the EU phytosanitary regulations in the early 1990s, citrus fruit exports to Europe were not subject to such strict phytosanitary regulations. Citrus fruits infected with CBS were instead regulated through quality standards, which permitted a maximum of three lesions per fruit.310 However, with the formation of what is now the EU, and therefore the customs union among many European countries, the EU became concerned about importing citrus infected with CBS due to the risk it may pose to its own citrus producing countries in the Mediterranean.  South Africa claims the EU’s phytosanitary measures against citrus black spot disease are not scientifically justified and are more trade restrictive than necessary. For example, CBS has never become established in any region with a Mediterranean climate (including the Western Cape, southern Australia, western Australia, Chile, Spain, Greece, Israel, Italy, Turkey and California) and only exists in places with a subtropical, summer rainfall climate. Therefore, South Africa argues that it is not possible for CBS to become established in the citrus-producing countries of the EU due to their Mediterranean climate.311 The use of climate matching techniques is a common way to measure the potential for the establishment of new species.312 Paul et al. compared the climates of places around the world where CBS is currently known to be distributed, and concluded that climate is an effective barrier for CBS establishment, and that the climate ‘in the vast majority of EU countries is definitely unsuitable for establishment’ of CBS.313  
                                                        307 Hattingh et al., above n. 282, p. 1. 308 Paul et al., above n. 284. 309 South African Citrus Black Spot Expert Working Group, above n. 291, p. 4. 310 Ibid., p 4. 311 Ibid. 312 A. Vicent (2006), Relationship between Environmental Variables and the Risk of Establishment of Guignardia citricarpa in Spain (unpublished manuscript). 313 Ida Paul et al., supra note 69, p. 302-304. 
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Additionally, CBS is only recorded to have spread to new areas through the movement of infected propagation material314 into areas where citrus is grown (and, as stated above, only in areas where the climate is suitable for establishment). There is not a single reported case of CBS being spread to new areas by citrus fruit.315 This is despite the fact that large quantities of CBS-infected citrus fruits have moved into these Mediterranean climate areas for many years.316 Additionally, timing—of the presence of spores, of inoculation and of susceptibility—is extremely important for CBS to occur. A series of consecutive steps would have to occur in order for CBS to become established. Therefore, South Africa argues that imported citrus fruit is highly unlikely to be a pathway for the establishment of CBS.317  The EU defends its position by arguing that there is a chance, however minimal it may be, that CBS could become established in the EU. The EFSA Panel on Plant Health conducted a risk assessment and concluded that CBS-infected fruit from South Africa poses a risk to European citrus orchards. The EU argued that ‘[a]lthough the probability would be low, it is believed possible that a single conidium318 could initiate infection and disease development on individual trees and this could ultimately lead to the eventual establishment of the disease in a citrus producing area over a long period of time’.319 Additionally, EFSA concluded that, based on climate data, release of infectious spores in EU citrus-growing areas is in most years early enough to coincide with the climatic conditions favorable for infection.320  In summary, based on undisputed data, South Africa argues that the EU measures are not scientifically justified and lack a technical basis. Additionally, they are more restrictive than necessary and have a negative impact on the South African citrus                                                         314 For example seeds and other plant material for the purpose of creating new plants 315 USDA APHIS Plant Protection and Quarantine, above n. 282. 316 ‘Despite over 100 years of unregulated movement of citrus fruit and citrus plant material within Australia, over 50 years of unregulated movement of citrus plants and 84 years of unregulated movement of citrus fruit from CBS endemic areas to non-endemic areas in South Africa and over 20 years of large scale citrus fruit exports from CBS-endemic countries to citrus producing regions in southern Europe (with as much as 84 years of such exports with smaller volumes), CBS has not establishment in any of these areas with a Mediterranean 
climate’. South African Citrus Black Spot Expert Panel, above n. 306, p. 1-2. Additionally, citrus has been exported to the EU from southern Africa since 1926; Hattingh et al., above n. 282, p. 5-6; Directorate Plant Health & Quality, above n. 306; South African Citrus Black Spot Expert Panel, above n. 306, p. 102. 317 USDA APHIS Plant Protection and Quarantine, above n. 282; South African Citrus Black Spot Expert Panel, above n. 306, p. 1-2.  318 The non-mobile spore of a fungus. 319 European Commission, Health & Consumer Protection Directorate-General, above n. 306. 320 EFSA Panel on Plant Health (PLH), above n. 281. 
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industry. Thus, South Africa claims that the measures imposed by the EU are not in compliance with the SPS Agreement. The EU argues that its territory is free from CBS, and since there is a chance that CBS could become established in the EU from imported fruit, it does not want to take the chance.321 One could meaningfully explain that the EU exercises its right to determine its own ALOP by proposing a zero risk strategy with regards to CBS. However, this would not cover the problem. The question here is not so much whether the zero tolerance is legal but rather whether the SPS measure to reach this policy is justified by science. To be more precise, as scientific facts are clear, both 
South Africa’s and the EU’s positions in this respect can be legitimately justified by science. There is a slight chance that CBS might spread, even if it is very unlikely. The major issue is thus: Is that enough to justify an SPS measure? Is the EU’s restriction a protectionist measure in disguise? According to which standard does science need to be evaluated? What lies behind these issues is a value judgment, namely, how to interpret science. This is particularly where the science-approach of the WTO comes to its limit and normative clarity is required.  
 Effect of the ban on South African citrus export markets – 
How bigger trading blocs define the ‘science only’ 
paradigm in WTO law  
In the absence of such normative clarity on the ‘science only’ approach, market forces rule the game. Bigger trading blocs may be tempted to use their market power to dominate regulatory standards. This carries the danger that the question of which 
‘science’ needs to be taken into account to satisfy WTO legal requirements will not be determined by law, but by the party with the bigger market power. We will illustrate this effect, again, with the example of the South African citrus dispute with the EU.  We have already emphasized that citrus fruit has been imported from South Africa for decades, potentially carrying CBS without being noticed and without doing harm. At the beginning of 2010, several consignments of South African citrus fruit were intercepted in the EU due to CBS. As a result, the European Commission announced in 2012 that it would institute a five-interception cutoff for South African citrus fruit infected with CBS                                                         321 WTO Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (2013), Summary of the Meeting 27-28 June 2013, G/SPS/R/71; WTO Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (2014), Summary of the Meeting 25-26 
March 2014, G/SPS/R/74; WTO Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (2014), Summary of the 
Meeting 15 and 17 October 2014, G/SPS/R/76. 
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during the 2013 season. If South Africa reached the cutoff point, the EU would implement stricter import measures, including possibly a complete ban.322 Therefore, the South African authorities and industry members strengthened CBS risk management measures in order to cope with the EU regulations and limit future potential interceptions.323  Nevertheless, the number of interceptions went above and beyond the threshold. After South Africa had 35 interceptions due to CBS, on 29 November 2013, the EU closed the market to South African citrus fruit for the remainder of the year.324 Since it was at the end of the export season,325 the effect on exports that year was not large; however, it would have consequences for future years.   The South African Citrus Growers’ Association (CGA) implemented additional measuresduring the 2014 season326 in order to avoid a ban. In order to export to the EU, 
orchards must have had a ‘clean record’ from the 2013 export season. All orchards must also have been tested for CBS using the pre-harvest ethephon test and must have been inspected within two weeks of harvesting. It is for these reasons that 1161 orchards withdrew their export registrations for the 2014 season.327 On 8 September 2014, after 28 interceptions during the 2014 season, South Africa voluntarily suspended exports to the EU except for citrus fruit from the Western Cape and Northern Cape provinces.328 However, given that approximately 80% of South African citrus production is in areas where CBS occurs, this is not a viable solution for South Africa.329 During the 2013 season, South Africa had exported 704,020 tons of citrus fruit to the EU, and in 2014 this figure dropped to 643,303.330 Due to the challenges and uncertainty associated with the European market, South Africa is diversifying its export market. The CGA has indicated                                                         322 Department of Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries (2013), Reports of a Ban of Exports of Fresh Citrus Fruit to 
the European Union due to Citrus Black Spot. Media Release. 323 Ibid. 324 Perishable Products Export Control Board (PPECB) (2014), Annual Report 2013-2014, p. 28.  325 Citrus arrives in the EU about four weeks after it is packed in South Africa, and interceptions in the EU are concentrated in September and October every year, Jacques Claassen (2014), Intense Lobbying to Ensure Citrus 
Exports. Farmer's Weekly, http://www.farmersweekly.co.za/a1gri-business/agribusinesses/intense-lobbying-to-ensure-citrus-exports/; Rubio, above n. 298. 326 Three out of five strikes were from one producer located in the Eastern Cape, and the product was organic lemons (confirmed by interview with a producer in the Western Cape).  327 Claassen, above n. 325. 328 Citrus Growers’ Association (2015). Annual Report. 329 Directorate Plant Health & Quality, above n. 306, p. 4.  330 ITC, above n. 288. 
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that alternative markets of interest are Indonesia, Thailand, China, USA, Vietnam, Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Russia, Ukraine and India.331 Russia has in particular become a more attractive market due to the recent sanctions on producers in the EU. In addition, in the 20 years of trade with Russia (as of 2 October 2015), not a single shipment has been rejected on phytosanitary grounds.332 Although in 2014 South Africa was able to divert some citrus fruit to these other export markets, estimations were that they shipped 15-20% less than in 2013.333 It is estimated that in 2014 the industry lost a total of ZAR 1 billion (USD 75 million),334 about half in revenue and the other half in additional spraying costs.   
 
Figure 3.1. Number of interceptions of South African citrus due to CBS in the European Union from 2003-2014335 *2010 information not available.                                                          331 Citrus Growers’ Association, above n. 289. Citrus Growers’ Association, above n. 328.  332 Fresh Plaza (2015), South Africa Main Citrus Supplier to Russia, http://www.freshplaza.com/article/134982/south-africa-main-citrus-supplier-to-russia. 333 Paul Vecchiatto (2014), SA Citrus Growers Halt Fruit Exports to EU. Investors Monthly, http://cached.newslookup.com/cached.php?ref_id=71&siteid=2060&id=8148489&t=1410151961; DAFF & NAMC, above n. 282, p. 8. 334 As of 31 October 2016 (exchange rate: 1 USD = 13.8 ZAR) 335 Sources of data: EUROPHYT (2011), Interceptions of Harmful Organisms in Commodities Imported into the EU 
Member States and Switzerland, http://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/plant/docs/ph_biosec_europhyt-interceptions-2011_summary.pdf; EUROPHYT (2012), Interceptions of Harmful Organisms in Commodities 
Imported into the EU Member States and Switzerland, http://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/plant/docs/ph_biosec_europhyt-interceptions-2012_summary.pdf; EUROPHYT (2013), Interceptions of Harmful Organisms in Commodities Imported into the EU Member States and 
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South Africa has criticized the lack of a harmonized inspection method in the EU. Interceptions in northern Europe, such as in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK are minimal. The majority of interceptions are in the south, particularly in Spain. It is possible that the inspections are done by visual confirmation, but spots on citrus fruit are not necessarily due to CBS, as there are numerous causes of black spots indistinguishable from CBS. South Africa is thus attempting to standardize inspection procedures.336  South African citrus growers and authorities have also made adjustments to comply with the EU requirements, including additional spraying, inspections, packhouse audits and testing, both in the orchard and the packhouse.337 These measures are very costly,338 but important to maintain access to the lucrative EU market. Nevertheless, given the uncertainty, the industry is diversifying its export markets to reduce dependence on the EU market in the long run.339 However, 2015 brought some surprising news: South Africa was able to increase its exports to the EU, for a total of 708,856 tons.340 The reason behind this increase is unclear. Were South Africa’s increased spraying and testing effective and not insufficient as previously thought? Were the weather conditions less conducive to the growth and spread of the fungus causing CBS? Was it because South Africa focused on the northern European harbors and avoided Spain since they had previously questioned their inspection methods?   
                                                                                                                                                                             
Switzerland, http://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/plant/docs/ph_biosec_europhyt-interceptions-2013_summary.pdf; EUROPHYT (2014), Interceptions of Harmful Organisms in Commodities Imported into the 
EU Member States and Switzerland, http://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/plant/docs/ph_biosec_europhyt-interceptions-2014_summary.pdf; EUROPHYT (2015), Interceptions of Harmful Organisms in Commodities 
Imported into the EU Member States and Switzerland, http://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/plant/docs/ph_biosec_europhyt-interceptions-2015_summary.pdf; Claassen, above n. 325; EFSA Panel on Plant Health (PLH), above n. 282. 336 South African Citrus Black Spot Expert Panel, above n. 306, p. 1-2; FreshFruitPortal.com (2015), South Africa 
Alleges “Inconsistent” Citrus Inspections in Southern Europe, http://www.freshfruitportal.com/news/2015/02/11/south-africa-alleges-inconsistent-citrus-inspections-in-southern-europe/. 337 DAFF & NAMC, above n. 282, p. 7; Freshfruitportal.com, above n. 336; Bureau for Food & Agricultural Policy (2014), Baseline Agricultural Outlook 2013-2014, p. 71. 338 André Jooste, Erik Kruger & Flip Kotze (2003), Standards and Trade in South Africa: Paving Pathways for 
Increased Market Access and Competitiveness. In John S. Wilson & Victor O. Abiola (Eds.), Standards and Global 
Trade: A Voice for Africa. World Bank.  339 Bureau for Food & Agricultural Policy, above n. 337, p. 71.   340 ITC, above n. 288. 
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South Africa disagrees with the EU’s zero tolerance approach to the presence of CBS on citrus fruit and argues it is more trade restrictive than necessary. During the whole process, South Africa tried to get help with its interpretation of data in front of international bodies. In March 2010, South Africa requested dispute resolution before the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC).341 Before this process could continue, both the EU and South Africa had to agree on the terms of reference and decide on three panel members. While the terms of reference have been agreed upon, there is still no consensus between the two parties regarding the panel members. This is a flaw in the system as it can stall the process for years. Even after six years, this dispute resolution has not gone one step further. In June 2013, after several years of exchanging opinions with the EU, the South African Department of Agriculture, Forest and Fisheries (DAFF) registered a trade concern with the WTO (#356).342 Due to the limited success of the IPPC panel process and the fact that the trade concern remains unresolved, in 2014 South Africa initiated a dispute at WTO level.343  It is most remarkable to see that on the one hand South Africa is of the opinion that the available scientific data are not sufficient to justify a ban such as the one imposed by the EU. On the other hand, in order to not lose the important EU market, South Africa had to factually adapt to EU standards. In other words, in the absence of clear normative guidance on how to interpret the available scientific data, the EU, the bigger trading partner, de facto imposes its interpretation of data with regards to citrus black spot disease and the respective measures to be taken on South Africa as the smaller trading partner.  
 Discussion  In this section we will investigate whether WTO law can provide a solution to the problem that the ‘science only’ uncertainty enables stronger trading blocs to de facto extraterritorialize their standards. In this sense, we will analyze, again with the example of the citrus dispute, whether the SPS Agreement can, and in what way it should, provide legal certainty with regards to how the relevant data are to be interpreted. The SPS                                                         341 The IPPC is a treaty for international cooperation in plant protection. The IPPC is named in the SPS Agreement as an organization that develops reference standards for phytosanitary measures.  342 WTO, SPS Information Management System: Specific Trade Concerns. Accessed 21 October 2015, http://spsims.wto.org/web/pages/search/stc/Search.aspx. 343 Citrus Growers’ Association, above n. 289, p. 6-7; WTO Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (2013), Summary of the Meeting 27-28 June 2013, G/SPS/R/71. 
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Agreement essentially applies three criteria by which a challenged SPS measure will be evaluated: there should be a scientific justification, the measure should be non-discriminatory and it should not be more trade-restrictive than necessary. Since the 
discrimination aspect is irrelevant in this case, the EU’s measure will be analyzed according to the other two criteria.   
3.5.1 Scientific justification: Probability as a benchmark under 
Articles 2.2 and 5.1  As discussed earlier, this case is an example of a ‘battle of science’ dispute. South Africa and the EU have been debating whether or not CBS can become established in the EU from infected South African citrus fruit. Their discussions focus on the technical aspects of this possibility. South Africa argues that based on scientific evidence CBS cannot become established in the EU. A whole series of consecutive, unlikely steps would need to occur for this to happen. The EU counters this by saying that the scientific evidence demonstrates that there is a small chance that CBS could become established. Since discussions between South Africa and the EU over 22 years could not settle the disagreement, the WTO will take on the role of a mediator and global regulator in this dispute. The WTO will be faced with the task of assessing the scientific validity of the 
EU’s phytosanitary measures against the importation of South African citrus fruit due to the presence of CBS, thereby providing a benchmark against which scientific data may be evaluated in future disputes.344   Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement states that SPS measures should be applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, should be based on scientific principles and should not be maintained without sufficient scientific evidence. Exceptions are permitted in cases where Article 5.7 is relevant, which states that ‘in cases where relevant scientific information is insufficient’, a member may provisionally adopt SPS measures. Article 5.7 however does not apply to the citrus case because the 
EU’s quarantine restrictions are neither provisional, nor is science inconclusive.   
                                                        344 There is ample discussion on whether the DSB’s decision should be treated as such a common law of trade, see inter alia Raj Bhala (1999). The Myth about Stare Decisis and International Trade Law (Part One of a Triology). American University International Law Review 14(4): 845-946; Sinopoli & Purnhagen, above n. 13, p. 97.  
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The initial burden of proof to establish that the measure is not in compliance with Article 2.2 is on the complaining party, which must establish a prima facie case of inconsistency.345 Afterwards, the burden of proof is on the defending party which can counter the claimed inconsistency.346  In a similar previous WTO dispute, Australia – Salmon, the Panel found that Australia’s 
measures regarding the importation of Canadian salmon were not ‘based on’ a risk assessment in accordance with Article 5.1347 and, by implication, were not in compliance with Article 2.2.348 The Appellate Body stated that a risk assessment349 must not simply conclude that there is a possibility of entry, establishment or spread of a pest or disease, but rather establish the probability, or likelihood, that a pest or disease will enter, establish or spread, as a result of the SPS measure that might be applied.350 As the AB held in the earlier case on EC – Hormones351, the ‘risk’ evaluated in a risk assessment must be an ascertainable risk; theoretical uncertainty is not the kind of risk which is to be assessed under Article 5.1.352 The reason for this is ‘since science can never provide absolute certainty that a given substance will not ever have adverse health effects’,353 theoretical uncertainty would by the end of the day allow Members to justify any kind of SPS measures. This statement can be interpreted as providing risk assessment with some, albeit weak, normative value that SPS measures need to be ‘sufficiently supported or reasonably warranted by the risk assessment’.354 However, the AB remains silent as 
to what ‘sufficiently supported’ or ‘reasonably warranted’ means. In Australia – Salmon,                                                         345 Panel Report, EC – Hormones, above n. 137, para. 8.252; Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, above n. 250, para. 98. 346 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, above n. 250, para. 98.  347 Panel Report, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon (Australia – Salmon), WT/DS18/R (12 June 1998), para 8.99. 348 As stated in the Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, above n. 250: ‘Articles 2.2 and 5.1 should constantly be read together. Article 2.2 informs Article 5.1: the elements that define the basic obligation set out in Article 
2.2 impart meaning to Article 5.1.’ Therefore, it can be presumed that if there is found to be a violation of Article 5.1 or 5.2, it can be presumed to be a violation of the more general Article 2.2. Panel Report, India – Measures 
Concerning the Importation of Certain Agricultural Products (India – Agricultural Products), WT/DS430/R, (14 October 2014), para 8.51. 349 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, above n. 252, para. 121. 350 Ibid., para 123. See Alessandra Arcuri (2010), Food Safety at the WTO After ‘Continued Suspension’: A Paradigm Shift? Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics (RILE) Working Paper No. 2010/04, for an analysis of 
the interpretation of ‘probability’, p. 11. 351 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, above n. 250, paras. 187, 194. 352 Ibid., para. 186.  353 Ibid., para. 186. 354 Ibid., para. 186.  
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the AB stipulated that paragraph 4 of Annex A of the SPS Agreement ‘refers to “the 
evaluation of the likelihood” and not to some evaluation of the likelihood.’355 One may read this passage as emphasis to provide for a substantial, qualitative or quantitative, assessment of a certain quality of the data and not just some kind of evaluation. As it is hence established that first, SPS measures require an interpretation of data and second, this interpretation needs to be of some quality, there is no certainty as to how data need to be interpreted to establish probability.   Two other similar disputes address the probability of a hazard as a benchmark in risk assessment. In Australia – Apples, New Zealand filed a dispute against Australia 
regarding Australia’s measures on the importation of apples from New Zealand. Australia had adopted sixteen phytosanitary measures on the importation of New Zealand apples, including eight measures against the risk of fire blight, four against European canker, one against apple leaf-curling midge, and three regarding all of the above pests. The panel found that thirteen of the sixteen measures (the pest-specific ones) were maintained without scientific evidence and were therefore inconsistent with Article 2.2. According to the Panel, Australia’s measures are ‘maintained without sufficient scientific evidence’. There was no ‘rational or objective’ relationship between the measures and scientific evidence, and therefore they are inconsistent with Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement.356 Australia’s measures depended on the idea that mature, symptomless apples were a pathway for the transmission of the diseases at hand. However, there was no scientific evidence that mature, symptomless apples were a pathway that would allow the introduction of these diseases from New Zealand. 
Additionally, there was no scientific evidence that Australia’s climate was favorable for fire blight and European canker to establish and spread.357  Similarly, in Japan – Apples, the US challenged Japan’s quarantine restrictions on apples from the US to protect against the introduction of fire blight. The US complained about measures on the prohibition of imported apples from orchards in which fire blight was detected, the requirement that export orchards be inspected three times a year, and the disqualification of any orchard from exporting to Japan should fire blight be detected within a 500 meter buffer zone surrounding each orchard. The Panel found that Japan’s phytosanitary measures were inconsistent with Articles 2.2 and 5.1. Similar to the                                                         355 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, above n. 252, para. 124. 356 Panel Report, Australia – Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples from New Zealand (Australia – Apples), WT/DS367/R (9 August 2010), para. 4.31. 357 Ibid., para. 4.14.  
CHAPTER 3 
 
 
75 
Australia – Apples case, the United States aimed to demonstrate that mature, symptomless apples do not serve as a pathway for the entry, establishment or spread of fire blight. In order to do this, the US had to demonstrate that there was insufficient scientific evidence supporting the view that mature, symptomless apples can serve as a pathway for the disease.358 The Panel concluded that there was indeed insufficient 
scientific evidence, and that there was not a ‘rational relationship’ between the scientific 
evidence available and Japan’s measure.  These cases provide a benchmark for assessing the citrus dispute. As Guignardia 
citricarpa is considered to be a quarantine pest and is listed accordingly in the Directive, the EU argues that it must maintain its zero import tolerance.359 South Africa argues that 
the EU’s measures lack a scientific justification. Citrus has been exported to the EU since 1925, and there has never been an incidence of CBS in European orchards. Additionally, there have been no reported cases of CBS in a Mediterranean climate or of CBS becoming established through a piece of citrus fruit (instead, it is typically transferred by the movement of propagation material). The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) also conducted an independent assessment and determined that citrus fruit is epidemiologically insignificant as a pathway for the introduction of CBS. Since CBS introduction by way of fruit depends on many specific factors at precise times, it is extremely unlikely that a piece of citrus fruit could cause the establishment of CBS.360 Due to the very low chance that CBS could become established in the EU, South Africa argues that a zero import tolerance would be an illegal measure.361  
South Africa’s complaint regarding the EU is that the EU maintains its stringent phytosanitary measures because ‘it has not been completely proven that CBS cannot 
establish in the PRA area’.362 South Africa argues that this is not in accordance with the 
‘minimum impact’ principle of the IPPC363 and with Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement. Additionally, South Africa argues that the EU is setting an unattainable criterion in its                                                         358 Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the 
United States (Japan – Apples), WT/DS245/RW (20 July 2005), paras. 8.85, 8.86, 8.106, WT/DS245/R (Jul. 5, 2003).  359 European Commission, above n. 306. 360 USDA APHIS Plant Protection and Quarantine, above n. 282. 361 South African Citrus Black Spot Expert Working Group, above n. 306. 362 European Commission, above n. 306; European Commission, above n. 306. 363 IPPC (2006). ISPM 1: Phytosanitary Principles for the Protection of Plants and the Application of Phytosanitary measures in International Trade. The IPPC International Standard for Phytosanitary Measures (ISPM) No. 11 on pest risk analysis for quarantine pests recognizes that zero-risk is not a reasonable option, but rather risk management should aim to achieve only the required degree of safety that is feasible. 
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regulation of CBS, namely that it must be completely proven that an event cannot occur,364 thereby applying the precautionary principle.  Taking the cases above as a benchmark, the risk assessment must establish the 
probability, or likelihood, that a pest or disease will enter, establish or spread as a result of the SPS measure. Since 1) citrus fruit has not been known to be a pathway for the establishment of CBS, 2) a series of consecutive, unlikely steps would need to occur for establishment, and considering that 3) CBS has never become established in a region with a Mediterranean climate, it is unlikely that Guignardia citricarpa will become established and spread in the citrus-producing countries of the EU. While the EU counters that the scientific evidence demonstrates that there is a small chance that CBS could become established in its territory, the probability is, therefore, low. Whether this 
suffices to establish a rational relationship between scientific evidence and the EU’s measures, or to prove that these measures are sufficiently supported or reasonably warranted cannot be said with complete certainty. However, one could meaningfully argue that the low probability brings this risk assessment closer to theoretical uncertainty than ascertainable risk, the former not being accepted as justification of an SPS measure. There is therefore some argumentative support that the WTO panel would 
not find the EU’s measures to be rational and therefore in compliance with Articles 5.1 and 2.2 of the SPS Agreement.   
3.5.2 Not more trade restrictive than necessary: Alternative measures 
under Article 5.6  Each WTO member has the right to specify its own ALOP but is required to do so in compliance with the provisions of the SPS Agreement.365 Members also have the right to establish SPS measures according to the ALOP they see fit; if desired, they can be as high 
as ‘zero risk’.366 Article 5.6 states that SPS measures should not be more trade-restrictive than required to achieve the ALOP, taking into account technical and economic feasibility. Three cumulative conditions need to be fulfilled to establish a violation of Article 5.6. The complainant needs to demonstrate that an alternative measure:  1) is reasonably available taking into account technical and economic feasibility;                                                         364 South African Citrus Black Spot Expert Working Group, above n. 306. 365 Ming Du, above n. 59. 366 SPS Agreement  
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2) achieves the Member’s ALOP; and 3) is significantly less restrictive to trade than the SPS measure contested.  
According to South Africa, the EU’s measures are more trade-restrictive than required to achieve its ALOP. It is the complaining party that bears the burden of proof to establish a 
prima facie case that an alternative measure meets all three elements under Article 5.6.367 Therefore, if South Africa wishes to challenge these measures, it must propose an alternative measure that meets the criteria above. It is then up to the EU to defend itself by arguing that the alternative measure does not meet the three criteria.  For example, this was demonstrated in India – Agricultural Products, in which the US requested consultations with India regarding India’s prohibition of various agricultural products from the US due to concerns of avian influenza. The Panel found, and the AB upheld,368 that India’s measures were inconsistent with Articles 5.6 and 2.2 because they were significantly more trade-restrictive than required to achieve India’s ALOP and were also applied beyond the extent necessary to protect human and animal life or health.369  When the citrus dispute is assessed at WTO level, the Panel must identify the level of protection that the EU has set as its appropriate level, and the level of protection that would be achieved by an alternative measure put forth by South Africa. If the level of 
protection of the proposed alternative measure meets or exceeds the EU’s ALOP, it would be considered to be more trade restrictive than necessary.   
While exclusion of inoculum is certainly an effective control measure, the EU’s regulations on the importation of citrus from South Africa have had, and will continue to have, a profound effect on the South African citrus industry. The effects are not only felt abroad; restrictions on the importation of citrus can have a negative impact on importers and distributors in the EU. Domestic consumers are also impacted: due to the seasonality of citrus production, during its summer the EU relies on imports of citrus 
fruit from the southern hemisphere. For South Africa to challenge the EU’s phytosanitary                                                         367 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural Products (Japan – Agricultural Products II), WT/DS76/AB/R (22 February 1999), para. 126; Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products, above n. 348, para. 7.525; Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples from New Zealand (Australia – Apples), WT/DS367/AB/R (29 November 2010), para. 329. 368 Appellate Body Report, India – Measures Concerning the Importation of Certain Agricultural Products (India – Agricultural Products), WT/DS430/R (4 June 2015), paras. 5.227, 5.233. 369 Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products, above n. 348, para. 7.617. 
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measures under Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement, it would need to propose an alternative measure that meets the three criteria discussed above.   Under Council Directive 2000/29/E370 the EU listed potential risk management options to deal with such situations, one of which is the establishment of a pest-free area. This would allow the importation of citrus from CBS-free provinces such as the Western Cape and Northern Cape to the EU market. Article 6.2 of the SPS Agreement also states that Members must recognize the concepts of pest-free or disease-free areas and areas of low pest or low disease prevalence. However, EFSA indicated that this is not an effective control measure in the case of South African citrus.371 EFSA states that while in theory it would be effective, it would require continuous monitoring to ensure that the area is accurate. Although the Western Cape, Northern Cape and other regions are commonly known to be CBS-free, EFSA stated that information on such a monitoring program had not been provided to them. Nevertheless, South Africa would not benefit significantly from such a rule, as much of its citrus production does occur in places where CBS is present.   The US, on the other hand, recognizes that the Western and Northern Cape provinces are free from CBS.372 The US currently allows the importation of citrus fruit from these provinces. Additionally, a proposed rule aims to give South African citrus even greater access to the US market. The US proposes to allow the importation of citrus fruit from areas in South Africa where CBS is known to occur. The fruit would have to be subject to phytosanitary treatment, packinghouse registration and there would have to be a traceability system in place. Additionally, a phytosanitary certificate and declaration would have to accompany the fruit. Citrus fruit from areas in South Africa that are CBS-free can continue to be imported under the current requirements, i.e. that they must be 
                                                        370 Council Directive 2000/29, above n. 301. 371 EFSA Panel on Plant Health (PLH), above n. 282. 372 Policies in other countries around the world:  
–New Zealand: Declaration that the consignment has undergone appropriate pest control effective against G. 
citricarpa or sourced from an area free of G. citricarpa  
–Australia: Citrus fruit may only be imported to South Australia if inspected and found free of CBS.  Other states do not regulate G. citricarpa  
–Brazil: Controls within the country regarding the spread of citrus fruit from regions with CBS to regions without CBS 
–India: additional declaration required stating the fruit is free from CBS (EFSA, 2008, p. 85-86) 
(South Africa’s response: ‘the existence of CBS regulations in other parts of the world does not automatically 
indicate that they are technically justified’) 
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accompanied by a permit and subjected to inspection, shipping and packinghouse procedures.373  Another possibility is to set up endangered and non-endangered zones in the EU to regulate the distribution and the end use of citrus, i.e., to limit the free movement of goods and only keep South African citrus in the northern and eastern member states.374 This measure would have the benefit of allowing South Africa to export citrus to the EU 
and would alleviate the concerns about the risk posed to the EU’s own citrus orchards in the Mediterranean region. Additionally, it would also be beneficial for importers within the EU. However, it would, naturally, limit the idea of a European free trade area. Additionally, EFSA stated that the technical feasibility of establishing endangered and non-endangered zones is low, due to the challenges in controlling and monitoring trade between the two areas.375 Although taking such a measure would certainly be challenging, protected zones do already exist in the EU, for example for restricting the spread of citrus tristeza virus.376 If South Africa wishes to propose this as an alternative measure, it will be important for them to demonstrate how their exported citrus could be labeled and monitored, for example through controls and a traceability program, to avoid entering the endangered regions of the citrus-producing Mediterranean countries. They should give specific information on the actions that would be taken in order to show that it is technically feasible.   In combination with the concept of endangered zones as discussed above, it is important to limit exports of citrus fruit to the northern EU member state ports. Most South African citrus fruit consignments enter the EU through the northern member state ports, for sale in the northern member states (increasingly in the eastern member states as well). Some citrus fruit does enter through the southern member states, but is primarily distributed to the northern markets. Citrus enters through the southern member state markets for the economic benefits and convenience, although South Africa will perhaps                                                         373 USDA APHIS (2014), Importation of Fresh Citrus Fruit from the Republic of South Africa into the Continental United States. 374 EFSA Panel on Plant Health (PLH), above n. 282.  375 EFSA Panel on Plant Health (PLH), above n. 281. 376 Directive 2000/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 May 2000 amending Council Directive 64/432/EEC on animal health problems affecting intra-Community trade in bovine animals and swine; Commission Directive 2001/32/EC of 8 May 2001 recognising protected zones exposed to particular plant health risks in the Community and repealing Directive 92/76/EEC; Commission Regulation (EC) No 690/2008 of 4 July 2008 recognising protected zones exposed to particular health risks in the Community (recast).   
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cease exports to them soon.377 Therefore, the probability that a piece of infected fruit would come into contact with a suitable host is quite low.   There are also other potential solutions to limit the presence of CBS but which are not practical for the situation. Nevertheless, it is still worth mentioning them for the process of elimination. One option would be the use of appropriate field (chemical) treatments to eliminate or prevent the fungus. However, there is currently no treatment that has been shown to fully prevent or eliminate CBS infections.378Additionally, it would hypothetically be possible to restrict imports to fruit with no symptoms in the field, but inspection procedures are insufficient and symptoms can develop after harvest.379 For this reason, EFSA suggested that South Africa apply methods to accelerate CBS symptoms to be used in a pre-entry quarantine system.380  Unfortunately, diverting fresh fruit to fruit intended for processing leads to a major loss of revenue since fresh fruit is worth significantly more. For example, a box of fresh oranges is worth an average of US$13.89, and the price of a box of oranges intended for processing is US$7.76. A box of fresh tangerines or mandarins is worth an average of US$23.47, but a box intended for processing is worth only US$0.75.381  
 Conclusions  Uncertainty with regards to how science has to be interpreted at WTO level to justify SPS measures provides a leeway for dominant trading blocs to impose their domestic standards on smaller trading partners. We showed with the example of the citrus black spot dispute between South Africa and the EU that due to this uncertainty, the EU was able to de facto export its standards to South Africa, while South Africa challenges these standards as unjustified trade barriers. The current international trading system is hence not able to provide sufficient legal certainty with regards to questions on how data must be interpreted to prevent such extraterritorial impacts.  However, if applied, WTO law indeed has the potential to provide some certainty. Drawing on previous case law (Australia – Salmon, Australia – Apples and Japan – Apples)                                                         377 South African Citrus Black Spot Expert Working Group, above n. 306. 378 EFSA Panel on Plant Health (PLH), above n. 282, p. 90. 379 Ibid.  380 EFSA Panel on Plant Health (PLH), above n. 282. 381 USDA APHIS Plant Protection and Quarantine, above n. 282. 
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we could demonstrate that current WTO SPS law has the potential to govern these disputes in a way that provides some legal guidance: an SPS measure must be based on a risk assessment that establishes the likelihood that a pest or disease will enter, establish or spread in a new territory. As discussed above, there are good arguments to support that it is unlikely that Guignardia citricarpa will become established and spread in the citrus-producing, Mediterranean countries of the EU, and therefore, the WTO will likely 
rule that the EU’s measures are not in compliance with Articles 5.1 and 2.2 of the SPS Agreement. Nevertheless, the WTO needs to provide further guidance and clarification regarding how to interpret data and whether the probability that a disease may become established must be a certain value to justify an SPS measure. Since this dispute remains 
unresolved and similar ‘battle of science’ cases will likely arise in the future, it is important for the WTO to provide normative clarity on these issues.  
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Abstract382  The article investigates the current and potential relevance of Article 5.6 SPS in deciding SPS disputes, and its impact on trade liberalization and WTO Members’ power to take sanitary and phytosanitary measures. Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement states that SPS measures may not be more trade restrictive than required to achieve a Member's appropriate level of protection. This obligation is self-standing and separate (in Article 5.6) from the necessity test (Article 2.2). We argue that its autonomous nature makes Article 5.6 SPS a distinct type of trade-off instrument (‘excessivity test’). Using the software ATLAS.ti, we conducted a systematic content analysis of all SPS disputes invoking Article 5.6. In particular, we surveyed the jurisprudential development of the provision (outcomes of 5.6 SPS cases over time, DSB application of the three cumulative conditions and their respective outcome determinacy). Our findings show that the importance of Article 5.6 has significantly increased over time, and holds immense 
potential for challenges to WTO Members’ domestic SPS measures for being excessively trade restrictive.      
                                                        382 This chapter was published as Hanna Schebesta & Dominique Sinopoli (2018), The Potency of the SPS 
Agreement’s Excessivity Test: The Impact of Article 5.6 on Trade Liberalization and the Regulatory Power of WTO Members to Take Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. Journal of International Economic Law 21(1): 123-149. 
CHAPTER 4 
 
 
85 
 Introduction  Governments pursue not only a quest for free, but also for safe, trading. Under the auspices of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the search for ‘the right balance’383 
between free trade and Members’ rights to take domestic measures for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health is governed by the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement).384   As a baseline, WTO Members are allowed to take SPS measures. Consequently, free trade is regularly limited by regulations that cover very diverse issues, for example maximum residue levels for contaminants in foodstuffs, standards for food additives and import restrictions to prevent the spread of avian influenza. In the last 20 years, over 18,000 SPS measures were notified to the SPS Committee, and more than 416 specific trade concerns on food safety, plant health, and animal health regulation were flagged, in equal proportion by developing and developed countries. Of these, 36% were reported as resolved by the SPS Committee mechanism.385   
The SPS Agreement also limits Member States’ freedom to take SPS measures by imposing that they must be necessary and based on scientific principles and evidence (Article 2.2); and it contains the standard prohibition on discrimination and disguised trade restrictions (Article 2.3). Additionally, the SPS Agreement prescribes that a 
domestic measure may not be more trade-restrictive than required to achieve a Member’s 
desired level of protection (Article 5.6). This duty is separate from the necessity test in Article 2.2. Its autonomous nature makes Article 5.6 SPS a distinct type of trade-off device386 that tests whether an excessive trade restriction exists. This ‘excessiveness 
test’ mandates the trade optimization of safety regulation and enshrines a pure liberalization rationale.      
This particular role of the ‘excessivity test’ in Article 5.6 SPS is theoretically and doctrinally understudied.387 The article aims to analyze the current and future potency                                                         383 Marceau & Trachtman, above n. 60. 384 WTO (2010), The WTO Agreements Series: Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, p. 27.  385 See Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (2017), Specific Trade Concerns. Note by the 
Secretariat. 7 March 2017,G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.17.  386 Joel P. Trachtman (1998). Trade And… Problems, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Subsidiarity. European Journal of 
International Law 9: 32-85, p. 38. 387 With the exception of Kamala Dawar & Eyal Ronen (2017). How “Necessary”? A Comparison of Legal and Economic Assessments–GATT Dispute Settlements Under: Article XX (B), TBT 2.2 And SPS 5.6. Trade, Law and 
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of Article 5.6 SPS in WTO litigation and the implications for WTO Members’ regulatory powers concerning human, animal and plant life and health. To this end, we conducted a systematic analysis of the jurisprudence, evaluating all documents from the 20 disputes388 in which Article 5.6 was cited by using qualitative content analysis software (ATLAS.ti7).389   In the following, we first discuss Article 5.6 and trace its recent rise in disputes (section 4.2). We then investigate how the individual Article 5.6 test conditions developed over time, examining which and how the conditions determine the outcome of Article 5.6 challenges (sections 4.3-4.5). We conclude with a modification to the interpretation of Article 5.6, and a critical evaluation of the jurisprudence in the light of trade liberalization effects and the regulatory power of WTO Members in the field of SPS (section 4.6).  
 Article 5.6: Testing the excessiveness of trade 
restrictions  We argue that the ‘excessivity test’ contained in Article 5.6 SPS is not a regular ‘necessity 
test’, but more trade liberalization oriented (section 4.2.1) and demonstrate that the power of the provision to challenge SPS measures has increased over time (section 4.2.2).  
4.2.1 An autonomous ‘excessivity test’ in the SPS Agreement   The SPS Agreement elaborates on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)390 and allows Members to take SPS measures as long as they abide by its rules. SPS measures are aimed at protecting human, animal or plant life or health from risks                                                                                                                                                                              
Development 8(1): 1-28, textbooks on the WTO and the SPS Agreement analyse the provision only curtly. Until 
recently, there were only few cases, as noted in 2010, ‘[r]egrettably, the case law relating to Article 5.6 is again 
very limited’, see Lukasz Gruszczynski (2010), Regulating Health and Environmental Risks under WTO Law. A 
Critical Analysis of the SPS Agreement. Oxford University Press, p. 249. 388 WTO, above n. 77. 389 The research methodology is discussed in Hanna Schebesta (2017, forthcoming), Empirical Legal Research - Necessity, not Opportunity, Wageningen Working Papers in Law and Governance 2017/08, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3051163. 390 WTO (1999), The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.  
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arising from e.g. contaminants, toxins, pests and diseases. The scope of application therefore links specific policy aims to specific types of risk.391 An SPS measure taken in conformity with the SPS Agreement then ‘shall be presumed’392 to be in conformity with the more general GATT 1994 trade rules. This establishes the SPS regime as a lex 
specialis.   The SPS Agreement goes some way in harmonizing SPS measures, particularly by requiring Members to base their standards where possible on those issued by one of the three SPS-endorsed international organisations (for food safety the Codex Alimentarius Commission, for animal health and zoonoses the International Office of Epizootics (OIE), and for plant health the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC)), unless otherwise justified by science.   In terms of the negative integration of trade, the SPS Agreement goes beyond the GATT in the following aspects:393 under the GATT, Article III imposes a national treatment obligation, but recognizes the need to protect human, animal or plant life or health as an exception in Article XX(b), provided that such measures are not an arbitrary 
discrimination or disguised restriction on trade. Seeing the GATT as an ‘incomplete contract’, the SPS Agreement completes it in several respects.394 It enshrines the standard prohibitions on discrimination and disguised restrictions (Article 2.3), but goes further than the GATT national treatment obligation:395 SPS measures have to be necessary, consistent, and based on scientific evidence (Article 2.2).  The SPS Agreement 
is ‘not concerned with the comparability of products but with the comparability of risks’.  
As a result, ‘“like” products causing dissimilar risks (externalities) are not subject to non-discriminatory treatment and can legitimately be regulated differently under the 
SPS’.396  
                                                        391 SPS Agreement, Definition 1 of Annex A. 392 See Article 2.4 of the SPS Agreement, which in particular singles out Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994 
including (read in conjunction with footnote 1 to the preamble of the SPS Agreement) the general ‘chapeau’ of that provision.  393 Boris Rigod (2013), The Purpose of the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS). European Journal of International Law 24(2): 503-532. In the same vein, see Trachtman, above n. 386. 394 Ibid. 395 Ibid. 396 Ibid., p. 527.  
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Additionally, Article 5.6 obliges Members to ensure that SPS measures are not 
excessively restrictive to trade. Footnote 3 to Article 5.6 specifies that ‘a measure is not more trade-restrictive than required unless there is another measure, reasonably available taking into account technical and economic feasibility, that achieves the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection and is significantly less 
restrictive to trade.’ Jurisprudence has consistently read Article 5.6 and its footnote to require a complaining WTO Member to meet a three-pronged test: the complainant must identify an alternative measure that (1) is reasonably available taking into account technical and economic feasibility; (2) achieves the Member's appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection (ALOP);397 and (3) is significantly less restrictive to trade than the SPS measure contested.398 The burden of proof of identifying the hypothetical alternative measure is on the complainant.399  The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) has held that ‘necessity is necessity’, i.e. that there is no difference among the legal tests in different agreements. Dawar et al have compared 
the DSB’s analysis and show that the economic assessment deployed in the various agreements differs.400 Adding to this, we demonstrate that also the legal structure of the reasoning shows specificities under Article 5.6 when considering all cases that used an Article 5.6-based reasoning.  Instead of balancing the objectives pursued, the provision analyzes exclusively whether a challenged regulatory measure could be replaced by a less trade restrictive alternative regulation. The provision therefore allows WTO Members to challenge SPS measures on the basis of an excessive trade effect alone, without having to contest the scientific basis for taking a protective measure or the legitimacy of the objectives pursued. Through this 
mechanism, the justificatory nature of ‘normal’ necessity tests is lost. An inconsistency with Article 5.6 SPS results in a rebuttable presumption that the same measure is inconsistent with the obligation in Article 2.2 to ensure that an SPS measure is applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health. This does 
not amount to a ‘consequential violation of Article 2.2’. Although ‘the ‘necessity’                                                         397 The ALOP is defined as ‘The level of protection deemed appropriate by the Member establishing a sanitary or 
phytosanitary measure to protect human, animal or plant life within its territory’, also called the ‘acceptable 
level of risk’ (Definition 4 of Annex A to the SPS Agreement).  398 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, above n. 252, para. 194. 399 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural Products (Japan – Agricultural Products II), WT/DS76/AB/R (19 March 1999), para. 126. See also Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products, above n. 348, para. 7.525. 400 See Dawar and Ronen, above n. 387. 
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requirement in Article 2.2 is closely linked with the determination under Article 5.6’,401 both remain different violations of the SPS Agreement. In terms of trade-off device, Article 5.6 SPS cannot be regarded as a straightforward necessity test; it is therefore 
specified as an ‘excessivity test‘ hereafter.   
4.2.2 Tracing the rise of Article 5.6 SPS in WTO dispute settlement  Since the WTO was established in 1995, there have been a total of 534 formal trade complaints. Of these, 47 disputes concerned the SPS Agreement, of which 20 cited Article 5.6 SPS specifically (Table 4.1).402  
Table 4.1. Major users of the WTO dispute settlement system  
Country Respondent  
(all cases) 
Complainant 
(all cases) 
Respondent 
(SPS cases) 
Complainant 
(SPS cases) United States 132 115 8 12 European Union 84 97 9 5 Canada 21 37 0 9 Australia 16 7 6 0 Brazil 16 31 0 2 Argentina 22 20 0 3 Japan 15 23 3 1 South Korea 16 17 6 0 China 39 15 0 1 India 24 23 3 1 Mexico 14 24 2 3 Indonesia 14 10 3 1  There was a ruling for only 18 out of 47 SPS cases, with some cases pending and others being settled, of which 10 disputes addressed 5.6 in the report(s). This means that in just over half of the SPS cases, Article 5.6 is invoked as an independent ground for invalidating a national SPS regulation. Looking at the distribution over time, only one of the cases after 2010 has not invoked Article 5.6. This demonstrates an increasing 
                                                        401 Panel Report, Russian Federation – Measures on the Importation of Live Pigs, Pork and Other Pig Products from 
the European Union (Russia – Pigs (EU)), WT/DS475/R and Add.1 (21 March 2017).  402 For surveying the disputes we relied on the WTO dispute database.  
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tendency by parties to rely on Article 5.6, and means that the provision will likely become more important in litigation practice in the future (Figure 4.1). 
 
Figure 4.1. Number of disputes that requested Article 5.6 or not by year. *Number of disputes was only counted as one in cases which resulted in a joint report (i.e. GMOs, hormones, COOL).    Looking back at over 15 years of jurisprudence (the first final report of a dispute was reached in 2000), out of the ten disputes in which Article 5.6 was evaluated, only six had a final ruling on Article 5.6.403 Out of these, an impressive share of five out of six found a violation of Article 5.6 (although, in some instances, at the level of the Compliance Panel Report). Only one single dispute resulted in a clear ruling that a domestic SPS measure did not violate the WTO rules.                                                          403 Out of the other three, in one (EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products) the EU’s general moratorium on GMO approvals was not considered to meet the definition of an SPS measure, so the analysis under Article 5.6 was discontinued (Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, above n. 136, para. 7.1405). In Australia – Apples, the AB found there to be insufficient information to make a finding on the level of 
risk associated with the proposed alternative measure. Since the AB could not compare Australia’s ALOP with 
the level of protection of New Zealand’s proposed alternative measure, it could not complete the analysis under Article 5.6 (Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, above n. 367, paras. 385-407). Lastly, in US – Poultry 
(China), the Panel refrained from ruling on Article 5.6 (Panel Report, United States – Certain Measures Affecting 
Imports of Poultry from China (US – Poultry (China), WT/DS392/R (25 October 2010), para. 7.337). The Panel regarded the level of risk posed by Chinese poultry products as speculative (Ibid., paras. 7.335 and 7.336). 
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Table 4.2. Overview of disputes in which Article 5.6 was evaluated 
Dispute Complainant Respondent Request for 
consultations 
received 
Year 
panel 
report 
Year 
AB 
report 
Year 
Panel 
21.5 
report 
5.6 Result 
DS18: Australia – 
Measures Affecting 
Importation of Salmon 
Canada Australia 1995 1998 1998 2000 P: 5.6 violation,  AB: reverse, no conclusion, CP: 5.6 violation 
DS76: Japan – Measures 
Affecting Agricultural 
Products 
US Japan 1997 1998 1999  P: 5.6 violation,  AB: not upheld, no violation 
DS245: Japan – Measures 
Affecting the Importation 
of Apples 
US Japan 2002 2003 2003 2005 P: no conclusion, AB: no mention,  CP: 5.6 violation 
DS291, 292, 293: 
European Communities – 
Measures Affecting the 
Approval and Marketing 
of Biotech Products 
US, Canada, Argentina EC 2003 2006   P: no analysis 
DS367: Australia – 
Measures Affecting the 
Importation of Apples 
from New Zealand 
New Zealand Australia 2007 2010 2010  P: 5.6 violation,  AB: reverse, no conclusion  
DS392: United States – 
Certain Measures 
Affecting Imports of 
Poultry from China 
China US 2009 2010   P: no conclusion  
DS430: India – Measures 
Concerning the 
Importation of Certain 
Agricultural Products 
US India 2012 2014 2015  P: 5.6 violation,  AB: upheld 
DS447: United States – 
Measures Affecting the 
Importation of Animals, 
Meat and Other Animal 
Products from Argentina 
Argentina US 2012 2015   P: 5.6 violation 
DS475: Russian 
Federation – Measures 
on the Importation of 
Live Pigs, Pork and Other 
Pig Products from the 
European Union 
EU Russia 2014 2016 2017  P: 5.6 violation (except Latvia),  AB: 5.6 not appealed 
DS484: Indonesia – 
Measures Concerning the 
Importation of Chicken 
Meat and Chicken 
Products 
Brazil Indonesia 2014 2017   P: no analysis 
CHAPTER 4 
 
 
92 
The data (Table 4.2) show that over time, Article 5.6 has been invoked more frequently and violations have been more consistently found, with the last three cases that were analyzed resulting in a clear violation. When considering the various rulings in different 
instances there are numerous reversals. The question is how this ‘turbulent’ pathway can be explained. In other words, what, in the application of the Article 5.6 SPS 
‘excessivity test’, determines the finding or not of a violation?   The three prongs of the excessivity test are firmly established in jurisprudence and, as a result, are applied in a formulaic way by the DSB.  However, what is actually tested, and how, in each of the elements has been subject to little systematization, a fact illustrated by diverging conclusions reached by the Panel, AB and 21.5 Compliance Panels. In the following we survey each of the elements individually, i.e. that an alternative measure is reasonable and feasible (section 4.3), that it achieves a Member’s ALOP (section 4.4) and that it must be significantly less restrictive to trade (section 4.5). Lastly, we argue that the test should be extended to cover a fourth element, namely the question of whether a valid alternative measure was identified by the complainant (section 4.6).  
 Condition 1: An alternative that is reasonable and 
feasible  The first condition is that a proposed alternative SPS measure must be ‘reasonably 
available’, taking into account technical and economic feasibility.404 It must not be 
merely hypothetically conceivable, but ‘an option reasonably available (...) in the real 
world’.405  
4.3.1 Condition 1 is often undisputed and superficially discussed  None of the 5.6 SPS disputes failed an alternative measure for not being reasonable or technically or economically feasible. This element of the test is not always disputed by the parties (i.e. in Japan – Agricultural Products II, US – Animals, Russia – Pigs (EU)) or subject to appeal (Australia – Apples, India – Agricultural Products, Russia – Pigs (EU)). It is                                                         404 For ease of reading, ‘reasonability’ should be read as referring to the joint formation of reasonability and feasibility. 405 Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the 
United States (Japan – Apples), WT/DS245/RW (20 July 2005), para. 8.171. 
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discussed in the reports often only superficially (Australia – Salmon), with only a few cases going into detail (Japan – Apples Article 21.5 Panel Report; India – Agricultural 
Products Panel Report).   The formalistic, not to say simplistic, application of this condition is well illustrated by 
Australia – Salmon. A domestic government report on quarantine policy options mentioned that there were four options meriting consideration to govern the importation of salmon to Australia; since the alternative measures proposed were among these options, the Panel concluded that they had been treated as feasible options.406   In Japan – Apples, the proposed alternative was a restriction of exports to only mature and symptomless apples by the complainant, and therefore the economic and technical feasibility of the measure was not tested for the respondent (Japan) but for the 
complainant (US). The Panel quickly established the measure to be ‘undeniably 
feasible’407 since it was already applied under the US Apple Export Act for all US exports. The risk of incorrect enforcement had to be regarded as an element of feasibility.408 In this case, the quality controls for apple fruit involved several pre-harvest and post-harvest steps and inspections carried out by federal and/or federally-licensed state 
inspectors ‘provide[d] sufficient guarantees’409 to ensure that indeed mature, symptomless apples would be exported. The Panel noted in passing that Japan would be free to establish additional import mechanisms to check compliance.    Only in India – Agricultural Products did a respondent (India) develop the argument that the proposed alternative would not be technically and economically easy for it to take, because it lacked the capacity to handle resulting import volumes and due to an 
enforcement risk.410 The United States countered that the OIE Terrestrial Code's recommendations are developed and used around the world, indicative of their feasibility.411 India submitted that it lacked capacity to handle the resulting volumes of 
imports, as it had quarantine facilities only at six ports and would have to increase                                                         406 In the subsequent Compliance Panel Report, concerning the imposition of consumer-ready salmon, it was simply argued that a regime without the consumer-ready requirements would be even more reasonably available in the sense of Article 5.6. 407 Panel Report, Japan – Apples (Article 21.5 - US), above n. 405, para. 8.169. 408 Ibid., para. 8.171. 409 Ibid., paras. 8.176-8.177. 410 Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products, above n. 348, para. 7.507. 411 Ibid., para. 7.536. 
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capacity to verify the sanitary condition of each consignment of imports from notifiable avian influenza (NAI)-reporting countries. The Panel rejected the argument, because India already had a system in place that needed to respond to increases in imports that were contingent on the possibly changing NAI status of an exporting country. 
Additionally, the Panel rejected the idea that ‘a WTO Member could justify an import ban on the basis that it is less administratively burdensome than an alternative measure’. 
This would ‘render meaningless the requirement in Article 5.6.’ India also tried to rely on enforcement arguments, lamenting that the Terrestrial Code shifts responsibility for the Code's application to exporting countries. India lacked resources to gather information on exporting countries' surveillance systems and establish if such systems were adequate.412 It was further ‘not prepared to put "full faith" in the United States' attestations regarding avian influenza (AI) and to import products without 
implementing other controls.’ The Panel rejected the argument, again because India made use of exporting countries' own declarations regarding their AI-status in several different contexts.413   
4.3.2 Findings: The reasonable availability of an alternative is readily 
assumed   Overall, the first condition did not emerge as a strong determinant of Article 5.6 dispute outcomes and was the least disputed by the parties. A measure was regarded as technically and economically feasible if it had been discussed as a policy option in a government report;414 or if it was already applied by the complaining or responding member state.415 The fact that an alternative measure is included in one of the three official SPS standard bodies was evidence of common practice416 and technical feasibility, and confirms the importance of the international SPS-endorsed standards.417 
Overall, the case law exhibits a pronounced preference for testing ‘reasonable                                                         412 Ibid., para. 7.508. 413 Ibid., para. 7.541. 414 Australia – Salmon. 415 E.g. in Russia – Pigs (EU), the measures required by the respondent (Russia), had been applied in the past; in US – Animals, the alternative measure proposed was an already existing domestic measure (i.e. the general import rules, and a special import mitigation protocol), it was just not applied to the Argentinian regions; in Australia – Apples, New Zealand (complainant) demonstrated the practice to be part of its regular export practice by reference to its export regulations; in India – Agricultural Products, because India already accepted self-certification in other contexts. 416 E.g. the Terrestrial Code in Russia – Pigs (EU). 417 India – Agricultural Products. 
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availability’ in a formal, rather than substantive, way without engaging in a concrete and factual assessment.  
The ‘reasonable availability’ condition sees a superficial similarity between Articles XX GATT and 5.6 SPS.418 Although technical and economic feasibility is not explicitly mentioned in the GATT, case law assessing alternative measures in the GATT context has taken such considerations into account. For example, it has been held that 
‘administrative difficulties’419 did not render a measure not ‘reasonably available’, while impossibility to implement a measure would make it so. A measure was, however, not 
‘reasonably available’ in the GATT where it is ‘merely theoretical in nature, for instance, where the responding Member is not capable of taking it, or where the measure imposes an undue burden on that Member, such as prohibitive costs or substantial technical 
difficulties’.420 By contrast, in the context of Article 5.6 SPS, reasonableness is interpreted weaker, focusing on whether it is possible for a Member, in an abstract sense, to take the alternative measures, and none of the disputes found a measure not to be reasonably available (see also section 4.6.2). The case law neither engaged much with the actual capacity of a Member to take measures as could be expected under 
‘feasibility’; nor did it test the reasonableness of the alternatives as a proportionality test 
stricto sensu by looking at whether it would be reasonable to impose the alternative measure.  Both elements feature much stronger in the case law under Article XX GATT. This discrepancy may be an ‘accidental’ development of jurisprudence. Nevertheless, 
there is no convincing reason why the ‘feasibility’ test under SPS, a highly sensitive area, should be weaker than under the GATT.      
                                                        418 See for example, Boris Rigod (2015), Optimal Regulation and the Law of International Trade. The Interface 
between the Right to Regulate and WTO Law. Cambridge University Press, arguing that the Panel finding in Australia – Salmon and Australia – Apples are ‘consistent with the AB’s Article XX GATT jurisprudence on the 
question of whether another measure is “reasonably available”’. 419 Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products (EC – Asbestos), WT/DS135/R and Add.1 (5 April 2001), para. 904. 420 Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting 
Services (US – Gambling), WT/DS285/AB/R (20 April 2005), para. 89. 
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 Condition 2: The proposed alternative achieves the 
desired protection  Of the three conditions that an alternative measure must meet, the requirement to achieve the appropriate level of protection (ALOP) is the most extensively analyzed and most difficult to prove.   
Point 5 of Annex A to the SPS Agreement defines the ALOP as the ‘level of protection deemed appropriate by the Member establishing a sanitary or phytosanitary measure to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health within its territory.’421 The ALOP is not equal to the SPS measure. Rather, the ALOP logically precedes the determination of an SPS measure;422 the ALOP ‘is an objective, and…[the SPS measure] is an instrument 
chosen to attain or implement that objective.’423 The ALOP should express a threshold on the amount, intensity or extent that a Member deems to be acceptable.424 The purpose of the analysis under Article 5.6 is not to determine whether the importing 
Member’s SPS measures are based on a risk assessment,425 and whether this risk assessment is in compliance with the SPS Agreement (as would be evaluated under Article 5.1). The legal question is whether the proposed alternative measure meets the 
respondent’s ALOP,426 by comparing the respondent’s ALOP and the level of protection that would be achieved by the proposed alternative measure.427 This is accomplished in three steps: i) identifying the level of protection the responding Member has set as its appropriate level, ii) determining what level of protection would be achieved by the proposed alternative measure, and iii) determining whether the level of protection that would be achieved by the alternative measure would satisfy the ALOP.428                                                           421 SPS Agreement, Annex A, point 5. The note to this definition states that ‘Many Members otherwise refer to 
this concept as the “acceptable level of risk”.’ The AB in Australia-Apples (see above n. 403) clarified that the two terms are equal.  422 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, above n. 252, para. 201. 423 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, above n. 252, para. 200. 424 Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products, above n. 348, para. 7.562. Stating that the ALOP seeks to ‘prevent 
ingress’ was considered insufficient to meet the definition (Ibid., para. 7.565). Even if the value is not expressed in quantitative terms, it should still present an amount (Ibid., para. 7.562).  425 Panel Report, Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Importation of Animals, Meat and Other 
Animal Products from Argentina (US – Animals), WT/DS447/R (31 August 2015), para. 7.438; AB Report, Australia – Apples, above n. 367, para. 358. 426 AB Report, Australia – Apples, above n. 367, para. 355. 427 AB Report, India – Agricultural Products, above n. 368, para. 5.223. 428 AB Report, Australia – Apples, para. 368. 
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4.4.1 Inducing the ALOP is allowed  The AB stated in Australia – Salmon that ‘the determination of the appropriate level of protection…is a prerogative of the Member concerned and not of a panel or of the AB.’429  A Member is entitled to establish its own ALOP, as long as it is in compliance with the provisions in the SPS Agreement.430 Nevertheless, the subject frequently arises in disputes, as there are many situations in which a Member’s ALOP is unclear and vaguely defined.    Out of the nine disputes evaluated in this study, the ALOP was clearly indicated in one, it was not evaluated due to a lack of information in three, and in the five others, it had to be inferred, to varying degrees, from the information submitted by the parties and from expert advice.   In line with in Australia – Salmon, Members have an obligation to identify the ALOP with sufficient precision:  (...) the SPS Agreement contains an implicit obligation to determine the appropriate level of protection.  We do not believe that there is an obligation to determine the appropriate level of protection in quantitative terms.  This does not mean, however, that an importing Member is free to determine its level of protection with such vagueness or equivocation that the application of the relevant provisions of the SPS Agreement, such as Article 5.6, becomes impossible. It would obviously be wrong to interpret the SPS Agreement in a way that would render nugatory entire articles or paragraphs of articles of this Agreement and allow Members to escape from their obligations under this Agreement.431   Therefore, the DSB is allowed to infer the ALOP in cases of insufficient precision432 or discrepancy between what is stated and the specific facts of a case.433 It is not ‘desirable’ to do so, but may be necessary.434                                                          429 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, above n. 252, para. 199. 430 On determining the ALOP for developing countries, see Wahidin & Purnhagen, above n. 59. Also Ming Du, above n. 59; Jeffery Atik (2012), On the Efficiency Level of Health Measures and the “Appropriate Level of 
Protection. In Geert Van Calster and Denise Prevost (Eds.), Research Handbook on Environment, Health and the 
WTO. Edward Elgar.   431 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, above n. 252, para. 206. 432 Ibid., para. 207. 433 Panel Report Add.1, Russia – Pigs (EU), above n. 401, para. 85. 
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4.4.2 Case law shows a mostly vague definition of ALOP  In five of the surveyed cases the ALOP was vaguely defined and had to be induced by the DSB. Only one case had a clearly defined ALOP.  In Australia – Salmon, Australia’s ALOP was not explicit, but described as ‘the import 
prohibition on fresh, chilled or frozen salmon.’435 The AB noted that the ALOP reflected 
in this import prohibition was ‘undisputedly a “zero-risk level” of protection. However, Australia determined explicitly that its appropriate level of protection is: ... a high or 
“very conservative" level of sanitary protection aimed at reducing risk to "very low levels", "while not based on a zero-risk approach.”’436 The Compliance Panel found that 
Australia’s ALOP was a ‘somewhat vaguely determined level’,437 but indicated it would still carry out its task of assessing compliance under Article 5.6, and it ultimately found 
that Australia’s measure was inconsistent with Article 5.6.438   In Japan – Apples, the ALOP was only addressed by the Compliance Panel. Japan’s ALOP 
was described as one which ‘provides a security level that will not compromise Japan’s status as a fire-blight free country’439 and ‘equivalent to the one that would result from an import ban on commercial apples.’440 The Compliance Panel concluded that mature, 
symptomless apples are not a pathway for the spread of fire blight, and that Japan’s measure was inconsistent with Article 5.6.441   In India – Agricultural Products, India was regarded as having two ALOPs, namely the 
‘prevention and ingress of LPNAI and HPNAI’ and ‘country freedom from NAI’.442 The 
Panel concluded that India’s ALOP was ‘very high or very conservative’.443 However, the 
                                                                                                                                                                             434 AB Report, India – Agricultural Products, above n. 368, para. 5.226. 435 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, above n. 252, para. 191, cited in Australia’s appellant submission, para. 311. 436 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, above n. 252, para. 191. 437 Panel Report, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon – Recourse to Article 21.5 by Canada 
(Australia – Salmon 21.5 – Canada), WT/DS18/RW (18 February 2000), para. 7.129. 438 Ibid., para. 7.153. 439 Panel Report, Japan – Apples (Article 21.5 – US), above n. 405, para. 8.190. 440 Ibid., para. 8.193. 441 Ibid., para. 8.198. 442 Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products, above n. 348, para. 7.553. 443 Ibid., para. 7.575. 
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OIE’s Terrestrial Code would meet this ALOP,444 and consequently the challenged measure was ruled inconsistent with Article 5.6.445 The AB upheld the analysis.446   The ALOP of the United States in US – Animals was between low and zero risk,447 to prevent the introduction of foot and mouth disease (FMD) into US territory. The United States argued that the OIE’s Terrestrial Code would not meet its ALOP, which is higher than that of the OIE. This is particularly for the reason that the US does not accept the OIE category of FMD-free countries or regions that practice vaccination.448 Argentina proposed two alternative measures for the importation of fresh beef from northern 
Argentina. The first was the protocol outlined in the OIE’s Terrestrial Code, but Argentina provided insufficient evidence that this would achieve the US ALOP.449 The second proposed alternative was to apply the US law on protocols of fresh beef from Uruguay to northern Argentina. The alternative would meet the US ALOP, and therefore the US measure was ruled inconsistent with Article 5.6.450 In addition, the Panel evaluated Argentina’s proposed alternative for the US prohibition on imports of FMD-susceptible animals and products from Patagonia, which was to apply the protocols in existing US law.451 The Panel found that this would also achieve the ALOP of the United States.452   In Russia – Pigs (EU), Russia argued its ALOP served to ‘ensure protection (...) against the import and spread of contagious disease pathogens, including diseases common to both animals and humans, and goods which do not comply with the Common Veterinary Requirements’.453 However, African swine fever (ASF) is present in certain regions in Russia.454 Additionally, Russia has stated that it ‘has applied a high ALOP in accordance                                                         444 Ibid., paras. 7.585-7.586. 445 Ibid., para. 7.597. 446 AB Report, India – Agricultural Products, n. 368, para. 5.227. 447 Panel Report, US – Animals, above n. 425, para. 7.440. 448 Ibid., para. 7.423; due to the risk of partial or no immunity in some animals and the potential for antibodies which may make it not possible to differentiate between vaccinated and infected animals.  449 Ibid., paras. 7.500-7.504. 450 Ibid., para. 7.511. 451 ‘[A]ccurate tracking and identification of animals, effective controls on the movement of FMD-susceptible animals from regions of higher FMD risk, appropriate collection of samples and laboratory capacity, efficacious mitigating measures at slaughterhouses such as ante- and post-mortem inspections, and comprehensive control 
policies in case of an outbreak’ (Ibid., para. 7.539). 452 Ibid., paras. 7.546-7.548. 453 Panel Report, Russia – Pigs (EU), above n. 401, para. 7.741. 454 Ibid., para. 7.749.  
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with the provisions set out in the OIE Terrestrial Code.’455 The Panel found that Russia’s 
ALOP is ‘high or conservative’.456 The Panel concluded that the provisions in the OIE 
Terrestrial Code would meet Russia’s ALOP,457 and that Russia’s EU-wide ban was inconsistent with Article 5.6.458   
Japan’s ALOP in Japan – Agricultural Products II is the only instance of a clearly indicated ALOP.  Japan would lift the import ban if an alternative measure were equally effective. This could be measured by the level of insect mortality that could be achieved by disinfestation (i.e. complete mortality in large-scale tests on a minimum of 30,000 codling moths).459 The alternative measure proposed by the US was testing by product (as opposed to variety), for which the Panel found there to be insufficient evidence to 
prove it would meet Japan’s ALOP.460 Uniquely in this dispute, the Panel deduced another alternative measure (determining the sorption level461 of additional varieties) based on the information submitted by experts, and evaluated this in comparison with 
Japan’s ALOP. The Panel found that this measure would achieve Japan’s ALOP,462 and 
since it meets all three criteria, the Panel ruled that Japan’s SPS measures were inconsistent with Article 5.6.463 The US had not argued that the determination of sorption levels is an alternative measure,464 and the AB reversed the Panel’s decision465, 
‘because the United States did not establish a prima facie case of inconsistency with 
Article 5.6’.466   
4.4.3 Findings  Condition 2 is the least predictable. The fact that in three disputes the DSB did not proceed to an evaluation suggests that a vaguely defined ALOP may help respondents to                                                         455 Ibid., para. 7.750. 456 Ibid., para. 7.752. 457 Ibid., para. 7.827. 458 Ibid., para. 7.834. 459 Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural Products (Japan – Agricultural Products II), WT/DS76/R (27 October 1998), para. 8.82. 460 Ibid., para. 8.84. 461 Ibid., para. 8.103. 462 Ibid., para. 8.101. 463 Ibid., paras. 8.103-8.104. 464 AB Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II, above n. 459, para. 130. 465 Ibid., para. 131. 466 Ibid., para. 130.  
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evade the requirement. However, where the ALOP is evaluated, all five disputes with vague/non-quantified ALOPs established an Article 5.6 violation.   The Compliance Panel in Australia – Salmon called for quantifiable ALOPs: ‘[w]e note, parenthetically, that a more explicit and in particular a quantitative expression of a Member's ALOP would greatly facilitate the consideration of compliance with not only 
Article 5.6 but with other provisions of the SPS Agreement as well.’467 In the case law, we saw quantification to occur only rarely. The following types of metrics for achieving an ALOP can be distinguished: quantified expression (e.g. required mortality in disinfestation measures to provide safety as a ban); relative expression (e.g. by reference to an OIE standard; stating that the ALOP is higher or lower than the point of reference); 
goal-based expression (status as a pest-free country); and categorical expression in terms of risk classification (zero risk, low risk, conservative level). Most times, the 
expression of the desired ALOP remained vague, in categorical form, for example ‘low risk’. Such open definitions of the acceptability of risks are in stark contrast to the scientific aspirations of the SPS Agreement.   
 Condition 3: How significant must the trade 
improvement be?   The third limb tests whether a proposed alternative measure has sufficient trade gain 
effects. Reflecting the WTO’s trade paradigm, other benefits such as environmental or animal welfare friendliness are not included unless they can be expressed in trade. Overall, we note that the trade-restriction criterion is subject to very diverging scrutiny in different disputes. The criterion was sometimes not disputed among the parties468 or not raised in the appeal.469 In other cases, the DSB made a more intensive assessment470 and failed the 5.6 test on this criterion.471   
                                                        467 Panel Report, Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada), above n. 437, para. 7.129. 468 Japan – Agricultural Products II; US – Animals.  469 Australia – Apples; India – Agricultural Products; Russia – Pigs (EU). 470 Notably in Australia – Salmon; Japan – Apples; Australia – Apples; India – Agricultural Products. 471 The general measures at issue in Australia – Apples; the standard corresponding measures in Russia – Pigs (EU). 
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4.5.1 What is the extent of the trade improvement required?  
Footnote number 3 states that a ‘measure is not more trade-restrictive than required unless there is another measure [... that] is significantly less restrictive to trade’. Looking at the wording only, this benchmark is higher (‘significantly’) than under GATT. It is not clear whether the threshold for finding a measure in violation of Article 5.6 is deliberately higher. The surveyed case law does not strongly support either position. Only the Panel in Australia – Apples emphasized that the measure must be ‘significantly’ less restrictive to trade and implied that there was a difference between significantly and simply less restrictive to trade.472 In this dispute, the Panel agreed with the 
defendant’s submission that ‘the alternative must be significantly less trade restrictive, 
"significant" meaning "important, notable, consequential".’473 As the Panel findings on Article 5.6 were reversed (but this aspect was undisputed), its legal authority is questionable, demonstrating some legal uncertainty on this issue.  In fact, requiring a significant trade improvement would correspond to a de minimis trade restriction threshold. It is not enough that there is any kind of trade improvement, but it must surpass a certain threshold.   
4.5.2 Significance by type of measure challenged and the trade 
improvement  There are only very few examples of proposed alternatives that failed condition 3: in 
Australia — Apples, one set of measures failed the significantly less restrictive test due to evidentiary rather than substantive concerns; in Russia — Pigs (EU) for only one subset of measures concerning Latvia was the proposed alternative (namely measures based on the OIE Code) not regarded as less trade restrictive, because the import ban was effectively based on that international standard.    The outcomes of the cases are most influenced by what kind of trade restriction is at issue. Based on the identified disputes, one can distinguish: alternative measure 
                                                        472 The Panel findings on 5.6 were ultimately reversed, but condition n. 3 was not part of the appeal; the legal weight of the Panel on this point is therefore exemplary only. 473 Panel Report, Australia – Apples, para. VII.1261; para. VII.1264.  
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compared to an import ban;474 alternative measures compared to measures characterized 
as a de facto ban;475 and alternative measures compared to restrictive measures.476   
4.5.2.1 Alternative measure compared to an import ban  
It can be regarded as settled case law that ‘any measure imposing conditions upon 
importation, even if stringent, ‘would still be significantly less restrictive to trade than 
an outright prohibition’.477   In India– Agricultural Products, the US argued that the OIE Code standard was significantly less trade restrictive because it allows for trade with countries that report 
avian influenza, while India’s measures did not. The Code recognizes zoning as an appropriate method to control for avian influenza risks and limits trade to the affected areas, while the challenged measures cause country-wide trade disruptions. India disputed that there would be significant increases to market access, because it would take it longer to confirm that other countries maintain adequate surveillance systems (OIE Code) than to accept imports from a country if it does not report avian influenza for three months (disputed measure).478 The Panel did not engage with this argument and relied on the general rule that any conditions on import are by definition significantly less restrictive than an outright prohibition.   In Russia – Pigs (EU), the Panel engaged in a similarly curt analysis. The Panel argumentation heavily relied on whether the disputed measures were based on the OIE                                                         474 Measures based on the OIE Code that identifies conditions for safe trade instead of an import prohibition of various agricultural products into India from countries reporting avian influenza (India — Agricultural Products); addition of regions to the list of FMD-free regions instead of prohibition on importation of fresh (chilled or frozen) beef from Northern Argentina and Patagonia (US – Animals); ban on non-affected EU member States as opposed to an EU-wide ban (Russia – Pigs (EU)). 475 Quarantine policy instead of the applied measures that prohibited imports of salmon that were not heat-treated (Australia – Salmon); prohibition on apple imports unless satisfying stringent measures (Japan – Apples). 476 Panel Report, Australia – Apples, above n. 356, para. VII.1265: Australia's measures concerning fire blight are Measures 1-8. Testing by product instead of testing by variety (undisputed among the parties, Japan – Agricultural Products II); restricting imports to mature, symptomless apples rather than very stringent pest-specific measures at issue, reduction but not elimination of trade-restrictiveness of 600-unit as opposed to 3000-unit inspection (Japan – Apples). 477 In the Panel Report of Russia – Pigs (EU), footnotes 1158 and 1612, citing India – Agricultural Products (para. 7.590) and Australia – Salmon as authority. 478 Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products, Add. 1, para. 13. 
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Code that had been put forward as the alternative measure. Since Russia’s measure amounted to a ban (EU wide), while the OIE Code provides for measures for safe trade from ASF-free areas, and the EU could demonstrate that it has ASF-free areas, the disputed measures qualified as significantly restrictive to trade. An almost identical argument was accepted for non-ASF free areas, as the Code provides for measures that allow for safe trade of pig products that have been subject to treatment. Only for non-treated products from Latvia did the Russian national ban correspond to the international standard from the Code and was therefore not a less restrictive measure.   An outright ban therefore raises a presumption that any alternative measure is significantly less trade restrictive without necessitating an analysis of the actual trade effects. Consequently, in  – Animals, the trade restriction was not even disputed between the parties. This onerous presumption was so far only rebutted where the import ban was in accordance with the international standard recognized by the SPS agreement.  
4.5.2.2 Alternative measures compared to measures characterized as a de 
facto ban  Another way of testing trade restrictiveness is to examine whether import conditions amount to a de facto import ban.  In Australia – Salmon, the DSB considered a modified quarantine policy to an import prohibition on salmon products that were not subject to heat treatment. The alternative measures proposed would result in more salmon products being allowed on the market, in particular because there was a large demand for the product in question (e.g. salmon exceeding 450g), considering both commercial and household/consumer demand. The overall test deployed is that of increased market access,479 substantiated by looking also at the demand side for specific types of products most severely hit by the ban. The DSB also tested the effective market foreclosure, because the Canadian product was 
effectively excluded from the market for whole salmon by Australia’s measures. The Compliance Panel Report – despite member submissions arguing more on trade restriction – simply characterized import only of heat-treated salmon as a de facto ban on fresh, chilled and live salmon product. With that characterization, the trade restriction was easily regarded as significantly less.                                                           479 Panel Report, Australia – Salmon, above n. 347, paras. 7.150-7.152. 
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In Japan – Apples, the United States proposed to accept the exportation of ‘mature 
symptomless apples’, because this would suffice to ensure Japan’s ALOP instead of the cumbersome measures imposed. The Panel examined the effect of the proposed measure on trade, considering that entire US orchards would be eligible for export that under the current measures were not. Further, the US put forward that only 1% of US orchards satisfied the current Japanese measures, while all current export by the US would qualify under the alternative measure proposed. The Panel did engage with the actual export figures and stated that since 2002 there were no apple exports from the US to Japan, despite the seemingly obvious willingness of exporters to do so. In other words, the Panel considered the export constraints of the proposed measures (i.e. only 1% of US orchards eligible); and compared the export prohibitiveness of the actual measures with the proposed alternative (i.e. burdensome measures are more export prohibitive than national measures already applied). The actual effects on trade patterns (no current exporting to Japan) showed that a measure had trade effects similar to a ban on US apples.  In the case law, the DSB has tended to look at market access tests, substantiated by looking at both the demand and supply sides.   
4.5.2.3 Alternative measures compared to restrictive measures  This type of test compares measures stricto sensu; i.e. by looking at the intensity or number with which tests must be carried out, whether they are more costly, time-consuming, labour intensive or easier to comply with for the challenging country.  In Australia – Apples, the Panel480 considered some of Australia’s measures to be significantly less restrictive to trade. The Panel summarized that a market access test was used; which specifically tests whether market access would be ‘obtained 
significantly more easily than under the current regime’ and whether the market access (i.e. trade gains) would be significant. Concerning fire blight and European canker specific measures, the Panel simply stated that the 12 contested measures were significantly more trade restrictive, as they are not just more numerous, but also more 
stringent and costly to comply with:481 More intensive inspections are more costly and                                                         480 The Panel Report was overturned, however, the only issues reconsidered by the AB on the fire blight and 
ALCM measures did not relate to condition 3. Therefore, in these parts, the Panel judgment’s reasoning can be seen to be valid. 481 Panel Report, Australia – Apples, above n. 356, para. 7.1263. 
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time-consuming, in particular with a five time smaller sample size; in this case the reduction would be about 600-unit as opposed to 3000-unit inspections. Also half the 
fumigation rate than another measure would be significantly less trade restrictive than 
other measures.482 By contrast, concerning the other measures, i.e. inspections, operation under standard commercial practices and packing house requirements, the Panel agreed483 that compliance with standard commercial practices would be costly and time consuming, but found that the parties provided insufficient evidence to demonstrate the increase in market access.   In terms of outcome, in Australia – Apples the Panel failed the challenge of general measures on grounds that the claim that alternatives would be significantly less trade restrictive was not well underscored. The other challenges passed the criterion rather easily.    
4.5.3 Findings   Only exceptionally did an alternative measure not constitute a significant trade improvement. Based on the analysis, it appears that the most decisive criterion is the 
nature of the restriction that is challenged, for instance whether it concerns a complete import ban or import restrictions.   Restrictive import conditions as an alternative measure instead of an import ban will generally qualify as a significant trade improvement. Less restrictive conditions as an alternative to very stringent import conditions will be scrutinized by the DSB, but have a good chance to qualify as a significant trade improvement. In particular, the DSB examines whether stringent import conditions can be characterized as a de facto ban on imports and otherwise compares the restrictiveness of the measures at issue.  There is leeway for jurisprudential developments to make the significance of the trade improvement a more important issue, in case the DSB decides to attach more meaning to 
the ‘significance’ of the trade improvement. The grey area where this could be meaningful is an India – Agricultural Products type of situation. Assuming that quarantine surveillance or documentation would in fact take more or the same time 
                                                        482 Ibid., para. 7.1364; Australia's measure concerning ALCM is Measure 14. 483 Ibid., 7.1398. 
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than an import ban that is limited in time, one could argue that the overall trade gains are not sufficiently significant.   
 The potency of Article 5.6 SPS   Sections 4.3-4.6 examined how the individual elements of the test determine an Article 5.6 violation. Based on the findings, we identify a major source of legal uncertainty in the application of Article 5.6 and suggest a doctrinal refinement of the test applied (section 4.6.1). We proceed to analyze our findings in light of trade liberalization theories: what kind of trade-off device is Article 5.6 and what kind of balance is struck between the need for domestic SPS measures and trade liberalization? (subsection 4.6.2) and examine how these interpretations affect the regulatory power of SPS measures for WTO members institutionally (subsection 4.6.3).   
4.6.1 Adding a preliminary condition: Identification and validity of the 
alternative measure  The case overview strongly suggests that the type of restriction and the type of alternative measure proposed are highly outcome determinative. It was easiest to demonstrate a violation of Article 5.6 if the proposed alternative measure was one based on an international standard. A proposed measure based on scientific evidence was more difficult to prove and required extensive analysis from the Panels and AB and often the input of experts. Four types of alternative measures proposed by complainant countries were identified: those based on international standards; existing legislation; 
science and technical solutions; and private measures.   Alternative measures based on international standards provided the strongest presumption that an alternative fulfilled the ALOP, unless the ALOP sought was explicitly higher than that of an international standard. In India – Agricultural Products, 
the proposed and accepted alternative measures were based on the OIE’s Terrestrial Code.484 In Russia – Pigs (EU), the EU proposed applying regionalization in accordance 
with Chapter 15.1 of the OIE’s Terrestrial Code (i.e. allowing exports from disease-free countries and zones), rather than implementing an EU-wide ban.485 The alternative met                                                         484 Panel Report, India – Agricultural Products, above n. 348, para. 7.526. 485 Panel Report, Russia – Pigs (EU), above n. 401, paras. 7.809- 7.814. 
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the Article 5.6 requirements.486 In US – Animals, Argentina proposed that the US follow 
the OIE’s recommendations for importation of fresh meat from FMD-free countries or zones where vaccination is practiced.487 However, the US ALOP for FMD was higher than that achieved by the OIE Terrestrial Code.488 The Panel concluded that Argentina failed 
to prove that this alternative measure would meet the US’s ALOP.489 With strong 
evidence, international standards can deviate from a country’s ALOP.   Alternatives are also commonly based on existing legislation that is already applied in other countries. In US – Animals, Argentina proposed that the US allow the mitigating protocols and addition of Patagonia to the list of FMD-free countries or regions under existing US law.490 The Panel found that these existing US measures would meet the US ALOP.491 By contrast, in US – Poultry (China), the US enacted a measure which excluded the import of poultry products from China into the United States. China argued that an alternative measure would be the application of normal approval procedures for the importation of poultry products, i.e. the same requirements as for other WTO members.492 In this case, the Panel found that the level of risk posed by Chinese poultry was unknown, so the analysis would be too speculative and it declined to rule on Article 5.6.493 This confirms the problem of relying on alternative measures that would need a scientific assessment in dispute procedures.   Ad-hoc science and technical solutions that are not based on international or national standards may also be proposed. In Australia – Salmon, the alternative measures were five technical options listed in Australia’s own government report, in particular evisceration.494 In Japan – Agricultural Products II, the alternative measure was testing by product (vs. variety), for which the Panel found there to be insufficient evidence to 
prove it would meet Japan’s ALOP.495 In Japan – Apples, the US’s proposed measure was to allow the importation of mature, symptomless apples since they are not known to be 
                                                        486 Ibid., paras. 7.816-7.834. 487 Panel Report, US – Animals, above n. 425, para. 7.432. 488 Ibid., para. 7.503. The US measures were not based on the Terrestrial Code precisely because the US does not consider regions recognized by the OIE as FMD-free where vaccination is practised to be FMD-free 489 Ibid., para. 7.504. 490 Ibid., paras. 7.432, 7.433 and 7.548. 491 Ibid., para. 7.511. 492 Panel Report, US – Poultry (China), above n. 403, para. 7.321. 493 Ibid., para. 7.335. 494 Panel Report, Australia – Salmon, above n. 347, para. 8.169. 495 Panel Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II, above n. 459, para. 8.84. 
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a pathway for the transmission of fire blight,496 similar to Australia – Apples, in which New Zealand proposed to restrict imports to mature and symptomless apples. This type of alternative is afflicted with the highest legal uncertainty. Lastly, private or public-private standard setting bodies can take valid alternative measures to be proposed as the DSB saw no reason to reject such alternative measures a 
priori.497 It is, however, a highly contested issue whether a pure private standard constitutes a valid alternative, and one may expect this to become a topic of future litigation.  The type of alternative usually makes or breaks an Article 5.6 challenge. Where the alternative measure is a technical solution, the case law showed that the DSB was more likely to not rule on an issue or to rule differently in various instances. The DSB shies away from engaging in science, inclined to find formal solutions, outsourcing scientific analysis either to one of the three endorsed international standards, or stating that the country already applies a similar measure (which then makes the argument akin to a non-discrimination argument). Alternative measures based on a standard written by one of the three SPS-endorsed standard-setting organisations (Codex, OIE, IPPC) were regularly regarded as achieving a given ALOP. This would only be different if the ALOP were explicitly defined in deviation of the international standards. The relationship between domestically taken SPS measures and international SPS standards is a key issue, and the research confirms that the application of Article 5.6 SPS reinforces the hegemony of the three endorsed SPS international standard-setting bodies. It is important to note that these standards often work on a consensus basis, but that decisions may also be taken by vote.498 In this case, Member States’ regulatory autonomy or even unilateral regulatory dominance is clearly limited by multilateral regulatory globalization.                                                         496 Panel Report, Japan – Apples (Article 21.5 - US), above n. 405, para. 8.198. 497 Panel Report, Japan – Apples (Article 21.5 – US), above n. 405. The alternative export measure was taken by 
private parties. The Panel underlined that the ‘standards are specified in legislation and subject to control by duly licensed government inspectors’, but conceded that they were ‘a combination of public and private 
interventions.’ 498 ‘In almost all cases, standards are adopted by consensus. In a small minority of cases, where it is not possible to achieve consensus, standards have been adopted after a vote. Voting is normally done by a show of hands and a two-thirds majority is sufficient for the adoption of a standard. More than half the Delegates representing 
Member Countries must be present in order to have a quorum for the adoption of standards’. OIE (2016), 
Procedures used by the OIE to set standards and recommendations for international trade. Accessed 13 August 2017, http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Internationa_Standard_Setting/docs/pdf/A_OIE_procedures_standards_2016.pdf. 
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Of all parts of the ‘excessivity test’, the identification and validity of a proposed 
alternative measure is characterized by the most legal uncertainty in application by the DSB. However, the identification of the alternative measure appears almost randomly in the DSB argumentation. The lack of articulation of this important preliminary question was the reason for reversing several Panel decisions, for example if the alternative measure had been proposed by the Panel, and not by the party. Similarly, in the 21.5 Panel Report of Japan – Apples, the Panel discussed the validity of a proposed measure as 
an alternative measure under ‘economic and technical feasibility’, conflating feasibility with validity of the proposed alternative.499   We suggest that the identification and validity of alternatives should be treated 
separately from the concerns tested in the other three elements of the ‘excessivity test’ in a preliminary first step of the Article 5.6 test. Such a doctrinal clarification is necessary, given that it was the reason for successful appeals and was conflated within the three other elements in numerous disputes. If taking into account more alternative measures allows finding superior options, then it is not conducive of the court to artificially limit the number of permissible alternatives. However, we also observed a dominance of the recognized multilateral SPS standards as alternative measures that consistently trump an Article 5.6 SPS analysis.   
4.6.2 Article 5.6 as ‘excessivity test’: Pure trade liberalization 
rationale  
Necessity testing has been criticised as being ‘overbroad and underinclusive’, leading to 
a ‘truncated maximization, or truncated comparative cost-benefit analysis, by keeping the regulatory benefit relatively constant and working on the trade detriment side. It thus evaluates a much more limited range of options, ignoring other groups of options 
that may be superior.’500   The pertinence of this criticism varies significantly for a ‘pure’ necessity test, and a 
necessity test that incorporates ‘reasonably available’ formulations: the latter has regard to regulatory costs, and relates these back to the trade restriction- such a test better reflects the overall implications of a measure, and would lead to more economically sound outcomes.                                                          499 Panel Report, Japan – Apples 21.5, above n. 405, para. 7911. 500 See Trachtman, above n. 386, p. 72.  
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 Article 5.6 SPS incorporates a weak reasonableness element that neglects the costs of an alternative measure at domestic level and the importance of the regulatory goals achieved. It is therefore a pure trade liberalization article: the DSB approaches 
‘reasonably available in terms of technical and economic feasibility’ in a narrow way; in fact, it only examines the possibility, not the reasonability, of a measure.  At the time of writing, no dispute has failed to fulfil this condition to date. By contrast, as a legal device, 
‘reasonableness’ could take many different legal shapes, leaning either towards a cost-benefit analysis or proportionality. As Trachtman writes: ‘If the reasonableness test amounts to a requirement that the least trade restrictive alternative not be so costly as to countervail the benefits of the regulatory measure, then it bears some resemblance to cost-benefit analysis; excluding from its truncated maximizing analysis only the measurement of benefits of the regulatory measure. If, alternatively, it amounts to a comparison that requires that the regulatory costs not be disproportionately great in comparison to the trade benefits, then it is a kind of proportionality testing.’501 A strong, or meaningful, reasonableness could therefore relate to the benefit achieved by the regulatory measure (is the regulatory benefit worth it?) or relate to the trade gains that accrue (are the trade gains important enough?). This is also one of the main criticisms 
levied, namely that the least/less trade restrictive alternative always trumps, ‘no matter 
what the domestic regulatory cost’.502 Including a strong reasonableness criterion in the necessity test could address this problem by placing an ‘indeterminate cap on the 
domestic regulatory cost’.503  Unfortunately, the interpretation of reasonability and 
feasibility and the ‘excessivity test’ ignores actual costs of a regulatory measure.  In addition, the ‘significantly less restrictive to trade’ element of the necessity test could require the trade gain to be significant. The DSB did not rely on this possible margin in its case law. It has been argued that GATT/WTO jurisprudence has not explicitly embraced proportionality testing, except to the extent that necessity testing may be 
viewed as ‘shading into proportionality’.504 Trachtman notes that ‘[c]omparative proportionality testing includes necessity testing, with a margin. Due to this margin, it is possible that a measure would fail necessity testing, but not be clearly excessive under proportionality testing, if it were only marginally more trade restrictive than another 
                                                        501 Ibid., p. 70. 502 Ibid., p. 72. 503 Ibid., p. 72. 504 Ibid., p. 75. 
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alternative.’505 The DSB so far has not required a significant trade restriction, and 
therefore Article 5.6 does not ‘shade into’ proportionality.  Looking at the text of the article, it seems that the drafters did everything to make Article 5.6 SPS a necessity test with a reasonable availability component: the words are literally mentioned, even elaborated on (technical and economic feasibility), and, 
arguably, a margin of appreciation is expressed in the requirement of a ‘significant’ trade improvement. It is therefore deplorable that the test is currently deployed in a very strict manner, without taking regulatory costs into account (at most paying lip service to this concept) or measuring the extent and importance of the regulatory benefit.506 While the institution of Article 5.6 at doctrinal level could provide more room for accommodating Members’ regulatory choices, the way the ‘formula’ is currently interpreted requires trade liberalization at all costs if a domestic measure and an alternative proposed measure both meet the ALOP.   The literature questions to what extent the necessity test developed in the GATT507 is valid for the interpretation of the SPS Agreement, and whether there is divergence between the two legal regimes. Several differences between Article 5.6 SPS and Article XX GATT can be identified. First, the burden of proof is different.508 In interpreting Article XX GATT, the AB held that the burden of proof is on the responding state to show that alternatives are not reasonably available, ‘taking into account a variety of factors including the domestic costs of such alternative[s]’.509 In SPS disputes, on the other hand, the burden of identifying a prima facie valid hypothetical alternative and establishing that each element of Article 5.6 is satisfied is on the complainant. Second, it has been argued previously that the SPS benchmark for the hypothetical measure is higher for the complainant as it requires a significantly less trade restrictive measure, in contrast to the approach taken under GATT requiring the original measure to be the 
least-trade-restrictive measure.510 On this point, our findings showed that such a                                                         505 Ibid., p. 76. 506 We thank an anonymous reviewer for commenting that this version of reasonableness could indeed contradict the national sovereignty provided in setting the ALOP by putting into question whether a given 
regulatory benefit is ‘worth it’.  507 Specifically Article XX GATT, the ten exceptions and the ‘chapeau’. 508 See Dawar and Ronen, above n. 387, Gisele Kapterian (2010), A Critique of the WTO Jurisprudence on 
“Necessity”. International and Comparative Law Quarterly 59(1): 89-127, p. 96; Nathalier Bernasconi-Osterwalder, Daniel Magraw, Maria Julia Oliva, Marcos Orellana & Elisabeth Tuerk (2005), Environment and 
Trade: A Guide to WTO Jurisprudence. Routledge, p. 152. 509 Kapterian, above n. 508, p. 108. 510 Bernasconi-Osterwalder et al., above n. 508, p. 152.  
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difference is not supported by past case law interpretations, although it could be interpreted in such a way in the future. GATT necessity is part of a two-tiered structure that first assesses whether a measure is necessary (for example to protect human, animal or plant life or health), before proceeding to test whether it is discriminatory or a disguised restriction. This necessity test can afford to be less strict, because after the first, a second test layer scrutinizes a domestic measure further. By contrast, Article 5.6 SPS has been construed in a stricter way overall, in particular concerning the 
‘reasonableness’ element, possibly due to the fact that it is self-standing. We, however, conclude that the necessity test in GATT XX (b) is more permissive of trade restrictions for 
public policy exemptions than Article 5.6 SPS.  
It has been argued that the purpose of the SPS Agreement is ‘to detect covert protectionist measures and to elaborate on the Article III GATT non-discrimination 
discipline’.511 Others claim a ‘post-discrimination trade order’.512  Under Article 5.6 SPS measures may be struck down for being excessively trade-restrictive. It does not necessitate discrimination, nor does it test indirect discrimination or arbitrary measures. Its exclusive precondition is that an alternative measure exists that would be less restrictive to trade. As we have shown, Article 5.6 SPS aims purely at trade liberalization. Therefore, in its specific area it can be characterized as a ‘neo-necessity’ 
test that constitutes both a ‘post-discrimination’ and a ‘post-protectionism’ trade discipline.  
4.6.3 Article 5.6: Limit to unilateral and reinforcer of multilateral SPS 
standard-setting powers  The importance of Article 5.6 SPS has grown, as measured by party reliance, extent of treatment by the DSB and outcomes. Further, it is a pure trade liberalization provision. 
How, then, does the Article 5.6 interpretation influence WTO Members’ regulatory power?  From an institutional point of view, looking at who decides, the European Commission, 
for instance, argued in one of its submissions: ‘[t]he fact that alternative measures must be "reasonably available" and "significantly less restrictive" implies that an appropriate degree of deference must be given to Members' choices of SPS measures’, and requires                                                         511 Rigod, above n. 393, p. 530.  512 Mavroidis in Rigod, above n. 418. 
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‘placing a high evidentiary burden upon complaining Members’.513 Such deference is not supported by the case law; instead the outcomes of Article 5.6 disputes often vastly interfered with and therefore limited Members’ regulatory choices.   
On the one hand, it is argued that WTO rules can act as a ‘shield’ to protect domestic 
regulation, or, on the other hand, as a ‘sword’ with which to challenge regulation. Previous authors have demonstrated the use of WTO rules as a sword or shield in the 
case of Japan’s trade policy in a variety of areas;514 the EU’s data privacy standards;515 and ISO standards.516 In the realm of SPS standards and measures, we argue that Article 5.6 SPS is a powerful legal institution that facilitates challenges to domestic SPS measures, and therefore provides a counter-narrative to unilateral regulatory globalization in the realm of SPS measures. This power of individual countries to regulate global markets has been referred to by various catch phrases, such as ‘extra-
jurisdictional impact’,517 ‘back impact’,518 ‘unilateral regulatory globalization’,519 the 
‘Brussels Effect’520 and ‘territorial extension’.521 These theories generally acknowledge the restraining effect of the WTO on the unilateral regulatory power of large states. However, in global regulation theory and the WTO, the specific instrument of Article 5.6 SPS is often overlooked.522 The pure trade liberalization aspect of Article 5.6 SPS provides an argument against theories that individual WTO Members use their power to impose their own standards, at least in the field of SPS.                                                          513 Panel Report, Australia – Apples, above n. 356, para. V.35. 514 Saadia M. Pekkanen (2001), Aggressive Legalism: The Rules of the WTO and Japan’s Emerging Trade Strategy. World Economy 24(5): 707-737; Saadia M. Pekkanen (2002), Sword and Shield. The WTO Dispute 
Settlement System and Japan. In Ulrike Schaede and William Grimes (Eds.), Japan’s Managed Globalization: 
Adapting to the Twenty-First Century. M.E. Sharpe. 515 Shaffer, above n. 6; Shaffer, above n. 64. 516 ‘ISO standards may operate either as a sword—a negative standard used to challenge a domestic regulatory action—or a shield—an internationally agreed reference point that bolsters the legitimacy of a national 
measure’; David A. Wirth (2009), The International Organization for Standardization: Private Voluntary Standards as Swords and Shields. Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review 36(1): 79-102.  517 Shaffer, above n. 6. 518 Wirth, above n. 1.  519 Bradford, above n. 1. 520 Ibid. On the relationship between the WTO and the Brussels Effect, see Sinopoli & Purnhagen, above n. 344.   521 Scott, above n. 26, 522 The ‘mandate’ of the WTO as described by Bradford, for instance, is characterized as a discrimination test only; other authors point out the distinction between discrimination and disguised restriction, but in the context of the SPS Agreement, do not include the provision of 5.6 SPS. Chang-Fa Lo (2012), The Proper Interpretation of 'Disguised Restriction on International Trade' under the WTO: The Need to Look at the Protective Effect. Journal of International Dispute Settlement 4(1): 111-137.  
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Trade has been argued, paradoxically, to trigger both a ‘race to the bottom’ and a ‘race to 
the top’523 of standards. The case law we examined, by contrast, supports the convergence of standards at multilateral level: the application of Article 5.6 leads to a shift of the locus of regulatory power towards the international standards of the three SPS-endorsed standard-setting bodies, which decisively influenced case outcomes, either as ‘irresistible’ alternative measures or as supporting the technical and economic feasibility of alternative measures. In terms of standard-setting powers, Article 5.6 SPS therefore provides (at least potentially) not only a negative limit to unilateral global standard-setting by WTO members. We have seen the predominance of international 
standards in tipping the balance in the application of the ‘excessivity test’, resulting in a multilateral convergence of standards that locates the regulatory power in the respective international standard-setting bodies, i.e. the Codex Alimentarius, OIE, and IPPC. Article 5.6, therefore, strongly reinforces the recognized SPS international standard-setting bodies.  
 Conclusions   Overall, the importance of the ‘excessivity test’ in Article 5.6 SPS has matured. Although the number of SPS disputes slightly declined, Article 5.6 SPS has been cited in nearly all recent SPS disputes, indicating a stronger litigation interest. Regarding outcomes, we observe three waves: an early phase of tension, with Panels finding a violation of Article 5.6 and the AB overturning decisions; a phase of hesitation around 2010 characterized by few cases and reports failing to reach conclusions; and after 2012 a phase of stricter 
application in which in all cases Article 5.6 violations were found.   
In terms of trade liberalization, the ‘excessivity test’ is self-standing and legally very 
potent due to the weakness of the ‘reasonableness’ and ‘trade gain’ requirements applied, and the fact that alternative measures, particularly when based on international standards, are mostly seen to fulfil the often vague definitions of desirable levels of protection to be achieved by domestic SPS regulatory measures.    Article 5.6 SPS acts as an instrument of negative standards levelling, whereby SPS measures may be struck down for being excessively trade-restrictive alone. In terms of standard-setting powers, Article 5.6 SPS therefore provides (at least potentially) a remedy against unilateral global standard setting by a WTO member. This, together with                                                         523 Vogel, above n. 15; Vogel, above n. 15, p. 3. 
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the fact that the recognized international multilateral standards are regularly seen as a valid yardstick, results in Article 5.6 SPS as a motor for convergence of SPS standards. These two mechanisms combined provide for a powerful counter-narrative to theories of unilateral regulatory power of WTO members when it comes to SPS measures.
 CHAPTER 5 
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Abstract  Most countries have adopted phytosanitary regulations for vegetable seeds in order to control the pests and diseases that could be transferred upon importation. Standards vary widely around the world, however, which poses a challenge when exporting vegetable seeds to multiple countries. Harmonization of the regulated pests and diseases and import certificates would reduce the burden of having to adapt to so many different requirements, and would additionally restrict the adoption of unnecessary and potentially protectionist measures. Despite these advantages, harmonization is not always as effective as intended and may have negative impacts on developing countries in particular. Developing a harmonized list of prohibited pests and diseases is technically and politically infeasible, although the logic to design phytosanitary standards would be valuable to standardize. This paper investigates the role of international organizations and their relevant schemes in harmonizing phytosanitary standards for vegetable seeds. ISF is compiling a database – the Regulated Pest List Initiative – which contains detailed information on relevant pathogens of vegetable 
seeds. Additionally, IPPC’s ePhyto certification system has the potential to reduce technical barriers of import and export phytosanitary certificates.        
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5.1 Introduction  International trade potentially serves as a pathway for the entry and establishment of seed-borne pathogens. Most countries have adopted phytosanitary measures524 for imported seeds in order to reduce the risk of the transfer of pests and diseases, although standards differ. All seeds imported by a country have to meet the domestic phytosanitary requirements of that country.525 This may result in trade barriers, since it can be a challenge for exporters to meet a variety of standards in order to gain access to different markets around the world. It is even more demanding if the import requirements are unjustified, unnecessarily strict and/or protectionist.   Efforts have been and continue to be made to harmonize national seed phytosanitary laws and trade regulations.526 Nevertheless, there is still room for more established harmonization of seed laws and certification systems.527 Following an overview of the benefits and concerns surrounding the harmonization of standards – and phytosanitary regulations in particular – a vision of harmonization is presented. Several relevant international organizations and their harmonization schemes are then discussed, and their role in the harmonization of seed health standards evaluated.   
 The importance and reality of harmonization  Seed quality control (testing for inter alia health, viability and purity) and certification (declaration that seed identity and uniformity comply with certain standards) were initially developed to help farmers who purchase seed, since neither the variety nor the quality can be determined simply by the appearance of the seed. In the absence of these regulations, farmers would be required to trust the supplier that the seeds are of sufficient quality.528 Instead, they provide a guarantee for the buyer that seeds comply                                                         524 Phytosanitary measures may be applied at various stages of seed growth, harvest, processing, storage and trade (i.e. upon arrival in the importing country). FAO and IPPC (2017). ISPM 38: International Movement of 
Seeds. 525 In addition to internal quality standards of companies and additional customer requirements 526 OECD (2012), OECD Seed Schemes: A Synthesis of International Regulatory Aspects that Affect Seed Trade. 527 It is important to note that although there are various types of seed laws, including intellectual property rights and those for other quality aspects (germination, varietal purity, etc.), this paper will only address phytosanitary, or disease-borne, measures. 528 Niels Louwaars (2007). Seeds of Confusion: The Impact of Policies on Seed Systems. PhD dissertation, Wageningen University. 
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with certain standards.529 The information on seed varieties included in certificates and quality test results is also important for farmers to develop their planning schemes, such as the time of year that is best to plant the seeds.530   Seed regulations are primarily created at national level, but they may also impact the international movement of seed. Seed health standards in particular have a very important trade aspect. While differences in germination standards across countries may be cumbersome to international trade, the presence of seed transmitted diseases can have devastating effects. Phytosanitary regulations can serve to avoid the spread of certain plant diseases within a country, although they more importantly exist to avoid the importation of ‘new’ diseases to a country.   There are large differences in countries’ phytosanitary regulations for vegetable seeds. Limited harmonization of seed laws may result in trade barriers, due to the strictness of some phytosanitary measures and the complexity in meeting different import requirements in different countries. For example, varying pests and diseases are regulated, field inspections may or may not be required, and specific laboratory seed 
health tests may or may not be necessary to meet a country’s import requirements. This is a challenge for exporters who have to comply with different standards in order to gain market access around the world. Another major burden is the complexity of documentation necessary for exporting and importing seeds, since the information required in import and export certificates is not standardized.   As an example of the dramatically different pests and diseases that may be regulated, Tables 5.1 and 5.2 summarize the pests and diseases on tomato seeds that are regulated by Mexico and the European Union. There are major disparities between the two places; in the case of Mexico, a very extensive list; and there are even differences based on the country of origin of seeds. In addition, these tables represent only one crop and two places. It poses a challenge for companies to keep track of and apply so many different requirements.                                                             529 FAO (2007), Private Standards in the United States and European Union Markets for Fruit and Vegetables: 
Implications for Developing Countries, http://www.fao.org/3/a-a1245e.pdf. 530 Louwaars, above n. 528. 
Table 5.1. Mexico: Regulated pests on tomato seeds based on country of origin 531 
 Country of Origin 
Pest  Chile, China, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Guatemala, 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
Taiwan, USA 
Costa 
Rica 
India Israel Kenya Morocco Peru Spain, 
Thailand 
Abutilon Theophrasti        x Alternaria brassicicola  x  x  x  x Chrysanthemum stunt viroid        x Clavibacter michiganensis subsp michiganensis x x x x x x x x Cu umber pale fruit viroid        x Cuscuta campestris     x    Orobanche cernua     x    Orobanche ramosa     x    Pepper veinal mottle virus     x    Phoma destructiva  x  x     Phomopsis vexans  x  x     Potato spindle tuber viroid  x  x   x x Pseudomonas marginalis pv. Marginalis     x    Pseudomonas syringae pv. Atrofaciens      x   Pseudomonas syringae pv. Syringae      x   Pseudomonas syringae pv. Tomato      x   Pseudomonas viridiflava     x   x Richardia brasilensis     x    Tomato black ring nepovirus     x    Tomato black ring virus      x   Tomato bushy stunt virus       x  Tomato ringspot nepovirus       x  Trogoderma granarium   x x     Verticillium dahliae (up to 10%)     x    Xanthomonas vesicatoria     x                                                            531 Servicio Nacional de Sanidad, Inocuidad y Calidad Agroalimentaria, Módulo de consulta de requisites fitosanitarios para la importación de mercancía de origen vegetal. Accessed 20 July 2017, https://sistemasssl.senasica.gob.mx/mcrfi/ConsultaCatalogos.xhtml. 
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Table 5.2. European Union: Regulated pests on tomato seeds532 
Pest Country of origin Clavibacter michiganensis ssp. michiganensis All countries Potato spindle tuber viroid All countries Xanthomonas campestris pv. Vesicatoria All countries Pepino mosaic virus All countries   The following examples of actual trade barriers further illustrate the importance of science-based phytosanitary requirements for vegetable seeds. China recently demanded a test for Verticillium (a fungus) on Brassica533 seeds. However, Verticillium is not proven to be a seed-borne disease for these crops, but is instead a soil-borne pathogen. There is therefore logically no seed test for it, making this requirement an unnecessary one to meet. In another example, Zambia declared that all imported vegetable seeds must have undergone a field inspection for Xanthomonas. This bacterium can only be detected in the field in cases of severe infection, however, and laboratory tests performed directly on the seeds are much more accurate. This is therefore a needless requirement. In 2015, Japan established a list of pests and diseases on vegetable seeds subject to quarantine requirements.534 The list is broad and overly comprehensive, and includes the entire genus of Fusarium. Although Fusarium can be a devastating disease, there are multiple species and only some are harmful. In fact, many 
Fusarium species are so ubiquitous and innocuous that some live on our skin and float through the air.  It is therefore unrealistic to include the entire Fusarium family on a quarantine list since all imports would be effectively, and unnecessarily, banned.   In addition, the divergences in terminology complicate seed trade. Countries around the world require different wording of the information included on import and export certificates. If a company wishes to export vegetables seeds to a variety of countries, it must prepare different documents that word essentially the same phrase in different ways; this is an unnecessary burden and barrier to trade.535 For example, additional declarations for tomato seeds are often mandatory to declare that the seeds are free                                                         532 Council Directive 2000/29, above n. 301; Commission Decision of 27 February 2004 on measures to prevent the introduction into and the spread within the Community of Pepino mosaic virus.  533 Genus of plants in the mustard family, including cabbage, broccoli, cauliflower, kale and Brussels sprouts 534 Plant Protection Station, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Japan, http://www.pps.go.jp/english/. 535 One of the goals of ePhyto is to harmonize additional declarations and other information included in certificates 
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from the regulated pests and diseases. This has to be formulated in writing in a specific way, however. Examples of such mandatory phrasing are: ‘free from’, ‘field inspection’, 
‘growing place free from’, ‘inspected and free from’, ‘inspected during growth’, ‘mother 
plants inspected’, ‘parent plants inspected’, ‘parent plants free from’, ‘taken from plants 
not’ and ‘tested’.   If there would be more globally harmonized seed standards, non-tariff barriers to trade would decrease, market uncertainty would also decrease (since one could expect a certain level of quality), food security would improve and the cost of seed to farmers would be reduced.536 It is important that governments find a balance between preventing infected seeds from being sold on the market and avoiding unjustified measures that have a negative impact on trade. The widespread adoption of international standards, or the harmonization of standards, would reduce the confusion when determining whether domestic standards have a legitimate scientific basis or are protectionist measures in disguise.537   Despite these numerous advantages, harmonization of standards is not viewed only in a positive light. Some critics of harmonization argue that it limits national sovereignty by preventing countries from adopting domestic standards more stringent than those of international organizations or other countries (the so-called ‘race to the bottom’). In addition, harmonization may pose barriers for developing countries. While it has been argued that adoption of stringent standards may be a competitive advantage538, such standards are also often considered to be barriers to accessing developed country markets.539 Developing countries are essentially required to comply with standards set by developed countries, and face a larger cost of compliance as a result.540 Finger and Schuler provided some examples of the costs of compliance with SPS measures. It cost US$41.2 million to improve the hygienic conditions of meat processing in Hungary, US$10.0 million to improve the quarantine system in China, US$3.3 million to modernize laboratories in Turkey for residue control and US$82.7 million for an agricultural export reform project in Argentina. It is also debated whether the standards set by                                                         536 D.D. Rohrbach, I.J. Minde & J. Howard (2003), Looking beyond national boundaries: regional harmonization of seed policies, laws and regulations. Food Policy 28(4): 317-333. 537 Asif H. Qureshi & Nohyoung Park (2013), The WTO as a ‘Facilitator’ in the Harmonisation of Domestic Trade Laws. Asian Journal of WTO & International Health Law and Policy 8: 217-247, p. 222. 538 Jaffee & Henson, above n. 59. 539 Graham Mayeda (2004), Developing Disharmony? The SPS and TBT Agreements and the Impact of Harmonization on Developing Countries. Journal of International Economic Law 7: 737-764.  540 Ibid. 
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international organizations are practical to implement in developing countries, for example whether it is necessary to have expensive seed of high quality, when cheaper seed of sufficient quality is more likely to be successful on local markets. More lenient standards are also more feasible in meeting emergency seed supply requirements.541  Van Zwanenberg et al. (2011)542 and Jansen (2007)543 argued that the implementation and enforcement of international standards are out of touch with the reality of the situations in developing countries, which Jansen demonstrated with the example of pesticides in Honduras. Jansen reasons that the transfer of international standards to developing counties needs to be further examined. As van Zwanenberg et al.544 state, ‘It is important to ask whose regulatory purposes are being represented and whose are being omitted in the promulgation of international regulatory norms. How are trade-offs 
and compromises made? And are poorer peoples’ interests and perspectives articulated or realized in the construction of regulatory purposes?’545 Mayeda (2004)546 referred to 
this as a ‘blind drive for harmonization’ and argued it ‘fails to recognize the need for countries to adapt laws and legal institutions to domestic conditions’.  
5.3 Vision of harmonization  While recognizing both the arguments in favor of and against harmonization, I argue that some harmonization of phytosanitary standards for vegetable seeds is essential.   It would not be ideal to have fully harmonized phytosanitary standards: in that case, all pests and diseases that exist anywhere in the world would be on a list of prohibited pests and diseases, requiring even more unnecessary testing, declarations, etc. Additionally, agro-ecological systems around the world are themselves not 
‘standardized’: the same pathogens may interact in various ways with environments in different parts of the world. As Victor (2002)547 stated:                                                         541 Rohrbach et al., above n. 536. 542 Patrick van Zwanenberg, Adrian Ely, Adrian Smith (2011), Regulating Technology. International 
Harmonization and Local Realities. Earthscan.  543 Kees Jansen (2007), The Unspeakable Ban: The Translation of Global Pesticide Governance into Honduran National Regulation. World Development 36: 575-589.  544 Van Zwanenberg et al., above n. 542. 545 Ibid. 546 Mayeda, above n. 539. 547 Victor, above n. 133. 
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SPS measures vary across and within nations because preferences and 
circumstances vary. Simply requiring nations to harmonize the SPS measures to a 
single standard is neither technically nor politically feasible in the global context. 
Some nations seek tight protection while others readily consume riskier foods; some 
pristine environments are vulnerable to pest infestations and require elaborate 
quarantines for imported products, but other countries are already overrun with 
pests. It would be difficult to design a single set of international standards that 
could accommodate such varied preferences and circumstances.548  It is instead important for testing methodologies and the logic that is used to develop phytosanitary standards to be harmonized. Even if not all pests and diseases can enter and become established in every territory around the world, it would be valuable to have set lists of which pathogens need to be regulated on which types of seeds, which testing and inspections need to be done and which specific treatments are available. This is important in finding the balance between limiting unnecessary trade barriers, while at the same time ensure that measures are in place to limit the entry and establishment of pathogens. The divergences in import and export certificate wordings and formatting would also benefit from standardization, for example by phrasing the same message in a uniform way and using templates for trade around the world.  National governments are, on the one hand, often in the best position to know which pests and diseases need to be regulated in their territories. On the other hand however, in many situations there is a lack of information or a misunderstanding regarding which pests and diseases need to be regulated. For example, ‘there are numerous articles on plant diseases published in which the authors note that the pest in question was found on seed. Often the relevance of such publications is questionable. The presence of a plant pathogen on seed does not necessarily mean that it transmits a disease or that seed is a pathway for establishment of the pathogen. The conclusion drawn of a pest being seed borne or seed transmitted may be based on experimental evidence, limited observations, or in some cases, simply suggestive statements. Many pests that are not seed transmitted or for which seed is not a pathway for establishment are, nevertheless, 
regulated’.549 In addition, many national governments cite single, and sometimes outdated, studies as the basis for their regulations, and unfortunately there is a lack of adequate research to correct them.                                                          548 Victor, above n. 133, p. 227-228.  549 ISF, ISF Pest List Regulated Initiative. Accessed 12 July 2017, http://www.worldseed.org/our-work/phytosanitary-matters/pest-lists/#isf-regulated-pest-list-initiative. 
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Although the vegetable seed industry and the food industry certainly have many differences, and it is not possible to assume that what works in one can be applied in the other, an example of a similar vision for harmonization is presented. The Codex Alimentarius Commission is the central organization for the harmonization of standards, guidelines and codes of practice for food safety and quality.550 Although standards developed by Codex are not compulsory, the organization is recognized by the SPS Agreement as the primary international organization for the regulation of food standards (as the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) is for plant health). This means that while WTO members are permitted to apply standards stricter than those of the Codex Alimentarius, where they exist, they must have a scientific justification for doing so. The Codex Alimentarius Commission has helped to create specific international standards for various aspects of food safety and quality. Its 188 members negotiate to develop standards on food hygiene, maximum limits for specific food additives, pesticide and veterinary drug residues, microbial contamination and more. Many countries have even adopted Codex standards as their own. These specific and more widely accepted standards have allowed for further harmonization of food safety and quality measures (although there are certainly differences in legislation and trade issues within the food sector as well!). However, the vegetable seed industry is more complex, as it deals with pathogens and seeds in diverse agro-ecological conditions. The Codex Alimentarius Commission only needs to focus on health impacts for humans, which are the same around the world.   
5.4 Unilateral vs. multilateral harmonization   Harmonization may occur via multilateral or unilateral standards. Unilateral regulatory globalization is when ‘a single state is able to externalize its laws and regulations outside its borders through market mechanisms, resulting in the globalization of 
standards…Unilateral regulatory globalization is a development where a law of one jurisdiction migrates into another in the absence of the former actively imposing it or the latter willingly adopting it’.551 Bradford identified five conditions that must exist for unilateral regulatory globalization to occur: 1) market power, 2) regulatory capacity 
                                                        550 Codex Alimentarius Commission, CODEX Alimentarius: Home. Accessed 12 July 2017, http://www.fao.org/fao-who-codexalimentarius/en/. 551 Bradford, above n. 1. 
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(expertise and resources to enforce its rules), 3) preference for strict rules, 4) predisposition to regulate inelastic targets, and 5) nondivisibility of standards.552  In the case of vegetable seeds, it is unlikely that a country would be able to unilaterally 
set the global standards. The reason for this is explained by applying some of Bradford’s characteristics of unilateral regulatory globalization.   
5.4.1 Market power   Unilateral regulatory globalization is more likely to occur in countries with a large market size. This is since the exporting country is typically dependent on sales in the importing country market, especially if it is unlikely to divert trade to other markets or increase domestic sales.553 The top exporters and importers of vegetable seeds are shown in Table 5.3. As can be seen, the EU as a whole is both the main global exporter and importer of seeds, followed by the United States.   
Table 5.3. Main exporters and importers of vegetable seeds in 2015 
Top exporters554  Value of exported 
seed in USD million 
Top importers555 Value of imported 
seed in USD million Netherlands (EU) 1221 Netherlands (EU) 420 USA 624 USA 381 France (EU) 409 Mexico 295 China 161 Spain (EU) 214 Chile 134 Italy (EU) 180 Israel 131 China 172 Italy (EU) 111 France (EU) 143 Japan 95 Japan 125 Thailand 94 Turkey 105 Germany 70 Canada 97     Australia 22 Australia 45 New Zealand 49 New Zealand 15                                                         552 Ibid. 553 Bradford, above n. 1. 554 ISF, Exports of Seed for Sowing by Country – Calendar Year 2015. 555 ISF, Imports of Seed for Sowing by Country – Calendar Year 2015. 
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5.4.2 Preference for strict rules   The adoption of strict standards, more likely in wealthy countries, is also an essential characteristic for unilateral regulatory globalization to occur.556  Unlike in many instances of agriculture and food safety in which the EU has some of the strictest requirements in the world, in the case of phytosanitary requirements for seeds, the EU has relatively lenient standards. There have been no studies on which country has the strictest phytosanitary standards for vegetable seeds. However, Eschen et al. found that for plants for planting (P4P), the EU has the most open approach, whereas Australia and New Zealand implement the strictest regulations (since they have white list approaches and mandate both pesticide treatment and post-entry quarantine).557 Due to resource and time constraints it was not possible to verify if this is the case for vegetable seeds as well. Nevertheless both Australia and New Zealand make up a small share of the market, and even if another country does have stricter requirements, they 
will come nowhere close to the EU’s market domination.   
5.4.3 Nondivisibility of standards  Unilateral regulatory globalization occurs only when an exporter applies the strict standard from the importing country to all of its products, whether they are for the domestic or other importing markets. An exporter has the incentive to do so when production is nondivisible or when adopting a single global standard is more beneficial than applying custom, often less stringent, standards to products for different markets. Advantages of doing so include a single production process (which may be simpler and less expensive than applying varying standards) and maintaining a uniform global brand.558 Production of vegetable seeds is divisible; it is currently the norm that companies apply different treatments, conduct different tests and produce different certificates for seeds destined for different countries. It is often inconvenient, however, which is why harmonization of seed laws would be advantageous.                                                           556 Bradford, above n. 1. 557 R. Eschen, K. Britton, E. Brockerhoff, T. Burgess, V. Dalley, R.S. Epanchin-Niell, K. Gupta, G. Hardy, Y. Huang, M. Kenis, E. Kimani, H-M Li, S. Olsen, R. Ormrod, W. Otieno, C. Sadof, E. Tadeu & M. Theyse (2015), International variation in phytosanitary legislation and regulations governing importation of plants for planting. 
Environmental Science & Policy 51: 228-237. 558 Bradford, above n. 1. 
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The application of these criteria, as well as general observations about the industry, demonstrate that there is no dominating country that sets the standards for global vegetable seed trade.   The following section looks into the role of international organizations in harmonizing phytosanitary standards for vegetable seeds.     
 International organizations and their harmonization 
schemes  The following section provides an overview of various international organizations in the vegetable seed sector and their harmonization schemes. The focus of the analysis is on harmonization of phytosanitary issues. Only international organizations were selected; various regional organizations do support harmonization, but they were not taken into account in this paper.   
5.5.1 International Standards for Phytosanitary Measures (ISPM)  The International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) is a multilateral treaty within the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) that aims ‘to prevent the introduction and spread of plant and plant product pests, and to promote appropriate measures for their 
control’.559 Its governing body, the Commission on Phytosanitary Measures (CPM), oversees the implementation of the IPPC. The focus of its work is on setting and implementing international standards.560   The IPPC gained relevance in the international arena in 1995 after the enactment of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) of the WTO, which stated that phytosanitary measures must be based on science or international standards, guidelines or recommendations. The IPPC is specifically recognized as the relevant organization for international standards, guidelines and recommendations on plant health. The majority of countries in the world (183) are 
                                                        559 IPPC, About. Accessed 12 July 2017, https://www.ippc.int/en/structure/. 560 IPPC, Standards and Implementation. Accessed 12 July 2017, https://www.ippc.int/en/core-activities/standards-and-implementation/. 
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members of the WTO or contracting parties to the IPPC561, and are therefore expected to comply with their international obligations. There are currently ten Regional Plant Protection Organizations (RPPOs) around the world that work with the IPPC to facilitate international harmonization of national phytosanitary measures.562 Several IPPC Regional Workshops are organized every year around the world in order to ‘help participants understand the phytosanitary realities and challenges of each region’ and 
‘receive input on how to better integrate these realities’.563   The International Standards for Phytosanitary Measures (ISPMs) developed by the IPPC are recognized as the basis for phytosanitary measures applied in trade by WTO Members (IPPC 2017b). They are themselves not regulatory instruments, but provide a basis for countries to establish requirements in their own national legislation.564 There are a total of 41 ISPMs, which cover principles for plant quarantine, determination of pest status and pest risk analysis, the use of biological control agents, the establishment of pest free areas, export certification systems and more.565 Many of them are relevant for trade in seeds. Additionally, on 15 May 2017, ISPM 38 on the ‘International 
Movement of Seeds’ was adopted. The focus of this standard is on ‘identifying, assessing and managing the pest risk associated with the international movement of seeds. The standard also provides guidance on procedures to establish phytosanitary import requirements to facilitate the international movement of seeds; on inspection, sampling and testing of seeds; and on the phytosanitary certification of seeds for export and re-export’.566  Although ISPMs are not legally binding under the IPPC, WTO Members are required to base their SPS measures on international standards, guidelines or recommendations, where they exist. They can choose to have stricter phytosanitary measures, but then they must have a scientific justification for doing so.567 It is still unclear what impact this ISPM38 will have on actual national phytosanitary rules and their implementation.                                                          561 IPPC, Structure. Accessed 12 July 2017, https://www.ippc.int/en/structure/. 562 IPPC, Adopted Standards (ISPMs). Accessed 12 July 2017, https://www.ippc.int/en/core-activities/standards-setting/ispms/. 563 IPPC, IPPC Regional Workshops. Accessed January 18, 2018, https://www.ippc.int/en/core-activities/capacity-development/regional-ippc-workshops/. 564 IPPC, Standard Setting. Accessed 12 July 2017, https://www.ippc.int/en/core-activities/standards-setting/. 565 IPPC, Adopted Standards (ISPMs). Accessed 12 July 2017, https://www.ippc.int/en/core-activities/standards-setting/ispms/. 566 FAO and IPPC (2017), ISPM 38: International Movement of Seeds.  567 SPS Agreement 
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ISPM standards provide a general basis for national phytosanitary legislation, but are too vague to harmonize specific phytosanitary standards. For example, according to ISPM 38 on the International Movement of Seeds, countries must conduct a Pest Risk Analysis (PRA) to identify which pests should be regulated, the different types of seed-borne pests are generally categorized and examples provided, general suggestions for pest management are provided for the various stages of seed production, and processing and treatment options are listed. While this is all important information and serves as a basic guidance document for national governments to establish phytosanitary measures, it does not go into enough detail to harmonize them.   
5.5.2 Regulated Pest List Initiative  The International Seed Federation (ISF) is a non-governmental organization that 
‘represents the interests of the seed industry at a global level’568, specifically at international organizations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV), International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). ISF also aims to facilitate the free international movement of seed, publish rules for trading seed, keep members informed of latest technology and developments and settle trade disputes, among others.569 It consists of 223 Members from 74 countries, covering 97% of global trade in seeds. Unlike many of the other organizations which focus on government 
membership, ISF’s members are national seed associations and seed companies.  As discussed already, many existing phytosanitary measures are unnecessary. ISF created lists of the pathogenic organisms (bacteria, fungi, insects, viruses, etc.) for crop seeds that are regulated by NPPOs around the world. Experts in the field, namely seed and field pathologists, then interpret scientific publications to determine whether seed may be a pathway for each pest, and if so, the conditions for its establishment.570 These ISF Pest Lists make up the ISF Regulated Pest List Initiative database. The database currently covers ten crops, and includes information on potential pests, their 
                                                        568 ISF, About – What We Do. Accessed 8 March 2017, http://www.worldseed.org/about/what-we-do/.   569 Ibid.; ISF. Dispute Settlement – Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, Accessed 8 March 2017, http://www.worldseed.org/our-work/trade-rules/#dispute-settlement. 570 ISF, above n. 549. 
CHAPTER 5 
 
 
132 
classification (if the pest should be regulated or not), and information on testing and treatment methods, if applicable.571   The ISF Regulated Pest List Initiative has the most potential to achieve harmonization of phytosanitary standards. The lists of potential pests, if the pests should be regulated or not, and information on any relevant testing and treatment methods572, all developed by experts in the field, are a valuable resource for countries to know which pests should be regulated for which crops. This would help to reduce the number of existing phytosanitary measures that are unnecessary. The current limitations are that the database only exists for ten crops, and it is not (yet) widely adopted.   
5.5.3 Quality Declared Seed (QDS)  The priority of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations is to achieve food security for all.573 One of its main areas of work was identified as enabling inclusive and efficient agricultural and food systems. This includes increasing the participation of smallholders in the increasingly integrated and globalized food and agriculture value chains.574 ‘Outdated, inefficient and sometimes conflicting policies, laws and regulations, together with uncertain government perceptions of public and 
private sector roles and responsibilities…impede the investments necessary to sustainably improve inclusiveness and efficiency in global, regional and national 
markets’.575  FAO established the Quality Declared Seed (QDS) system in the 1980s.576 It provides a source of practical information on seed standards and is available for a total of 92 species of crops. It aims to provide for the development of the agricultural sector. The purpose is to provide good quality seed even under conditions of limited resources, for example, for the crops, regions and farming systems where other more advanced seed quality control systems are too demanding to implement.577 Therefore, the system was                                                         571 ISF, ISF Regulated Pest List Database. Accessed 12 July 2017, http://pestlist.worldseed.org/isf/pest_lists_db.html. 572 Ibid.  573 FAO, About FAO. Accessed 12 July 2017, http://www.fao.org/about/en/. 574 FAO, What We Do. Accessed 12 July 2017, http://www.fao.org/about/what-we-do/en/. 575 Ibid. 576 FAO (2006), Quality Declared Seed System. FAO Plant Production and Protection Paper. 577 Ibid. 
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designed in a way ‘to provide quality control during seed production, which is less demanding on government resources than other more developed quality systems’, yet still produce good quality seed.578 It has also been particularly valuable as a source of seed and established quality standards for seed relief interventions after natural disasters or other catastrophes.   
The QDS system of the FAO ‘is not proposed as a global scheme, which countries would formally recognize or adopt as a basis for trade’.579 It rather aims to facilitate seed trade in countries where no other scheme exists or where official certification is not practical when applied to remove and small-scale seed production- and to provide a basis from which to develop seed standards.580 QDS consists of the minimum standards and procedures that must be applied in order for seed to be classified as Quality Declared Seed. National governments are authorized to grant the designation if it determines that the requirements have been met.581 QDS is made up of standards for different types of crops, and covers issues such as varietal and species purity, weeds, field inspections, seed quality standards (e.g. germination, purity, moisture content). However, QDS only includes a general statement on seed-borne diseases: ‘The seed field must be within the standards for seed-borne diseases specified by each country according to local needs’.582 Instead of harmonizing which diseases should be regulated, it is still left open to each country- which is logical as the main aim of QDS is on quality, and it will only focus on the most important diseases at any specific location.   
5.5.4 Seed Schemes  The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) aims to ‘promote policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of people around the 
world’.583 It provides a forum for governments to collaborate on solutions to common problems, including setting international standards in a variety of fields. It consists of 35 members, nearly all of which are the most advanced countries in the world.584                                                            578 Ibid. 579 Ibid., p. 6-7.  580 Ibid. 581 Ibid. 582 Ibid., p. 185.  583 OECD, About the OECD. Accessed 12 July 2017, http://www.oecd.org/about/. 584 OECD, Members and Partners. Accessed 12 July 2017, http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/. 
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The OECD’s Seed Schemes were established in 1958 to promote the consistent high quality of seeds. It is an international seed certification system, aiming to ‘facilitate seed trade by reducing technical barriers, improving transparency and lowering transaction costs’.585 The Seed Schemes are open to OECD countries as well as other UN or WTO Members586; there are currently 58 members.587  If seed is produced and processed in accordance with the principles of the Seed Schemes, it will receive a corresponding label and certificate. ‘Each Scheme includes a set of Rules and Regulations aiming at the varietal certification of seed, except for the Vegetable Seed Scheme where generally 
traded seed, “Standard Seed”, may not be certified but only controlled’.588 The annual List of Varieties eligible for OECD Certification includes about 49,000 varieties from 200 species. The technical requirements are comprised in the Rules and Regulations of the OECD Seed Schemes. The Schemes ensure the varietal identity and purity of the seed through appropriate requirements and controls throughout the cropping, seed processing and labelling operations. The OECD certification provides for official recognition of ‘quality-guaranteed’ seed.589  
OECD’s Seed Schemes are used globally in seed trade, but only in the countries that participate in the program and that have had their certification procedures validated by the OECD. If a crop is found to conform to the standards of the Seed Schemes, OECD certification labels are placed on the seed sacks. Additionally, some countries have accepted the OECD Seed Schemes as their own national standards.590 The standards set minimum requirements for field inspections, purity, isolation, etc. However, they do not provide any specific guidance on phytosanitary or seed quality standards. The various standards for crops include statements such as ‘Seed-borne diseases that reduce the usefulness of the seed shall be at the lowest possible level’591, ‘The seed shall have been 
tested in a laboratory….if appropriate, for freedom from specific seed-borne diseases’592 
and ‘The seed used for seed crop production should be as pest and disease free as possible. Its health should be checked before use and, if pest or disease organisms                                                         585 OECD, above n. 526, p. 4. 586 OECD (2017), OECD Seed Schemes 2017: OECD Schemes for the Varietal Certification or the Control of Seed 
Moving in International Trade.  587 OECD, About the OECD Seed Schemes. Accessed 12 July 2017, http://www.oecd.org/tad/code/abouttheoecdseedschemes.htm. 588 OECD, above n. 586, p. 12.  589 OECD, above n. 587. 590 FAO, above n. 576. 591 OECD, above n. 586, p. 110.  592 Ibid., p. 150.  
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against which there is an effective seed treatment are present, that treatment should be 
applied’.593 Similar to the QDS system, there is no attempt to harmonize the seed-borne diseases to be regulated.  
5.5.5 ePhyto  While not directly addressing a phytosanitary issue, ePhyto is still relevant and important to address in a discussion of harmonization.   The IPPC has also encouraged the use of electronic versions of phytosanitary certificates by developing ePhyto, which stands for ‘electronic phytosanitary certificate’. The same information that is included in a typical paper phytosanitary certificate is also in the ePhyto; the advantage is that ePhytos can be exchanged electronically. This allows for greater efficiency (reduced data entry and validation), fewer delays (more efficient arrival and clearance at the point of entry, facilitates replacement of certificates when required), digitally structured information, more secure (reduced potential for fraudulent certificates, improved security in the transmission of certificates) and shorter routes.594 Appendix 1 of ISPM 12 describes the format, contents and exchange of ePhytos.595 It also reduces the risk of typos, as for example commas or periods are sometimes required in certain certificates. When proper electronic formats are used, such problems can be avoided.  ePhyto is a recent project and is still under construction. The aim of the ePhyto system is to develop a hub and generic national system (GeNS) for the internationally harmonized 
transfer of the certificates. ‘The hub facilitates transfer of certificates from the national plant protection organization (NPPO) of the exporting country to the NPPO of the importing country using a harmonized protocol. The generic national system allows NPPOs to produce and send an ePhyto to the hub. It also allows NPPOs to retrieve ePhytos from the hub for imported consignments’.596 Pilots are currently being developed to evaluate the systems and ensure that they produce, transfer and receive the ePhytos effectively.597                                                          593 Ibid., p. 153.  594  IPPC, Electronic Phytosanitary Certification (ePhyto). Accessed 12 July 2017, https://www.ippc.int/en/ephyto/.  595 IPPC, ePhyto. Accessed 12 July 2017, http://ephyto.ippc.int. 596 FAO and IPPC (2016), ePhyto Factsheet #9.  597 ISF, above n. 549. 
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IPPC’s ePhyto also has major potential to achieve harmonization. While it does not aim to harmonize which pests and diseases should be regulated in which crops, it does intend to standardize certificates as much as possible. A major opportunity with ePhytos is the potential for global harmonization of formatting and wording. IPPC promotes the use of harmonized codes and terms to facilitate international trade of seeds, including country codes, scientific names, units of measure, treatment types, additional declarations and more.598 An example of the variations in the wording of additional declarations was shown above. IPPC has developed a list of standardized phrases that can be used to simplify the variations required in producing certificates for different importing countries. It also provides templates for e.g. export and re-export certificates.599 Nevertheless, it is still a very new scheme with pilots underway, so the extent to which it can achieve harmonization is still to be determined.   
 Conclusions  
As discussed above, there are major disparities in countries’ phytosanitary regulations for vegetable seeds, since different pests and diseases are regulated, different field and laboratory inspections and tests are required, and different information is mandated on seed certificates. This results in a challenge for exporters that are obliged to comply with a variety of standards in order to gain access to markets in different countries. Of course there are reasons for differential regulation. If a disease is already widely present in a country, imported seed carrying that disease will not do much damage. When the disease is not present, there are good reasons to keep it out. Full harmonization of all aspects of phytosanitary regulations is therefore not the goal.   The aim of this research was to determine the role of international organizations in achieving global harmonization in the area of phytosanitary standards for vegetable seeds. Although harmonization of standards can be viewed in a negative light, I argue that some harmonization, i.e. regarding which pests and diseases should be regulated, which tests and inspections should be required, and import and export certificates could 
benefit from further harmonization. ISF’s Regulated Pest List Initiative, with the detailed 
list on which and how pests should be regulated, and IPPC’s ePhyto system, aiming to standardize certificates, do have the potential to meet these goals. Such guidelines would provide a basis for which phytosanitary issues should be regulated.                                                          598  IPPC, above n. 595. 599 Ibid.  
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Until, if ever, there is any further harmonization of phytosanitary standards, seed companies will be left with the burden of having to comply with many different requirements. Countries will be more likely to get away with protectionist or, in any case, scientifically unjustified standards. While it is possible to challenge them in the 
WTO’s dispute settlement system or via other dispute settlement mechanisms, these procedures usually take years and lead to sales losses during the meantime. A major reason for some of the trade barriers is uncertainties and a lack of information regarding relevant pathogens. It is therefore recommended to increase research on relevant pests and diseases. 
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 Introduction  This dissertation contributes to research on standards in the WTO context by investigating the influence of the WTO on constraining or enabling the extraterritorial effect from the perspective of the WTO law rationale. It examined an important and previously understudied area, namely how international economic law regulates sanitary and phytosanitary measures. In order to do so it conducted a doctrinal analysis of the legislation and jurisprudence, and further studied the legal impacts on national regulations.   
 Answering and discussing the research questions  
6.2.1 Research question 1: How does the extraterritorial effect of SPS 
measures impact trading partners in practice?  While the extraterritorial effect has been observed in a variety of areas at an abstract level, its concrete effects on trade have barely been investigated. In order to study the influence of WTO law on the extraterritorial effect of SPS measures, it was important to first understand if, and how, the extraterritorial effect of SPS measures impacts trading partners in practice. The question was answered by looking at the legal impacts of three previous (Chapter 2) and an ongoing (Chapter 3) trade disputes. This research found that the extraterritorial effect is observed in the SPS sector, as trade partners have de 
facto and in some instances de jure adopted the standards of the dominant country. Despite the fact that the exporters were opposed to the standards of the importing country, they chose to adopt them rather than forgo the critical markets.   Chapter 2 presented three examples of the extraterritorial effect in previous trade disputes. For the EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products dispute, this dissertation showed that countries dependent on trade with the EU modified their policies and practices regarding GMOs in order to maintain their access to its market. Zambia even rejected food aid (GM corn) from the US; the president stated the country 
would ‘rather starve’600 than accept it, out of fear that the corn seed would contaminate the local supply, and lead to the restriction of Zambian exports to the EU. Similarly, in the EC – Hormones dispute, Argentina, Uruguay and the US took specific actions just to                                                         600 Drezner, above n. 162, p. 169. 
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access the EU market. The Dolphin – Tuna case was also studied in this article, and while it is a TBT rather than an SPS dispute, it is still relevant for the food sector. Several nations modified their fishing procedures in order to comply with US law in response to its import restrictions.  Chapter 3 showed that South Africa ‘traded up’ to meet the EU’s stringent phytosanitary measures on the fungus causing citrus black spot (CBS) disease. Due to the threat of losing access to the lucrative EU market, South African authorities, industry groups and producers implemented additional risk management measures, such as limiting the orchards that could export to the EU; requiring additional treatments, testing and inspections; and even imposing a voluntary suspension. These measures were not taken because South Africa believed CBS could become established in the EU; in fact, South Africa disagreed with the EU’s zero tolerance approach to the presence of the fungus on citrus fruit. Nevertheless, in order to not face a full ban, South Africa had to factually 
adapt to the EU’s phytosanitary standards. The EU, as the bigger trading partner, was able to impose its standards on South Africa, the smaller trading partner.   These observations are in line with previous research on the extraterritorial effect of measures601, which found that trading partners often adopt the laws of the country to which they are exporting if the market is too important to forgo. Chapter 2 assessed from a legal perspective the conditions of the extraterritorial effect (as described specifically in the context of the Brussels Effect by Anu Bradford) and found that not all of the conditions are required for it to occur. The effect was still present even when products were divisible and when a country did not have full market power.   As written in the introduction, ‘extraterritorial effect’ was selected as an umbrella term describing when a stringent regulatory standard of an economically strong jurisdiction migrates to another jurisdiction on the back of traded goods. It has most frequently been demonstrated with the exportation of EU regulatory standards. In Chapters 2 and 3 I described the extraterritorial effect of measures from the EU and US (which used to be a more dominant global regulator). In Chapters 4 and 5, however, it was observed that the scope is broader than originally thought. Many more countries, including developing countries, enacted measures with a de facto extraterritorial effect. While no de jure or global (or even necessarily nation-wide) adoption was observed with this broader view, it was still interesting to see that these markets were important enough that exporters did not want to bypass them.                                                          601 Bradford, above n. 1; Shaffer, above n. 5; Scott, above n. 2. 
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This research found that the extraterritorial effect of measures had a negative economic impact on trading partners. In the case of the dispute on citrus black spot disease 
between the EU and South Africa, having to adapt to the EU’s stringent requirements was costly for South Africa. It was estimated that in one year the industry lost a total of ZAR 1 billion (EUR 66 million), about half in revenue and the other half in additional treatment costs. Although the general consensus is that standards are barriers to trade,602 some authors have argued that when developing countries in particular adopt the more stringent standards of an importing country, they might serve as a ‘catalyst’603 for change. In the case of food trade, this may lead to e.g. safer food for the domestic market and higher quality, more marketable products for the export market. However, in this case, it is unknown if there is potentially a more long-term positive effect. Even though South African citrus fruit is successfully exported to numerous countries around 
                                                        602 Chunlai Chen, Jun Yang & Christopher Findlay (2008), Measuring the Effect of Food Safety Standards on 
China’s Agricultural Exports. Review of World Economics 144(1): 83–106; Anne-Celia Disdier, Lionel Fontagne & Mondher Mimouni (2008), The Impact of Regulations on Agricultural Trade: Evidence from SPS and TBT Agreements. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 90(2): 336–350; Gebrehiwet et al., above n. 268; Juthathip Jongwanich (2009), The Impact of Food Safety Standards on Processed Food Exports from Developing Countries. Food Policy 34(5): 447–457; Tsunehiro Otsuki, John S. Wilson & Mirvat Sewadeh (2001), Saving Two in a Billion: Quantifying the Trade Effect of European Food Safety Standards on African Exports. Food Policy 26(5): 495–514; Tsunehiro Otsuki, John S. Wilson & Mirvat Sewadah (2001), What Price Precaution? European Harmonisation of Aflotoxin Regulations and African Groundnut Exports. European Review of Agricultural 
Economics, 28(3), 263– 284; John F.M. Swinnen & Thijs Vandermoortele (2011), Trade and the Political Economy of Food Standards. Journal of Agricultural Economics 62(2): 259–280; Ning Yue, Hua Kuang, Lin Sun, 
Linhai Wu & Chuanlai Xu (2010), An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of New Food Safety Standards on China’s Tea Exports. International Journal of Food Science and Technology 45(4): 745–750; Oscar Melo, Alejandra Engler, Laura Nahuehual, Gabriela Cofre & Jose Barrena (2014), Do Sanitary, Phytosanitary and Quality-Related Standards Affect International Trade? Evidence from Chilean Fruit Exports. World Development 54: 350-359; John S. Wilson & Tsunehiro Otuski (2002), To Spray or Not to Spray: Pesticides, Banana Exports and Food Safety. World Bank. Policy Research Working Paper, No. 2805.  603 Jaffee & Henson, above n. 59, p. 1; Spencer Henson & John Humphrey (2010), Understanding the Complexities of Private Standards in Global Agri-food Chains as they Impact Developing Countries. Journal of 
Development Studies 46(9): 1628–1646; Spencer Henson & Steven Jaffee (2008), Understanding Developing Countries Strategic Responses to the Enhancement of Food Safety Standards. World Economy 31(4): 548–568; Spencer Henson, Oliver Masakure & John Cranfield (2011), Do Fresh Produce Exporters from Sub-Saharan Africa Benefit from GlobalGAP Certification? World Development 39(3): 375–386; Nicodeme Nimenya, Pascal-Firmin Ndimira & Bruno Henry de Frahan (2012), Tariff Equivalents of Non-tariff Measures: The Case of European Horticultural and Fish Imports from African Countries. Agricultural Economics 43(6): 635–653; Ian Sheldon (2012). North–South Trade and Standards: What Can General Eequilibrium Analysis Tell Us? World 
Trade Review 11(3): 376–389; S.M. Anders & J. Caswell (2009), Standards as Barriers Versus Standards as Catalysts: Assessing the Impact of HACCP Implementation on U.S. Seafood Imports. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, 92(2), 310-321. 
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the world, if producers improve the quality of their citrus fruit, it would perhaps become even more profitable.  
6.2.2 Research question 2: How is SPS law applied and interpreted as a 
‘sword’ or ‘shield’ by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body?   This question looked into how SPS law may constrain or enable the extraterritorial effect of measures through its application and interpretation by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). It was addressed by studying the requirements that measures must be based on science (Article 2.2, Chapter 3) and not more trade restrictive than necessary (Article 5.6, Chapter 4). This dissertation also went beyond the black-letter law of the dispute rulings and examined the effect of extraterritorial measures even after WTO rulings by looking into the impact in action (Chapter 2). This research shows that the DSB applies and interprets SPS laws in ways that may act as either a ‘sword’ or a 
‘shield’ for the extraterritorial effect, depending on the provision studied.   This dissertation addressed the legal uncertainty left by the SPS Agreement regarding its normative requirements for justifying SPS measures. According to Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement, measures must be based on science. In certain cases the scientific facts are 
undisputed but are interpreted differently by countries. This may result in a ‘battle of science’, as both positions can be justified by science. Without clarity as to how scientific facts should be interpreted, e.g. if a small risk is enough to justify an SPS measure, market forces can take over and bigger trading blocs can impose their standards on their trading partners through an extraterritorial effect. This research looked into WTO case 
law to find if the DSB has interpreted the ‘science’ requirement in previous disputes. It was found that there is only a weak benchmark against which scientific data may be evaluated.  The possibility and not only the probability604 of a risk must be established, 
and SPS measures must be ‘sufficiently supported or reasonably warranted by the risk 
assessment’605, but there is limited elaboration on what these terms mean. The lack of a defined normative standard for science can be used by dominant countries to their advantage. The uncertainty with regards to how science, and the uncertainty in science, need to be interpreted can be used as a shield for bringing forward unnecessarily strict 
and even protectionist policies shielded as a ‘scientific necessity’.                                                          604 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, above n. 252, para. 123.  605 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, above n. 250, para. 186. 
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Whereas Article 2.2 may hence serve as a shield for the extraterritorial effect of SPS measures, Article 5.6 may be used as a sword to challenge such measures. Article 5.6 states that measures should not be more trade restrictive than required to achieve the 
ALOP. In order to challenge a Member’s measure under this article, a country must put forward an alternative measure that is 1) reasonably available, 2) meets the challenged 
Members’ ALOP and 3) is significantly less restrictive to trade. Chapter 4 found that Article 5.6 is a pure trade liberalization provision: measures were found to be in violation of SPS law for the sole reason that a less trade-restrictive alternative measure existed (as long as it was reasonably available and met the importing country’s ALOP). The proposition of a less-trade restrictive alternative measure was therefore seen as a sword with which to strike down measures with an extraterritorial effect. It was observed, however, that the DSB shies away from science; proposed alternative measures with a scientific basis were less likely to be accepted as valid alternatives.  Furthermore Chapter 2 went beyond the dispute rulings to look at the actual impact that they had. It was found that while the WTO aimed to restrict the extraterritorial effect of measures, and did so when looking in the black-letter of the WTO rulings, it was not able to limit the extraterritorial effect in action: it had limited impact on the way the dominant regulator acted. It was found that there was what has elsewhere been called 
‘reform without change’606 in the case of the GMOs dispute. Even though the DSB ruled against the EU, it had little effect on GMOs in the EU in practice. Although many GM crops are imported for animal feed, GM foods for humans are in limited numbers on the market and Member States can reject the cultivation of GMOs in their territories. The EU 
did not comply with the DSB’s rulings in the EC – Hormones dispute, and the US and Canada responded with retaliatory tariffs. The EU preferred to accept retaliation rather than bring its measures in compliance with the WTO ruling, which it was within its rights to do. Shaffer607 and Bradford608 also observed that the WTO serves as a shield for the extraterritorial effect of measures as it limits the impact of retaliation. The DSB ruled against the US in Dolphin – Tuna (again, a food-related TBT dispute), and brought its measures into compliance with WTO rules (i.e. non-discrimination), but they still had an extraterritorial effect in other countries. Despite the rulings against the extraterritorial effect of measures, these three examples show how the weak impact of WTO laws may be used to shield measures with an extraterritorial effect.                                                           606 Pollack & Shaffer, above n. 46, p. 260. 607 Shaffer, above n. 6, p. 419; Shaffer, above n. 64, p. 7-8, 46.  608 Bradford, above n. 1, p. 56. 
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It is unclear if the DSB interprets and applies SPS rules more as a ‘sword’ or a ‘shield’, or if it is primarily case- and provision-dependent. None of the disputes analysed in Chapter 2 invoked Article 5.6; it was found, however, that Article 5.6 has been invoked more frequently over time, and those disputes were from the early days of the WTO. If it had been addressed, it is possible that this trade liberalization article would have been a powerful enough sword to actually prevent the measures with an extraterritorial effect. Or, perhaps, countries enacting the extraterritorial measures might still have been able to shield them by using the WTO rules to their advantage.  When answering this research question the topic of science frequently emerged. Two different types of extraterritorial measures were identified in this research. The first is measures that are more stringent than those of an international standard or another country. This was often the result of a different value judgment or a different 
interpretation of science that can be legitimately justified (‘battle of science’ issue). The second type is those measures that are stringent but do not have a scientific justification, perhaps due to purely protectionist motives and/or simply a lack of correct science. It can be difficult to tell whether a disputed measure is the result of differing sciences or 
uninformed ‘science’, and it is also unclear how to regulate situations in which different interpretations were drawn from the same science.   Having thus illustrated the need for normative guidance for science, the question arises of what kind of benchmark should be used to determine such a normative guidance. One might turn to international standards, where available, as these are negotiated at global level and are based on scientific evidence.609 This would be in accordance with Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement.610 However, the idea that science is sound and that 
international standards are based on ‘sound science’ has been disputed.   First of all, several scholars have argued that science in general is not as objective as it may appear to be611, and therefore should not be relied on to solve disputes.612 For example, ‘purely “scientific” representations of risks’ have been criticized as regularly                                                         609 Codex Alimentarius Commission, Codex and Science. Accessed 5 March 2018, http://www.fao.org/fao-who-codexalimentarius/about-codex/science/en/. 610 ‘To harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary measures on as wide a basis as possible, Members shall base their sanitary or phytosanitary measures on international standards, guidelines or recommendations, where they 
exist, except as otherwise provided for in this Agreement, and in particular in paragraph 3.’ 611 Robert E. Hudec (2003), Science and ‘Post-Discriminatory’ WTO Law. Boston College International and 
Comparative Law Review 26(2): 185-195, p. 188-189. 612 Arcuri, above n. 115, p. 1.  
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being a mix of science and politics613 since always some ‘subjective professional 
judgment’ is applied in interpreting science.614  It has been observed that non-scientific assumptions influence the scope of risk assessments615 and the selection and interpretation of evidence.616 Additionally, differing conclusions on risk may be drawn not simply as a result of differing interpretations of science, but due to different questions being asked617 and different value-choices in scientific studies.618   
If science is not ‘pure’ and always has some sort of bias, then international standards 
and guidelines may be ‘imbued with social preferences’619 and may not represent ‘the 
only conceivable approach to risk assessment’.620 It is therefore not ‘honest’621 to assume that they are better than the regulations of domestic countries. Arcuri (2014) showed with the case of ractopamine how this may cause problems: ‘Two scientific panels reached different conclusions on the safety of a certain substance. The Panels are both institutional bodies, composed of arguably well-established “regulatory scientists”. Arguing that following JECFA recommendations is sound science and all the rest is not 
means disqualifying EFSA science as unsound.’622  Taking all this into account, science as it is currently regulated by the WTO is insufficient. The development of international standards could be advanced to restrain the extraterritorial effect of measures.   
                                                        613 Erik Millstone (2009). Science, Risk and Governance: Radical Theories and the Realities of Reform in Food Safety Governance. Research Policy 38: 624-636. 614 Goh, above n. 258, p. 668. 615 Helge Torgersen & Franz Seifert (2000), Austria: Precautionary Blockage of Agricultural Biotechnology. 
Journal of Risk Research 3(3): 209–217.  616 Sheila Jasanoff & Brian Wynne (1998), Science and Decision-Making. In Steven Rayner, Elizabeth L. Malone (Eds.), Human Choice and Climate Change: An International Assessment. Vol. 1 The Societal Framework. Battelle Press. 617 Erik Millstone, Patrick van Zwanenberg, Claire Marris, Les Levidow & Helge Torgersen (2004), Science in Trade Disputes Related to Potential Risks: Comparative Case Studies. European Science and Technology 
Observatory, Institute for Prospective Technological Studies, Seville. 618 Arcuri, above n. 115, p. 10. 619 Van Zwanenberg et al., above n. 542, p. 39. 620 Ibid., p. 39.  621 Arcuri, above n. 115, p. 7. 622 Ibid., p. 9. 
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6.2.3 Research question 3: How do international regulatory standards 
impact the extraterritorial effect of SPS measures?   In order to study the influence of international regulatory standards on the extraterritorial effect of SPS measures, this dissertation looked into how they are used in Article 5.6 SPS disputes and what role they may serve in challenging extraterritorial measures not based on science. This dissertation shows that standards of international organizations have the potential to limit the extraterritorial effect of SPS measures. Chapter 4 found that standards of the international organizations endorsed by the SPS Agreement were used very successfully as a ‘sword’ to show that a challenged measure was more trade restrictive than necessary. Chapter 5 found that international organizations beyond the WTO have the potential to be used as a sword when challenging measures without a scientific basis.   Chapter 4 showed that the type of proposed alternative measure has a major influence on whether a violation of Article 5.6 is determined. Alternative measures based on a standard written by one of the three SPS-endorsed standard-setting organisations 
(Codex, OIE, IPPC) were regularly regarded as achieving a defending country’s ALOP (except when the ALOP was explicitly defined as higher than that of an international standard), resulting in an Article 5.6 violation. In contrast, it was more difficult to prove a proposed measure based on scientific evidence would meet the requirements, perhaps 
due to the ‘shielding’ properties of the weak interpretation of science, as shown in Chapter 3.  In this case, measures with an extraterritorial effect (and national regulatory autonomy in general) were at least indirectly limited by the power of standards of international organizations.  In the vegetable seed sector there are no major dominant regulators that are able to set global standards through their extraterritorial effect of measures. Domestic phytosanitary standards for vegetable seeds often vary widely and are not based on 
scientific evidence. The main reason for these ‘unnecessarily strict’ measures—besides protectionism—is that there is a lack of adequate science on which to base phytosanitary measures. The lack of adequate scientific data is also one of the main difficulties in determining and challenging potentially protectionist measures.   The SPS Agreement recognizes the IPPC as the international standard-setting 
organization for plant health standards. The IPPC’s International Standards for Phytosanitary Measures (ISPMs), however, are more broad guidelines for national 
CHAPTER 6 
 
 
148 
phytosanitary standards, and specific phytosanitary issues are not addressed. It can 
therefore be difficult to argue in the WTO DSB that Members’ measures are in violation of the SPS Agreement: Chapter 4 showed that measures based on scientific evidence, rather than international standards, are difficult to prove.   Another international organization, the International Seed Federation (ISF), is working on a Regulated Pest List Initiative, a database developed by experts in the field that covers which pests should be regulated for which crops, and which treatment and testing methods are necessary. Its aim is not necessarily harmonization but to be used as a resource for national legislation. It would also have value in challenging measures not based on science, although its status within the WTO dispute settlement system is unclear since ISF is not specifically endorsed by the WTO, and it is not known to what extent national governments comply with its recommendations. Nevertheless, if it becomes more widely adopted and recognized, its guidelines have the potential to be used as a sword to fight the extraterritorial effect of measures.   Bradford (2012) identified three external constraints specifically in the context of the 
‘Brussels Effect’: markets, other states and international institutions such as the WTO.623 This research found international standards to be a particularly powerful restraint for the extraterritorial effect of measures.   Despite this claim, the extraterritorial effect was not always constrained in this study, i.e. in Chapters 2 and 3. There were some relevant Codex standards for hormones in beef in the EC-Hormones dispute. In this case the EU refused to comply with the DSB ruling and instead accepted retaliatory measures from the US and Canada. However, in other cases there were no relevant international standards. For example, the fungus that causes citrus black spot disease in the dispute between the EU and South Africa is a phytosanitary issue; Chapter 5, although with the example of vegetable seeds, showed that there is a need for further international standardization in the phytosanitary sector. This demonstrated the importance of expert-developed guidelines in a sector dealing with scientific uncertainty and protectionism.   If countries would take a step further and align their domestic regulations with international standards, there would be fewer barriers to trade. This additionally offers greater transparency, as harmonized measures and those based on international standards make it easier to distinguish between measures with a legitimate scientific                                                         623 Bradford, above n. 1. 
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justification and those without. ‘Of course, to the extent that harmonization is realized, this will not ipso facto entail that all regulatory unilateralism will be ruled out and that no more disputes will arise. For instance, even if international harmonization is realized, the SPS Agreement expressly authorizes Members to maintain higher standards (linked 
to a set of appropriate conditions)’624 Nevertheless, international standards can be used 
as a ‘sword’ to challenge measures with an extraterritorial effect.   
 Synthesis of the research: In what ways does WTO law 
prevent or enable the extraterritorial effect of domestic 
sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures?      Chapters 2-5 taken together provide a mixed view of whether WTO law acts as a sword or shield for the extraterritorial effect of domestic SPS measures. This dissertation found instances of how the law is used both to limit and facilitate the effect. The following overview is a summary of the findings of the research chapters.   Use of SPS laws as a shield to enable the extraterritorial effect of measures  Chapter 2 demonstrated that even when the WTO rules against a dominant country in a dispute, its influence on the extraterritorial effect in action is limited. It was possible for countries to modify their measures to be in compliance with WTO law, but still have an extraterritorial effect. Chapter 3 observed that the lack of normative definitions of science and risk allow market forces to take over and bigger trading blocs to impose their interpretations of science on weaker trading partners. It also noted that the uncertainty regarding how science should be interpreted can be used as a shield for protectionist and/or extraterritorial measures, by designing such measures shielded as a scientific necessity. Chapter 5 showed that the lack of harmonization and shortage of standards for acquiring and interpreting scientific data on phytosanitary issues for vegetable seeds can provide a leeway for countries to introduce protectionist measures.  Use of SPS laws as a sword to challenge the extraterritorial effect of measures  
                                                        624 Geert van Calster (2008), Against Harmonization – Regulatory Competition in Climate Change Law. Carbon 
and Climate Law Review 2(1): 89-94, p. 93. 
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Chapter 4 found that the standards of international organizations can limit the extraterritorial effect. Proposed alternative measures based on international standards were most likely to be accepted as valid alternative measures. In addition, Article 5.6 was observed to be a pure trade liberalization article; SPS measures may be ruled in violation of WTO law solely for being excessively trade restrictive. Chapter 5 showed the value of international standards and guidelines in challenging protectionist measures and/or those without a scientific basis.   In summary, this dissertation found that the uncertainties and different interpretations of science are the main ‘shield’, and international standards are the main ‘sword’ for the extraterritorial effect of SPS measures. Although the extraterritorial effect has the potential to be—and in some instances is—limited by international standards, it still often persists, perhaps due to the lack of a normative standard for science. This is discussed further in Section 6.5: Policy implications and recommendations.  
 Limitations of the research  The main limitations of this research stem from the fact that findings were drawn from specific situations in the chapters, and can therefore not always be generalized.   First of all, the focus on the SPS Agreement as a case study of WTO rules on the extraterritorial effect of measures does not necessarily apply to other areas of WTO law. It was observed that science can be used as a ‘shield’ and international standards can be 
a powerful ‘sword’, but these specific SPS elements are irrelevant in most other sectors.   In Chapters 2 and 3, the analysis was based on only three and one dispute(s), respectively. Conclusions on the extraterritorial effect and its relationship with WTO rules cannot necessarily be extrapolated from this relatively small sample. This is additionally due to the fact that interpretations of WTO rules by the DSB are ‘formally 
authoritative for the dispute being decided, not for others.’625 The case study in Chapter 3 was compared with previous WTO disputes in order to understand what kind of logic the DSB might apply in such a case. However, ‘(t)he decision as to whether a case is sufficiently similar to another is ultimately a subjective one as no two cases are ever 
                                                        625 Van Damme, above n. 70, p. 610. 
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completely identical.’626 It may not always be possible to extrapolate the results to other disputes, perhaps because the case may be too specific or because it is unknown if the result is due to the application of the SPS Agreement or the legal strategy of a jurisdiction.627   In addition, there was sometimes a narrow focus of the research. For example, in Chapter 4, only Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement was analysed. This was, however, to enable an extensive analysis of one provision, rather than a superficial analysis of multiple provisions. In Chapter 5 it would have been valuable to know the compliance rates with the harmonization schemes or the extent to which they have been adopted. These indicators are not readily available, however, and are perhaps an area for future research.   This dissertation is on the impact of WTO rules, so naturally, trade dispute proceedings were a major part of the analysis. Chapters 2-4 in particular were focused on WTO disputes. Due to the challenges, effort and resources required to launch a dispute with the WTO, countries are likely to do so only when they expect a positive outcome. In addition, countries may be hesitant or avoid bringing a case to the WTO if they for example wish to limit further tensions or evade media attention on a particular topic.628 There are likely many instances of the extraterritorial effect that have not been reported in the WTO dispute settlement system. The focus of trade disputes as a source of information may therefore be a skewed representation and it is acknowledged that there is likely much beyond the scope of this dissertation.   
 Policy implications and recommendations  This dissertation found international science-based standards, guidelines and recommendations to be a powerful tool in limiting the extraterritorial effect of SPS measures. It did identify a need for further standards, guidelines and recommendations at multilateral level since there are currently many gaps in their coverage. It is 
important, however, to not give international standards a ‘taken-for-granted status’ so 
that they are ‘no longer open to questioning’.629 The WTO should regulate international                                                         626 Paul Chynoweth (2008), Legal Research. In Andrew Knight and Les Ruddock (Eds.), Advanced Research 
Methods in the Built Environment. Blackwell Publishing, p. 28-38, p. 33. 627 Downes, above n. 97, p. 110-111. 628 Pollack & Shaffer, above n. 46, p. 179. 629 Jansen, above n. 543. 
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standard-setting bodies to ensure that international standards themselves are not biased. It is therefore essential to frame the composition of these organizations to sure they are impartial. The Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade set out guidelines on the development of international standards, guidelines and recommendations ‘to ensure transparency, openness, impartiality and consensus, effectiveness and relevance, 
coherence, and to address the concerns of developing countries.’630 This document, while still vague, could be used as a baseline to govern how these organizations should operate to ensure that all interested countries contribute and all views are taken into account.631   Of course, even if there are more international science-based standards, guidelines and recommendations, WTO Members still have the right to enact more stringent domestic regulatory measures. In situations with two sound scientific evaluations, or one undisputed scientific evaluation but with different interpretations, it is likely that disputes will continue to arise regarding whose science and interpretations are correct. For such situations the WTO should develop a defined normative standard for science. Without guidance from the WTO, it is possible for countries to impose their—not necessarily better—interpretations on their trading partners.  This dissertation found further instances of uncertainties in the application of SPS law for which it is recommended that the WTO provide normative clarity. It would be valuable to elaborate on what is considered to be a rational relationship between risk assessment and SPS measures, and similarly what sufficiently supported and reasonably 
warranted632 imply. There is additionally a grey area regarding what significantly less trade restrictive in Article 5.6 means; it is recommended that the WTO elaborate on what is meant specifically by significantly. In addition, it was found that when examining the reasonable availability requirement of a potential alternative measure, the Panel and Appellate Body focused on only the possibility, and not the reasonability, of a measure. It could be evaluated in a more sound way, by focusing on for example the benefit achieved by the regulatory measure or trade gains.                                                           630 Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (2015), Decisions and Recommendations Adopted by the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade Since 1 January 1995. G/TBT/1/Rev.12 (21 January 2015), p. 47. 631 Ibid., p. 58. For a discussion of the development and application of technical standards specifically in the EU and US, see Kai Purnhagen (2018), Who Recognises Technical Standards in TTIP? In Elaine Fahey (Ed.), 
Institutionalisation Beyond the Nation State. Transatlantic Relations: Data, Privacy and Trade Law. Springer International Publication. 632 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, above n. 250, paras. 186. 
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Such clarifications are an opportunity for change. The proposal for the WTO to develop a more normative standard to be used for the interpretation of science is not a minor task. The outcome will have a major impact on human, animal and plant life and health around the world, and should not be taken lightly. 
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Domestic regulatory standards can migrate to other jurisdictions via trade. This 
‘extraterritorial effect’ has been most frequently demonstrated with the exportation of the typically more stringent European Union (EU) regulations to other countries. The 
EU’s trading partners often involuntarily ‘trade up’ and adopt EU regulations in order to access its market. The extraterritorial effect is subject to the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). It has been argued that the WTO can constrain this extraterritorial effect primarily through the enforcement of its rules in the dispute settlement system. However, scholars have argued that WTO rules can in fact shield the extraterritorial effect against retaliation and cannot easily declare extraterritorial measures as incompliant if they are not discriminatory. These characterizations of WTO law are arguably simplified and do not address the technicalities of WTO law. This dissertation therefore examined WTO rules on the extraterritorial effect of measures in a technical, nuanced manner by systemically analysing provisions and applications of WTO law. The focus of the analysis is on the understudied area of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures.   The central research question this dissertation answers is: In what ways does WTO law constrain or enable the extraterritorial effect of domestic sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures? The three sub-questions to address this question are: 1) How does the extraterritorial effect of SPS measures impact trade partners in practice?, 2) How is SPS 
law applied and interpreted as a ‘sword’ or ‘shield’ by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)?, and 3) How do international regulatory standards influence the extraterritorial effect of SPS measures? Since the focus of this dissertation is based upon the knowledge gap of the simplified conceptualizations of WTO law on the extraterritorial effect of measures, and hence on a question concerning primarily the internal analysis of law, the methodology applied is legal doctrinal research. Such an approach allowed for a thorough examination of the relevant WTO and domestic rules, as well as how they are applied and interpreted in jurisprudence. The doctrinal analysis was expanded to include research from other disciplines in order to enrich the analysis. The dissertation is based upon four articles, as follows:  
Chapter 2: Reversed harmonization or horizontalization of EU standards?: Does WTO law facilitate or constrain the Brussels Effect? (published in the Wisconsin International Law Journal)  Chapter 2 investigates if the extraterritorial effect can be found in the food sector and what the influence of the WTO is even after dispute settlement rulings. To conduct this 
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research three trade disputes were analysed: genetically modified organisms (GMOs), Hormones and Dolphin-Tuna. The extraterritorial effect was found in all disputes. Although the DSB did rule against the extraterritorial measures, it was observed to have limited impact in action. In the case of GMOs, the DSB ruled in favour of the US, Canada 
and Argentina and declared the EU’s de facto moratorium and member state bans incompliant with WTO rules. However, this had little impact on the EU regulations for 
and market for GMOs. In the Hormones dispute, the EU refused to comply with the DSB’s ruling to accept beef treated with certain hormones, and instead accepted retaliatory tariffs from the US and Canada, which it was well within its rights to do. Lastly, in the Dolphin-Tuna dispute, the US modified its challenged regulations so that they were no longer discriminatory, but they still had an extraterritorial effect on Mexico and other countries that exported tuna to the US. This chapter showed that although the black-letter of the WTO rulings aimed to constrain the extraterritorial effect of measures, it was unable to do so in practice.    
Chapter 3: When life gives you lemons: The “battle of science” on the correct interpretation of data on citrus black spot disease between the European Union and South Africa according to the SPS Agreement (published in Trade, Law and Development)  SPS measures must be based on science; this requirement has been extensively analysed and debated by scholars. Despite this scrutiny many questions remain regarding what kind of scientific evidence is required to justify a measure and how science should be interpreted. In some situations this results in a ‘battle of science’, in which the scientific data are not disputed but differing conclusions are drawn on the level of risk posed and the measures that should be taken. Chapter 3 showed with the example of the dispute on citrus black spot disease between the EU and South Africa that this uncertainty can be used by dominant countries to impose their standards on trading partners. South Africa had to factually adapt to EU regulations, even though it disagreed with them, just to maintain access to its lucrative market. An investigation into existing WTO jurisprudence found only limited interpretation that can provide a benchmark for how the science-based requirement must be construed: SPS measures must establish the probability, not only the possibility, that an identified risk will occur.   
Chapter 4: The potency of the SPS Agreement’s ‘excessivity test’: The impact of Article 5.6 on trade liberalization and the regulatory power of WTO members to take sanitary and phytosanitary measures (published in the Journal of International Economic Law) 
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 Article 5.6 SPS stipulates that SPS measures must not be more trade restrictive than 
required to achieve a Member’s appropriate level of protection (ALOP). A measure may be declared in violation of Article 5.6 if an alternative measure exists that is reasonably 
available, meets the Member’s ALOP and is significantly less restrictive to trade. In Chapter 4 all trade disputes that invoked the provision were systematically analyzed using qualitative analysis software (Atlas.ti). Article 5.6 was found to be a powerful tool in challenging SPS measures for being excessively trade restrictive, and its importance has increased over time. It was additionally observed that alternative measures based on international standards were most likely to demonstrate a violation of the provision.   
Chapter 5: The role of international organizations in the harmonization of phytosanitary standards for vegetable seeds (under review)  Most countries around the world have adopted phytosanitary regulations for (imported) vegetable seeds in order to control the pests and diseases that may be potentially introduced through trade. Standards diverge widely and pose a challenge for exporters that need to meet varying import requirements. Additionally, many of these domestic phytosanitary measures are not based on science. Although it is not technically or politically feasible to fully harmonize phytosanitary standards for vegetable seeds, the logic used to develop them should be further standardized. This chapter examined relevant international organizations and their harmonization schemes to understand what, if any, role they may serve in reducing barriers to trade in this sector. It was found that certain science-based guidelines do have the potential to aid in challenging unjustified phytosanitary measures, although the feasibility in doing so is still unknown.   This dissertation concludes with answers to the research questions and a synthesis of the entire dissertation. Limitations and policy implications are also addressed. It was observed that the extraterritorial effect does occur in the SPS sector, and its scope is broader than originally thought, i.e. both developed and developing countries enact measures with an extraterritorial effect. This research found that WTO laws both constrain and facilitate the extraterritorial effect of measures. The uncertainty 
surrounding the science requirement is used as the main ‘shield’ for extraterritorial 
measures and international standards are the main ‘sword’ for challenging such measures. It is recommended that further science-based international standards, guidelines and recommendations be developed as they were found to be a powerful tool in challenging measures with an extraterritorial effect. The WTO should regulate the 
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organizations that set these standards to ensure that they are impartial. Additionally, it concludes that the WTO should develop a normative standard for science in the SPS Agreement in order to limit the use of extraterritorial measures shielded as a scientific necessity.    
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